



AD A059770

DDC FILE COPY

6 A DYNAMIC ANALYSIS OF THE MEDIUM
TANK BATTALION CONDUCTING HASTY
OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS.

10 ~~MAJ~~ Gerald P. Schurtz, USA
LTC Frederick J. McConville, USA
MAJ Henry J. Lowe, USA
MAJ James J. Steele, USA

JUNE 1978

DDC

OCT 11 1978

F

11
1343p.
9 Final rept.,

The views contained herein are those of the author, and publication of this research by the Center for Advanced Research, Naval War College, does not constitute endorsement thereof by the Naval War College, the Department of the Navy, or any other branch of the U.S. Government.

Further reproduction of this paper by agencies of the U.S. Government must be approved by the President, Naval War College. Reproduction by nongovernment agencies or individuals without the written consent of the President, Naval War College, is prohibited. The content, however, is open to citation and other reference in accordance with accepted research practices.

This document has been approved
for public release and sale; its
distribution is unlimited.

78 10 03 021

410 268

DISCLAIMER NOTICE

**THIS DOCUMENT IS BEST QUALITY
PRACTICABLE. THE COPY FURNISHED
TO DDC CONTAINED A SIGNIFICANT
NUMBER OF PAGES WHICH DO NOT
REPRODUCE LEGIBLY.**

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
1. REPORT NUMBER	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO.	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Subtitle) A Dynamic Analysis of the Medium Tank Battalion Conducting Hasty Offensive Operations.		5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED Final
		6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
7. AUTHOR(s) Schurtz, Gerald P., LTCOL, USA; McConville, Frederick J., LTCOL, USA; Lowe, Henry J., MAJ, USA, and Steele, James J., MAJ, USA		8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s)
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS Center for Advanced Research Naval War College Newport, Rhode Island 02840		10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS Center for Advanced Research Naval War College Newport, Rhode Island 02840		12. REPORT DATE June 1978
		13. NUMBER OF PAGES 321
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS (if different from Controlling Office)		15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report) Unclassified
		15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report) Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.		
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)		
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES NOTE: Best available copy.		
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) TANKS; BATTALION LEVEL ORGANIZATIONS; COMPANY LEVEL ORGANIZATIONS; FIELD ARMY; TACTICAL WARFARE; ARMY; ARMOR; ARTILLERY FIRE; USSR; TERRAIN; TASK FORCE; ENEMY AND WARFARE; WEATHER; SMOKE MUNITION; CAMOUFLAGE		
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) An analysis of alternate offensive tactics was conducted using the computer- assisted manual war game BATTLE (Battalion Analyzer and Tactical Trainer for Local Engagements). The purpose of the study was to determine which of two sets of tactical procedures is better for the conduct of a hasty attack against a reinforced Soviet motorized rifle battalion defending dominant terrain. Varia- tions in attack formations, composition and size of the overwatch force, characteristics of avenues of approach, the use of scouts, and the employment of smoke munition under varying weather conditions were examined. The scope of the		

DD FORM 1 JAN 73 1473

EDITION OF 1 NOV 65 IS OBSOLETE
S/N 0102-LF-014-6601

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)

study was bounded by specific conditions regarding terrain, visibility, weather, enemy dispositions, and friendly force organizations. Two U.S. tank battalion organizations, each with 54 tanks, an organic TOW company, a mechanized infantry company and supported by indirect fire units, conducted the attacks. Close air support and attack helicopters were excluded. Tactics which create a partial or complete envelope of smoke around the attacking force concentrated on a mass formation consistently achieved the objective at least cost in terms of U.S. weapons systems destroyed. Areas for further research are identified.

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The U.S. Army has made impressive changes in tactical doctrine in recent years, particularly regarding our ability to capitalize on the inherent advantages of the defender in order to fight and win the first battle. Implicitly, we must be able to conduct attacks on short notice which generate the essential local superiority of force to exploit defensive successes or reverse enemy pressure in salients.

The purpose of this Study was to analyze current U.S. tactical offensive doctrine as it pertains to an arm r heavy battalion in a hasty attack. Specifically, does the presence of long range, accurate, and lethal direct fire weaponry, even at the rifle squad level, alter the manner in which that attack must be conducted? The thrust which evolved concentrated on determining answers to these questions:

a. Will current tactical procedures permit the tank battalion to successfully conduct a hasty attack as a part of a larger force against a battalion sized element in defensive positions?

b. Will certain alterations to these procedures enhance the ability of the battalion to accomplish a hasty attack?

A tank battalion with 54 M60A1 tanks, an organic anti-tank (AT) company (12 TOW), an attached mechanized infantry company, and organic mortar and supporting artillery fires was required to conduct a hasty attack in a non-toxic conventional environment. A Soviet motorized rifle battalion

(MRB) reinforced by a tank company defended on a 5 kilometer front employing 3 defensive belts. Effectiveness of the attack was measured by the battalion's ability to rupture this defense and seize key terrain to facilitate future operations. Operational cost was measured in terms of tanks, TOWs, APCs, DRAGONS, and LAWS lost during the battle.

The attack was conducted in 3 scenarios on terrain typical of Central Europe. BATTLE, a computer-assisted manual war game, was employed to simulate the environment, and evaluate, record, and process engagement results.

The Study Group developed two alternative sets of tactics to conduct the analysis. Option I followed closely the procedures articulated in FM 71-1 and 71-2, characterized by an axis of advance employing clever use of terrain, a substantial requirement for overwatch, and responsive indirect fire and smoke on enemy positions. Option II used a direction of attack allowing direct and rapid movement to close with the enemy in the objective area, the selective and more limited use of an overwatch force, and employed smoke envelopes around the attacking battalion to prevent the enemy from massing long range fires on the assault element.

Key factors around which the scenarios were developed included:

- a. Terrain - Variations of broken, wooded and open terrain were employed.

b. Enemy Forces - The composition and disposition of the Soviet MRB were varied.

c. U.S. Task organization - Two combinations, 4-3-4 and 5-3-3 (# tanks in a platoon, # platoons in a company and # of companies in a battalion) were employed. 4-3-4 was selected in a prior Study by the authors as the preferred organization for the tank battalion.

Weather conditions, expressed as visibility, wind and trafficability were held constant in order to bound the analysis. Future testing should include variation of these factors.

Evaluation of the 6 battles revealed each option achieved the designated measure of effectiveness as shown:

	Scenario		
	1	2	3
Option I	No	No	Yes
Option II	Yes	Yes	Yes

In each case, Option II's operational losses (costs) were less than Option I's. Significantly, tank and TOW losses were lower in Option II while mechanized infantry and scout losses were higher - a reflection of the manner in which Option II tactics altered the battle. Option II's smoke envelope allows a massed formation to avoid attrition from long range enemy fires while enroute to the objective area and therefore maximize its firepower and shock effect. Further, the attack can achieve favorable force ratios at a decisive point because

iii

SECTION for	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> White Section	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<input type="checkbox"/> Buff Section		
ANNOUNCED			
NOTIFICATION			
DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY CODES			
ST.	AL.	PL.	SPECIAL
			A 23

the smoke envelope isolates the battlefield for the attacker. Because the attack does not depend on covered approaches, the speed of the assault can be increased; however, the scheme of maneuver and fire support plan (especially smoke) requires extensive coordination.

The Study recommends further analysis be conducted, including field testing, to validate the use of smoke envelopes. Further, it recommends an increase of smoke munitions in artillery and mortar basic loads and intensive research and development efforts to develop smoke which will counter thermal sights.

ABSTRACT FOR
A DYNAMIC ANALYSIS OF THE MEDIUM TANK BATTALION
CONDUCTING HASTY OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

An analysis of alternative offensive tactics was conducted using the computer-assisted manual war game BATTLE (Battalion Analyzer and Tactical Trainer for Local Engagements). The purpose of the Study was to determine which of two sets of tactical procedures is better for the conduct of a hasty attack against a reinforced Soviet Motorized Rifle Battalion defending dominant terrain. Variations in attack formations, composition and size of the overwatch force, characteristics of avenues of approach, the use of scouts, and the employment of smoke munitions under varying weather conditions were examined.

The scope of the Study was bounded by specific conditions regarding terrain, visibility, weather, enemy dispositions, and friendly force organizations. Two U.S. tank battalion organizations, each with 54 tanks, an organic TOW company, a mechanized infantry company and supported by indirect fire units, conducted the attacks. Close air support and attack helicopters were excluded. Tactics which create a partial or complete envelope of smoke around the attacking force concentrated on a mass formation consistently achieved the objective at least cost in terms of U.S. weapons systems destroyed. Areas for further research are identified.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The authors of this research project wish to acknowledge the assistance we have received from the staff and faculty of the Naval War College and its Center for Advanced Research. We especially appreciated the supporting attitude for non-naval research displayed by the President, Vice Admiral James B. Stockdale, and the Center's Director, Professor Hugh Nott.

Our faculty advisors, Colonel Gilbert R. Green, USA and Lieutenant Colonel (P) Harry D. Walker, USA, provided excellent technical assistance. Likewise, the Senior Army Advisor, Colonel Warren A. Spaulding gave us his most welcome support.

Pete Shugart, Terry Peterson, and Al Kellner, at TRADOC Systems Analysis Activity, White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico, went to great lengths to teach us the inner workings of BATTLE, from which we were able to establish realistic game rules and procedures to improve the simulation.

Finally, special thanks go to the members of the Naval War College staff without whose help this project would have foundered: Mel Lieberman, the Administrative Officer, Tony Sarro and his Graphic Arts staff for their excellent work, Joe Domingoes, Center for War Gaming, whose assistance was invaluable when we were constructing terrain boards, Cathy Card, Computer Center of the Center for War Gaming, for

accurate and expeditious key punch support, and Carole Sanchez, whose superb efforts transformed our hieroglyphics into a finished product.

However, we recognize and accept our responsibility for any factual or technical error and that the views expressed herein are those of the authors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	PAGES
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	i-iv
ABSTRACT	v
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	vi-vii
I DECISION SITUATION	1-2
II THE SYSTEM	2
III THE SYSTEM OBJECTIVE	3
IV ALTERNATIVES	3-11
V HIGHER SYSTEM	11-12
VI KEY FACTORS	12-20
VII MEASURE OF EFFECTIVENESS	20
VIII MEASURE OF COST	20
IX CRITERIA	20
X METHODOLOGY	20-22
XI BATTLE RESULTS	22
XII EVALUATION	23-28
XIII INTERPRETATION	28-50
XIV CONCLUSIONS	50-51
XV RECOMMENDATION	52
ANNEXES	
A Methodology	A-1
B Assumptions	B-1
C Tactical Setting	C-1
D Soviet Defensive Dispositions	D-1
E Biographical Sketches	E-1
F Scenario #1	F-1
G Scenario #2	G-1
H Scenario #3	H-1
I Interpretation	I-1

I. DECISION SITUATION

In recent years the U.S. Army has made impressive changes in its tactical doctrine, particularly as it relates to our defensive role as a NATO partner. Given the overwhelming Soviet threat, the emphasis has clearly been to refine our tactics so that we can fight and win the first battle. Recognizing that successful defensive operations, like the shield, are paramount to survival at the outset, the key to ultimate success lies in our ability to effectively wield the sword - the offensive.

The purpose of this Study is to analyze the current U.S. Army tactical doctrine as it relates to armored forces conducting hasty offensive operations. A previous study conducted by this Group addressed the question of optimizing the organization of a Medium Tank Battalion based on analysis of defensive operations in the Central European theater.¹ It was clear during the course of that work that the increased range, lethality, and numbers of enemy and friendly weapon systems on the modern battlefield would impact even more dramatically on the conduct of offensive operations. It became obvious that it is simply no longer possible to move armored forces across open areas even for short periods of

¹A Dynamic Analysis of the Medium Tank Battalion (Newport, RI: Center for Advanced Research, Naval War College, 1978).

time without exposing them to accurate, lethal, long range fires. The entire concept of achieving force ratio superiority as a basis for determining where, when and with what size force to attack is clouded by the enemy's ability, even at the rifle squad level, to deliver accurate fire out to 3,000 meters.

Hence, this Study alters the thrust of the previous work and analyzes the ability of the U.S. Army tank battalion to conduct a hasty attack against a Soviet Motorized Rifle Battalion (MRB). (A discussion of the organization and disposition of the enemy force and the rationale for its selection is found in paragraph VI, KEY FACTORS on page 14.) We sought to answer these questions:

a. Will current tactical procedures permit the tank battalion to successfully conduct a hasty attack as a part of a larger force against a battalion-sized element in defensive positions?

b. Will certain alterations to tactical procedures enhance the ability of the tank battalion to accomplish a hasty attack?

Study results and recommendations will be presented to the Commanding General, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command for consideration and possible further testing.

II. SYSTEM UNDER ANALYSIS

U.S. Medium Tank Battalion conducting a hasty attack in a Central European environment.

III. SYSTEM OBJECTIVE

Seize a key terrain objective in order to facilitate future operations.

IV. ALTERNATIVES

The Study Group developed two options (I and II) to the solution of the tactical problem posed by the mission, enemy, troops and terrain. Each option seeks to seize key terrain by isolating elements of the defending force and concentrating superior combat power at a decisive point on the battlefield.

Option I consisted of the basic tactics that are presented in the new family of "How to Fight" manuals and particularly FM 71-1 and 71-2. Option II includes a composite of lessons learned using the BATTLE model as well as the professional experiences of the analysts. A detailed discussion of the model is found in paragraph X, METHODOLOGY, on page 21 and ANNEX A (METHODOLOGY).

A. Option I

Current offensive doctrine allows the commander a great deal of flexibility in selecting the manner in which he will conduct a hasty attack. FM 71-1 and 71-2 encourage innovation and make it difficult to categorize a set of tactics as "conventional." However, the Study Group identified a set of basic principles used throughout the Study that typify the current doctrine.

1. Combat Formations: Although current tactical doctrine provides considerable latitude in how forces should

be deployed in the attack, the two primary considerations for the commander revolve around the enemy and the terrain. Tanks are dispersed in the assault to take advantage of folds in the ground and to avoid enemy killing zones. Infantry tend to be employed on wooded and broken approaches. The use of more than one avenue of approach to the objective is typical.

2. Overwatch: Overwatch has become a basic principle of any tactical movement of combat elements from squad to battalion. The concept has been refined so that, depending on the situation, the moving force will use a variation of overwatch and bounding overwatch techniques. A tank battalion in the attack might typically devote a company of tanks to act as the overwatching or base of fire element. This force is ideally located in hull down positions with good observation and fields of fire so that a threat to the maneuver force can be destroyed or suppressed.

3. Avenues of Approach: Current doctrine stresses the clever use of terrain and vegetation to limit the enemy's capability to bring lethal, long-range fires on the attacking force. Under Option I avenues of approach typically included folds and defiles to cover the movement of armored forces and wooded or broken avenues for infantry. Smoke was employed to augment the friendly scheme of maneuver by screening known or suspected enemy locations.

4. Artillery:

a. Under Options I and II the composition of

the supporting artillery forces remained constant and was organized to provide responsive support from all calibers available. Organic mortars along with direct support and reinforcing artillery units provided rapid fire support to the attacking battalion while other artillery units were available to lend depth to the battle and provide additional support as required. The organization for combat is in paragraph VI, KEY FACTORS/ASSUMPTIONS, p. 19.

b. Although counter battery fires were not played in the games, a short, intensive preparation was fired as a part of both options in recognition of the Soviet counter-battery capabilities. A counter preparation was not fired. Under Option I all fire units were used to fire a preparation and certain suspected enemy locations were covered by smoke to limit the enemy's observation of the attacking force. Organic mortars, direct support and reinforcing artillery were used to engage high priority targets of opportunity with smoke, ICM or HE munitions. General support units engaged lower priority targets of opportunity, provided on-call pre-planned fires, and supported the final assault and consolidation. In general terms, artillery-delivered smoke was oriented on suspected and known enemy locations although it was also employed to screen the exposed flank of some units of the attacking force. It was used to cover the extraction of attacking elements in certain cases. Artillery units did not displace while supporting the attack; however, some fire

units might have remained silent during a preparation to avoid detection.


5. Scouts: The role of the scout platoon in a hasty attack using current doctrine was to screen the battalion's flank and provide early warning of a possible counter-attack. The scouts might have coordinated the passage of lines if the attacking force was moving through a friendly defending force.

B. Option II

The Study Group compiled a set of different tactical principles based upon the experience of the analysts and a set of experimental iterations using the BATTLE model. As with Option I, these tactics are relatively flexible and are most effective when employed in an innovative way. However, they represent a substantial change to current doctrine in several areas.

1. Combat Formations: The maneuver force advanced in a massed formation allowing movement along a direction of attack within a smoke envelope which screened enemy observation and effective direct and indirect fire. It focused the battalion's firepower at the breakthrough point. A typical mass formation under this option contained most of the battalion's combat systems deployed across a narrow (approximately 600 meter) front. (Illustration 1 depicts an example of such a formation, and variations are displayed in ANNEX I (INTERPRETATION).) It should be noted that an overwatch force consisting

ILLUSTRATION I MASS FORMATION



- H TANK
- O PERSONNEL CARRIER
- O TOW CARRIER
- ⊙ INFANTRY COMPANY COMMANDER
- ⊙ TANK COMPANY COMMANDER
- ⊙ BATTALION COMMANDER


of two anti-tank (AT) platoons was positioned elsewhere but is not shown. The Scout Platoon was employed to the front and flanks of the massed formation to provide early warning and emplace smoke pots where artillery and mortar-delivered smoke was not adequate.

2. Overwatch: Like Option I, this option used the concept of overwatch, but on a more selective basis. An overwatch element was located outside the smoke envelope so that it could observe and, when necessary, bring direct and indirect fire on the enemy should an attempt be made to redeploy forces to counter the friendly maneuver force. TOWs were used most frequently for this purpose; however, a small number of tanks, perhaps a platoon, was used at times to augment the TOWs thereby increasing the rate and overall volume of fire. If the terrain was suitable, a small overwatch force was located within the smoke envelope to suppress enemy fire while the maneuver force closed. The difference between the two options was the amount and type of resources devoted to the overwatch mission.

3. Avenues of Approach: The most radical difference between the options was the scheme of maneuver. Under this option the choice of an avenue of approach was more dependent on effective smoke conditions than upon terrain. Throughout the Study, the use of a smoke envelope was the primary means used to limit the enemy's ability to deliver effective direct and indirect fire. Illustration II shows

ILLUSTRATION II

SMOKE ENVELOPE



a typical smoke envelope. Variations of the approach are found in ANNEX I (INTERPRETATION). The avenue chosen must allow the maneuver force to move rapidly and directly to the objective. The specific route for the assault element might well be chosen based on wind direction rather than terrain.

4. Artillery:

a. The artillery organization for combat was unchanged from Option I. Under this option smoke was employed primarily along the flank(s) and to the front of the attacking force to conceal its movement to the objective.

b. A short, intensive preparation was directed against suspected enemy locations with an initial volley of ICM intended to kill exposed defending personnel and soft materiel targets. Subsequent volleys of HE were directed against dug-in personnel and materiel. The preparation included initial firings of smoke munitions to build a smoke envelope for the attacking force but some smoke was also employed against certain suspected enemy locations. Close coordination was required between the maneuver force and supporting artillery to maintain and move the smoke envelope in a timely and accurate maneuver. Rapid delivery of accurate fire by supporting units was critical. Significant amounts of smoke munitions were required and either the use of landmarks recognizable within the friendly smoke screen or a time schedule was employed to coordinate the

delivery of fires. An observer to a flank might also be used to assist in that coordination.

c. Organic mortars and direct support artillery were employed to establish and maintain the smoke envelope. They also engaged high priority targets of opportunity while other supporting artillery units attacked other targets enroute to and in the vicinity of the objective. As with Option I, mortar and artillery units were not displaced during the attack.

5. Scouts: The scouts were used to screen a flank as in the conventional approach. However, they had the additional mission of moving to the front and flank of the attacking maneuver force and laying smoke pots or otherwise generating smoke to cover any gaps in the artillery or mortar-delivered screen. Because they are equipped with TOWs, they might also have been used as part of an overwatch force.

V. HIGHER SYSTEM

A. Description: U.S. Army Brigade organic to the Heavy Division.

B. Objective: To achieve a penetration in an assigned sector; disrupt, defeat and/or destroy enemy forces, seize specific terrain objective(s).

C. Relationship of System Under Analysis to Higher System:

1. System under analysis receives orders from and carries out missions assigned by higher system.

2. System under analysis reports progress, status, and requirements to higher system.

VI. KEY FACTORS/ASSUMPTIONS

A. Constants

1. Weather conditions and their corresponding effect on visibility, wind and trafficability were held constant throughout the Study.

2. Visibility was established at 2,200 meters; that figure represented the average daylight visibility experienced in the Hunfeld area (see Para VII B-1) and would probably best characterize the conditions under which a hasty attack might have to be planned, mounted, and conducted. In a tactical maneuver which sought to capitalize on the opportunities of the moment it seemed unlikely that a commander would wait for a change in conditions. He would do the best he could with whatever was present at the time. It was the consensus of the Group that a low visibility (1,000 meters) would clearly favor the attacker given the limitations such conditions impose on Anti-tank Guided Missiles (ATGM) systems. On the other hand, in the experience of the analysts it was unlikely that more ideal conditions (3,000 meters) would be present. Even if such a high visibility had been played, the nature of the terrain in all scenarios would have allowed the attacking force to close to within 2,200 meters of the defender's reconnaissance elements before any possibility of observation existed.

3. The rate of movement used throughout all scenarios reflected normal ground conditions and overall trafficability for Central Europe. Aside from being typical, this type of condition did not appear to favor either option. Although wind speed and direction remained the same, the requirement to attack on varying axes of advance provided a change in the relative effects of wind on the battle.

B. The primary variables that bound the analysis are terrain, threat disposition, and U.S. task organization. These factors were varied in the development of three scenarios which permitted testing of Option I and II under a variety of conditions. Both options were tested once under each scenario for a total of six iterations. An overview:

<u>SCENARIO</u>	<u>TERRAIN</u>	<u>THREAT DISPOSITION</u>	<u>*U.S. TASK ORGAN</u>
1	Open/broken	MRB covering 2 major avenues of approach. Regimental reconnaissance assets available.	4-3-4
2	Wooded	MRB covering 2 major avenues of approach. Regimental reconnaissance assets available.	4-3-4
3	Open	MRB covering one major avenue of approach. No regimental reconnaissance assets available.	5-3-3

* U.S. Task Organization included two battalion organizations, 4-3-4 and 5-3-3 (tanks per platoon - platoons per company -

companies in the battalion). A more detailed discussion is found on page 19 under "U.S. Task Organization."

1. Terrain. The general area under study is near the town of Hunfeld, Germany (NA 5414). See Illustration III (Map). In Scenarios 1 and 2 the objective was a wooded area which constricted movement of the attacker during the final assault. Approaches to the objective were generally open with some small patches of scattered woods. The avenues chosen permitted rapid movement. In Scenario 3 the objective and its approaches were open and allowed rapid and direct movement to the objective area.

2. Threat

a. Rationale. Soviet defensive doctrine indicates that the backbone of the defense is the motorized rifle battalion (MRB) defending dominant terrain. The MRB normally is reinforced by a company of tanks to supplement its anti-armor capability and provide a small battalion reserve force. The Group chose the MRB (reinforced) as the defending force in this Study since it represents the organization most likely to be encountered by a U.S. tank battalion conducting hasty offensive operations.

b. General. The Commander of the Soviet motorized rifle battalion organized his defense in light of his mission, the forces available, the terrain, intelligence about the enemy, and certain defensive principles.




ILLUSTRATION III

(MAP)

c. The threat force was assigned the mission of defending a dominant piece of terrain with a frontage of about 5,000 meters in all scenarios.

d. Forces Available. The threat force for all scenarios consisted of a Soviet motorized rifle battalion (MRB) with certain reinforcements (See ANNEX D [SOVIET DEFENSE DISPOSITION]).

In addition to his normal organization the Soviet commander was reinforced with a tank company (13 T-62s) and, in Scenarios 1 and 2, elements of the regimental reconnaissance company (3 BRDMs and 1 PT 76). Soviet indirect fire assets included:

(1) Immediately available

(a) A 120mm mortar battery organic to the MRB (6 weapons)

(b) A 122mm battery from the Regimental Artillery Group (RAG) - 6 weapons

(c) A 152mm battery from the RAG - 6 weapons

(2) Other units in support

(a) Two 122mm batteries from the RAG - 12 weapons

(b) Two 152mm batteries from the RAG - 12 weapons

(c) A 122mm battalion from the Division Artillery Group (DAG) - 18 weapons

(d) Two 152mm battalions from the DAG -
36 weapons

(e) Two 130mm battalions from the DAG -
18 weapons

(f) A 122mm MRL battalion from the DAG -
24 launchers

A more detailed treatment of indirect fire assets is found
in ANNEX D (SOVIET DEFENSIVE DISPOSITIONS).

Other assets such as Air Defense units, etc.,
were also reinforcing but are not mentioned since they did
not affect the results of the game (See ANNEX B [ASSUMPTIONS]).
The battalion and all reinforcing units were at 100 percent
strength.

e. Terrain Considerations

(1) In Scenarios 1 and 2 the disposition
of forces was almost identical. The terrain allowed lateral
movement of Soviet forces in response to a threat along either
of two avenues leading to the defensive position. An excel-
lent road and trail network concealed within wooded areas
permitted rapid redeployment within the second and third
defensive belts. Wooded areas permitted the employment of
Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG) teams from concealed positions.

(2) In Scenario 3 the Soviet force
deployed in a classic three belt defense astride the major
avenue of approach leading to the position. However, the
open terrain throughout the area did not provide concealed

or covered routes for the redeployment of defending forces. Similarly, the open terrain leading to and in the objective area detracted from the effectiveness of RPG teams.

f. The Enemy: The Soviet commander considered an attack by a U.S. Medium Tank Battalion to be most likely.

g. Defensive Principles: The Soviet commander organized his defense guided by the following principles:

- (1) Anti-armor weapons were the keystone.
- (2) Company strong points were established which would provide mutual support.
- (3) The defensive forces were employed to create three defensive belts.
- (4) Combat power was concentrated in his first echelon forces occupying the first two belts.
- (5) A small reserve was maintained.
- (6) Enemy forces were engaged at the range which would maximize the amount of firepower that could be brought to bear upon them at the time.
- (7) Tank-killing zones were created.
- (8) Digging-in of positions was started immediately.
- (9) The defense utilized fires at longer ranges to break up enemy formations and disrupt his attack

while intensive fires were employed to defeat and destroy him forward of the main defense belt.

A more detailed discussion of the Soviet defensive disposition is found in ANNEX D (SOVIET DEFENSIVE DISPOSITIONS).

3. U.S. Task Organization

a. Two different U.S. tank battalion organizations were employed in an effort to vary the conditions under which the tactical concepts were tested. In Scenarios 1 and 2 the battalion was organized in a 4-3-4 configuration (4 tanks per platoon, 3 platoons per company, 4 companies in the battalion). In Scenario 3, the battalion was organized in the current 5-3-3 mode (5 tanks per platoon, 3 platoons per company, and 3 companies in the battalion).

b. The current organization was used for obvious reasons. The 4-3-4 battalion was chosen because, as a result of the Group's previous work, it was considered to be the best alternative to the present organization in the defense. It had the secondary advantage of containing exactly the same type and number of major combat systems which aided in analytic comparisons. In all Scenarios, the U.S. force also contained an organic AT Company (12 TOW M113Als), an organic scout platoon (7 M113Als-3 with TOWs and 3 with DRAGONS) and an attached mechanized infantry company. Indirect fire assets included:

(1) 81mm mortars organic to the Infantry Company (3 weapons).

(2) 4.2" mortar platoon organic to the battalion (6 weapons).

(3) A 155mm battalion in Direct Support (32 M109A1).

(4) An 8" battalion reinforcing the DS battalion (12 M110).

(5) A 155mm battalion in General Support or General Support - Reinforcing (32 M109A1).

(6) An 8" battalion in General Support (12 M110).

A detailed discussion of the friendly situation is located in ANNEX C (TACTICAL SETTING).

VII. MEASURE OF EFFECTIVENESS (MOE)

Penetration of the second echelon positions (third defense belt) of the MRB and occupation of the terrain objective. Depending on the terrain these were located 1500-3000 meters behind the leading edge of the 1st echelon company positions.

VIII. MEASURE OF COST (MOC)

U.S. combat power destroyed expressed as numbers of tanks, TOWs, APCs, DRAGON and LAW teams killed.

IX. CRITERION. Minimize cost (MOC) for a fixed level of effectiveness (MOE).

X. METHODOLOGY

A. To conduct the six iterations that constitute the tests of the alternatives, the Study Group used the Battalion Analyzer and Tactical Trainer for Local Engagements

(BATTLE Model) developed by Training and Doctrine Command's Systems Analysis Agency (TRASANA), to simulate the battles. BATTLE, a computer assisted, manual war game, has four components: (1) scale model terrain boards of a specific geographic area, (2) a set of miniature weapons systems, (3) a minicomputer, and (4) a software package.

1. The Study Group modelled 80 square kilometers of terrain Northeast of Hunfeld, Germany (NA 5414). The terrain boards depicted in three dimensions all natural and man-made topographic features of the area. The boards have a horizontal scale of one inch equal to 50 meters and a vertical scale of one inch equal to 40 meters (a 25% vertical distortion). Accurate terrain models and miniature weapons systems were critical to the determination of intervisibility.

2. BATTLE's computer performs four basic functions - game initialization, data management, action processing of engagements, and post processing. The latter function provides a detailed compilation of the friendly and enemy systems destroyed and ammunition expended. These results formed the data base for analysis of the options.

B. As an analytical tool, BATTLE is at its best when the opposing force players are highly experienced with the organizations, equipment, and tactics being studied. Because the players' judgment enters into the game continuously, BATTLE inherently possesses enough flexibility

to allow broadly experienced individuals to make the conflict on the terrain boards approach the reality of war. Consequently, player experience is an essential ingredient in the utility of BATTLE. (See ANNEX E [BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES])

C. Initial deployment was the same for both options in each Scenario. A hasty attack order was issued to the U.S. commander, after which he conducted a map reconnaissance to plan his scheme of maneuver and prepare a fire support plan. Concurrently, the Soviet commander was given six hours to prepare his defenses.

D. Upon initiation of the artillery preparation both players were committed to their initial deployment and/or axes of advance until some event provided them with intelligence upon which to alter their plans.

XI. BATTLE RESULTS

Aside from practice games run to train the players, the Study Group conducted eight iterations. The Study played the first two iterations to develop the Option II tactics. The final six iterations form the core of the comparative analysis of Option I and Option II tactics. Annexes F, G, and H contain brief narratives of each of the final six iterations, overprinted maps of force dispositions, time sequenced pictures of the terrain boards during the battles, statistical analyses of the battles, and a compilation of historical data for each attack.

XII. EVALUATION

A. Effectiveness Model: The system objective (seize terrain) does not yield an output measure that is easily translated into quantifiable terms. In many respects, measures of effectiveness are terrain and scenario dependent. Soviet defensive principles and dispositions make it unlikely that the defending commander would concede the battle unless a major portion of his force was destroyed or dominant terrain was seized by the attacking force. FM 71-2, "The Tank and Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force," characterizes a proper objective for a U.S. battalion conducting a penetration. The objective would typically lie in the area of the motorized rifle battalion's second echelon company, about 1500-3000 meters to the rear of the enemy's front line companies. Considering the terrain and Soviet defensive dispositions a key terrain feature consistent with these guidelines was designated for each scenario. In each case it was clear to all members of the Study Group that achievement of that MOE would clearly rupture the Soviet commander's defense. Furthermore it was clear that the Soviet commander would identify that terrain as key to the accomplishment of his mission and would organize his position accordingly.

B. Measure of Cost: U.S. systems (Tanks, TOWs, APCs, DRAGONS, LAWs) destroyed.

C. Criterion: Minimize cost (MOC) for a fixed level of effectiveness (MOE).

D. Summary of Battle Results (See ANNEXES F, G and H)

	Effectiveness	Costs ²	% of Initial U.S. Force ¹ Lost
Scenario 1			
OPTION I	Failed to penetrate	41 M60A1	76%
	Soviet first belt.	3 TOW	20%
	<u>Failed to achieve</u>		
	<u>MOE</u>	7 APC	39%
		2 DRAGON	13%
		5 LAW	14%
OPTION II	Penetrated Soviet	27 M60A1	50%
	2d echelon force and	2 TOW	13%
	occupied terrain	12 APC	67%
	objective. <u>Achieved</u>	3 DRAGON	20%
	<u>MOE.</u>	6 LAW	16%
Scenario 2			
OPTION I	Failed to penetrate	40 M60A1	74%
	Soviet first belt.	8 TOW	53%
	<u>Failed to achieve</u>	4 APC	22%
	<u>MOE.</u>	1 DRAGON	7%
		8 LAW	22%
OPTION II	Penetrated Soviet 2d	34 M60A1	63%
	echelon force and	6 TOW	40%
	occupied terrain	11 APC	61%
	objective. <u>Achieved</u>	7 DRAGON	47%
	<u>MOE.</u>	15 LAW	41%
Scenario 3			
OPTION I	Penetrated Soviet 2d	29 M60A1	54%
	echelon force and	2 TOW	13%
	occupied terrain	5 APC	28%
	objective. <u>Achieved</u>	1 DRAGON	7%
	<u>MOE; however, sub-</u> stantial elements of Soviet force in posi- tion for a counter- attack.		

OPTION II	Penetrated Soviet 2d echelon force and occupied terrain objective. <u>Achieved</u> MOE.	7 M60A1 3 TOW 4 APC 2 DRAGON 4 LAW	13% 20% 22% 13% 11%
-----------	---	--	---------------------------------

Notes: 1. Initial U.S. Force

54 M60A1
15 TOW
18 M113
15 DRAGON
37 LAW

2. All DRAGON's and LAW's were killed on board vehicles (APC).

E. Alternative Selected:

- (1) Scenario 1: Option II
- (2) Scenario 2: Option II
- (3) Scenario 3: Option II

F. Sensitivity/Contingency Analysis

1. Experimental Error: Assuming the results of Option I tactics are accurate and that error exists only in Option II iterations, a comparison of losses (costs) will approximate the degree of experimental error which must be present before we are indifferent between options. For example, in Scenario 3 during which both options achieved the MOE, a 414% error in tank losses (29:7) would be required for us to be indifferent. Since a detailed methodology and set of game rules were applied uniformly and consistently in all iterations, this degree of error is highly unlikely. While the same comparison is not meaningful for Scenarios 1 and 2 because Option I did not achieve the MOE, examination

of the data at the end points of the battles tends to exhibit the same bias in favor of Option II.

2. Organization differences: Using Option I tactics 5-3-3 did achieve the established MOE in Scenario 3 while, using the same tactics, 4-3-4 failed to achieve the established MOE in Scenarios 1 and 2. However, the significant differences of such key factors as terrain and enemy disposition between scenarios caused the Study Group to discard any organizational comparisons. The terrain in Scenario 3 was more conducive to an armor attack and the enemy disposition allowed the flank of the defensive position to be more easily turned. The iterations conducted did demonstrate that Option II's tactics were less costly than Option I's, regardless of organization. However, altering the U.S. organization to a Mechanized Infantry Battalion may disclose interesting differences between tank heavy and infantry heavy units using Options I and II.

3. Terrain: In the interest of time and to concentrate on the geographical area of greatest current interest, the Study necessarily considered terrain characteristic of Central Europe. The favorable results from Option II's tactics must be examined further on different types of terrain in order to conclusively demonstrate superiority.

4. Weather: The bounds placed on weather, reflected in constant visibility, wind conditions, and trafficability (rate of movement), reflect the Group's conviction that any

attack may be dramatically affected by weather. Since these factors may vary significantly for different climates and types of terrain, further analysis is warranted.

a. Visibility: Our new field manuals repeatedly state, "What can be seen can be hit." Option II with its detailed employment of smoke envelopes evolved as a result of that fact. As stated earlier, 2200 meters was chosen as an average visibility for the area. Additional iterations are necessary and visibility should be altered in order to better determine the effect on Option II tactics. Differences in exposure time to massed artillery and/or concentrated tactical air support as well as changes in requirements for smoke munitions should be examined as a minimum.

b. Trafficability: Wet, soft ground will slow the movement of the assault force thus increasing its vulnerability under both options. However, it may also restrict movement to ridge lines and woods and deny low, covered approaches envisioned for Option I. Thus, the need for Option II tactics may increase, particularly the principle of smoking one's own forces.

5. Threat Organization: The value of Option II was tested against a hasty defense. A deliberate attack against a prepared defense anchored on terrain obstacles or significant minefields might yield different results. Again, further testing is indicated.

6. All of the variables discussed above - U.S. task organizations, terrain, weather, and composition and disposition of the Soviets - offer fertile ground for continued research.

XIII. INTERPRETATION

A. Other Quantifiable Factors

1. U.S. Leadership Lost. The ability of the attacker to seize and effectively consolidate the objective is largely a function of the leadership that survives. With this premise in mind, the Group completed a statistical summary of the leadership that was lost during the battle. This analysis included the leaders at battalion level, the company commanders, the platoon leaders and the platoon sergeants. Statistical data are displayed in ANNEX I (INTERPRETATION). The results of the analysis indicated that leadership lost under both options closely reflected the total number of vehicles destroyed. As expected, Option II began losing leadership at roughly the same time it began sustaining other casualties during the final assault. Option I began losing leadership much earlier and continued throughout the battle. In sum, had leadership lost been a Measure of Cost (MOC), the results would have been the same; Option II was superior in all scenarios.

2. Unit Attrition. The basic MOC used in evaluation did not specify the losses by type of unit. A compilation of losses by unit at the end of each battle is presented in the following chart:

		% of Unit Lost						
		<u>A Co</u>	<u>B Co</u>	<u>C Co</u>	<u>D Co</u>	<u>Inf Co</u>	<u>AT Co</u>	<u>Scout Pltn</u>
Scenario 1								
	Option I	76.9	100	38.5	100	46.2	15.4	28.6
	Option II	61.5	23.1	69.2	30.8	76.9	0	57.1
Scenario 2								
	Option I	76.9	53.8	53.8	92.3	7.7	61.5	28.6
	Option II	15.4	53.8	84.6	92.3	46.2	38.5	71.4
Scenario 3								
	Option I	84.2	17.6	70.6		46.2	15.3	
	Option II	11.8	29.4	0		0	7.7	

Several observations concerning unit attrition seem apparent:

a. Scouts. Under Option II, the Scout Platoon sustained high casualties compared to Option I. This was a result of the additional requirement placed on the scouts to move to the front and flanks of the mass formation to place smoke pots in any gaps in the smoke envelope. They were normally the first to receive enemy fire from defending reconnaissance and other first echelon forces.

b. Infantry. The infantry losses sustained under each option appear to be more a reflection of the terrain in the objective area than the tactics employed. The wooded nature of the objective in Scenario 1 and 2 caused Option II (the only alternative to reach the objective) to sustain greater infantry losses.

c. In Scenario 3, Option I lost most of its force including the infantry. Option II took the objective with fewer losses. With open terrain in route to objective, the infantry was placed during Option II at the rear of the mass formation and sustained no losses.

d. Tank Units

Unit attrition among the tank companies does not appear to reflect the tactics employed. In Option II the tanks at the front of the mass formation were the most likely to be killed. Scenario 2 was an exception because most of the tanks in one company were destroyed when a Soviet 122 MRL volley hit the center of the mass formation.

e. AT Company. TOWs were employed in an overwatch role under both options. No significant differences in loss rates seem apparent.

3. Enemy Destroyed

Enemy targets destroyed was discarded as a possible measure of effectiveness because successful accomplishment of the attack mission was based primarily on the seizure of terrain. Destruction of enemy forces was viewed as a secondary benefit gained from the operation. Statistical results are shown in the following chart:

Enemy Systems Destroyed

	T62		BMP		BRDM		PT 76	
	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%
Scenario #1								
Option I	10	76.9	6	19.4	2	66.7	0	0
Option II	13	100	24	77.4	2	66.7	0	0
Scenario #2								
Option I	7	53.8	3	9.7	1	33.3	1	100
Option II	13	100	26	83.9	2	66.7	1	100
Scenario #3								
Option I	8	61.5	3	9.7	0	0	0	0
Option II	8	61.5	9	29	0	0	0	0

	SPG 9		SAGGER TEAM		RPG TEAM	
	<u>No</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>%</u>
Scenario #1						
Option I	0	0	8	25.8	1	3.7
Option II	1	50	13	41.9	20	74.1
Scenario #2						
Option I	0	0	5	16.1	6	22.2
Option II	0	0	7	22.6	23	85.2
Scenario #3						
Option I	0	0	2	6.5	3	11.1
Option II	0	0	6	19.4	5	18.5

In Scenarios 1 and 2, the Soviet losses were relatively low when the attacker used Option I tactics. This was due to the inability of the U.S. force to penetrate the enemy's first echelon. Option II not only penetrated the second echelon, but literally destroyed the entire MRB because the Soviet commander had redeployed his forces to meet the threat. In Scenarios 1 and 2, Option II destroyed most of the enemy forces that had originally been deployed across a three to five kilometer front. This gap would have permitted an exploiting force to move through easily.

In Scenario 3, the attacker using Option I penetrated the second echelon forces and technically achieved the MOE. However, the width of the penetration was so narrow (1,000 meters) and the remaining enemy forces so numerous that a counterattack very likely would have overwhelmed the remnants of the U.S. force. Option II achieved a wider penetration which gave the U.S. force dominant terrain overlooking many of the Soviet first and second echelon positions. Had

the battle been permitted to continue through the consolidation phase, the Soviet losses would probably have been substantial.

4. Direct Fire Ammunition Expenditures

A statistical comparison of the ammunition expended by the U.S. direct fire systems indicates that Option I relied more heavily on tanks firing 105 APDS, while Option II expended significantly more 105 HEAT. However, numerical comparisons between options could be deceiving because of the repeated failure of Option I to achieve the fixed effectiveness level. Had Option I reached the objective, the expenditure of 105 HEAT would probably have been much higher because of its enhanced effectiveness against armored vehicles at close ranges. A similar observation can be drawn about the expenditure of Cal 50 ammunition which was used in far greater amounts by Option II.

A useful observation can be made about the mixture of HEAT and APDS expended under Option II. Over the three scenarios, U.S. tanks expended four times more HEAT than APDS (154 HEAT/38 APDS).

Although this Study does not constitute a comprehensive analysis of ammunition expenditures, it does suggest that units anticipating hasty offensive operations should increase their basic load of HEAT. In neither option do the tanks expend HEP in any quantities. A statistical compilation of ammunition expenditures is found in ANNEX I (INTERPRETATION).

5. Indirect Fire Systems

a. Fire Missions

(1) General. One player served as commander of all indirect fire resources for both sides during each iteration. Plans for preparation fires, other planned fires, and attack of targets of opportunity complemented each side's scheme of maneuver.

(2) Target engagement

(a) Preparation fires were short and intense, employing mixtures of smoke, HE and ICM on targets designated by the attacking commander.

(b) Targets of opportunity were engaged as rapidly as possible using organic mortars, direct support units, and other supporting fires in that priority.

(c) Experience with the effects of various munitions during the play of the game led to the application of these general rules.

1. Mortars almost exclusively employed HC or WP munitions.

2. If 8" fires were employed against materiel or personnel either HE or ICM munitions were used respectively.

3. If 155mm fires were employed against materiel either ICM (Dual Purpose) or HE munitions were used unless the target was engaging the friendly force. In the latter case HC munitions were used initially.

4. If 155mm fires were employed against personnel (dug-in) either HE or ICM munitions were used. If the target was a SAGGER team that had already engaged the friendly force HC munitions often were used to neutralize the enemy's direct fire capability and then concentrate as much HE as was required to destroy him.

5. Volume of fire per mission:

- a. 81 Mortar: 3 or 4 volleys
- b. 4.2in. mortar: (1) HC: 2 volleys; (2) HE (rare): 2 volleys.
- c. 155mm Howitzer: (1) HC: 2 volleys; (2) H or ICM: 1 volley.
- d. 8" howitzer: 1 volley.

b. (1) U.S. Fire Missions processed by iteration

Scenario/ Option	81mm			4.2"			155mm			8"			Grand Total
	(a) Prep	(b) Battle	(c) Total	(a)	(b)	(c)	(a)	(b)	(c)	(a)	(b)	(c)	
1, I	0	3	3	2	7	9	16	35	51	3	8	11	74
1, II	2	3	5	2	4	6	22	18	40	2	8	10	61
2, I	0	0	0	2	2	4	16	30	46	2	2	4	54
2, II	2	3	5	3	5	8	18	23	41	4	9	13	67
3, I	DATA	NOT	AVAILABLE										
3, II	0	0	0	0	3	3	21	15	36	4	10	14	53

(2) Observations: The number of fire missions shown in column (b) for each caliber is an indicator of the load placed on fire support communications nets in response to the needs of the attacking force after the preparation was fired. In general terms some of these missions were pre-planned and the fire mission represented a request for on-call fires. However, it was clear in the course of each iteration that Option I required the engagement of far more targets of opportunity than Option II. Furthermore, in the case of Scenarios 1 and 2 it should be noted that Option I's operations were terminated when it became clear that the Measure of Effectiveness would not be achieved. Continuation of these attacks would only have increased the number of missions fired in support of a losing cause.

c. U.S. Indirect Fire Ammunition Expenditures

(1) Expenditure data by weapon and munition type for Scenarios 1 and 2 are displayed below:

SCENARIO 1
OPTION I

Weapon Type	Ammunition Type				
	HC	WP	HE	SI	DI
81mm ¹	-	12	3	-	-
4.2inch ²	72	-	36	-	-
155mm ²	256	-	336	48	64
8 inch	-	-	120	12	-
TOTALS	328	12	495	60	64

NOTES: 1. 81mm mortars reached planned firing positions shortly before attack was terminated.
2. Bulk of expenditures were used against targets of opportunity.

OPTION II

Weapon Type	Ammunition Type				
	HC	WP	HE	SI	DI
81mm ¹	-	6	27	-	-
4.2 inch ²	42	-	24	-	-
155mm ²	272	-	160	48	-
8 inch	-	-	132	-	-
TOTALS	314	6	343	48	-

- NOTES:
1. 81mm HE expenditures occurred during preparation and support of final assault.
 2. Bulk of HC expenditures were on-call, planned fires (smoke screens)

SCENARIO 2

OPTION I

81mm ¹	-	-	-	-	-
4.2 inch	48	-	-	-	-
155mm	272	-	120	16	64
8 inch	-	-	24	24	-
TOTALS	320 ²	-	164 ³	40	64

- NOTES:
1. 81mm never reached planned firing positions before attack was terminated.
 2. HC expenditures were divided roughly equally between targets of opportunity and on call, planned fire.
 3. Bulk were against pre-planned targets.

OPTION II

81mm ¹	-	30	6	-	-
4.2 inch ²	60	-	24	-	-
155mm ²	288	-	144	48	8
8 inch ³	-	-	132	24	-
TOTALS	348	30	306	72	8

- NOTES:
1. Bulk of WP expenditures against targets of opportunity.
 2. Bulk of HC expenditures against planned targets (smoke screens).
 3. Bulk of expenditures against on-call, pre-planned targets.

(2) Comparative data for Scenario 3 were not recovered.

(3) Comment:

(a) Planned smoke fires during Option II were oriented on the attacking force, not on suspected enemy locations or in response to detection of enemy. Since U.S. force location was known, individual missions delivered more accurate and effective fire.

(b) Under Option I the bulk of indirect firing took place after the preparation and as a reaction to enemy actions. Under Option II the bulk of firing took place during the preparation and in execution of the fire support plan for the final assault.

(c) Since targets of opportunity were almost always engaged with only one volley of HE, the proportion of HC to HE expenditures would vary if more FFE volleys were fired. Conclusions about anticipated level of expenditures are not warranted because of scenarios, assumptions, game rules, and conditions.

(d) With respect to HC munitions it appears that Option II made better use of its expenditures than Option I because of the orientation on the attacking force with its known location and direction. Furthermore, the compact formation is a smaller target than the dispersed defending force. If a decoy envelope were fired, then expenditures would increase.

B. Nonquantifiable Factors

Although the analytic model provided a straightforward method of measuring both the effectiveness and costs associated with each option, it became obvious that important aspects of the work were not easily quantified. For example, achievement of the basic measure of effectiveness although easily identified, reflected the judgment and experiences of the analysts. This section contains a summary of those non-quantifiable factors that in reality would impact on the usefulness and viability of the two alternatives. The qualitative observations found in this section are a product of the research, judgment and past experience of the Study Group members.

1. Coordination and Timing: The success of even the most elementary offensive operation requires effective coordination of available assets. Option I requires the attacking force to carefully coordinate the advance of maneuver elements on a relatively broad front and an over-watch force in order to avoid piecemeal commitment of the battalion. Option II requires increased coordination, particularly between the maneuver force and the indirect fire support assets. Should this coordination breakdown and the smoke envelope not be properly developed or maintained, the operation would very likely fail. It was the conclusion of the Study Group that although Option II may require a greater

degree of coordination and timing, much of it could be accomplished in the planning phase prior to battle. The impact of each option on indirect fire coordination and planning is discussed in more detail in ANNEX I (INTERPRETATION).

2. Command and Control

a. The Study Group assumed perfect command and control for both Option I and Option II because of the exceptional difficulty of interjecting command and control mistakes (e.g., map reading errors, failure to respond, misunderstood radio transmissions, etc.). While command and control is always imperfect, Option II tactics offer less opportunity for command and control errors.

b. Option I, with companies and platoons dispersed, is much more dependent on the use of FM voice radio to control maneuver. In Option II, not only do all companies attack on the same avenue; often they follow each other. Consequently, a company commander could control all of his platoon leaders by hand and arm signals, supplemented occasionally by radio. The second and subsequent companies need only follow the unit to their front with little use of radio transmissions.

c. Both options have peculiar map reading difficulties. Option I requires many leaders to correctly read their maps for the attack to succeed. However, these map readers have a chance to use as much of the terrain as they can see to keep oriented. Option II requires fewer

leaders to correctly read their maps for the attack to succeed. However, the smoke envelope limits their use of surrounding terrain as an aid to orientation. In Option II, the leadership may have to rely on easily recognized landmarks (woods, towns, etc.) within the smoke envelope as well as spotter rounds to compensate for their relative blindness to the surrounding terrain.

d. Under Option I units begin suffering casualties during critical maneuver phases early in the battle. Some of these casualties will no doubt be among the company and platoon leadership. This will disrupt command and control during absolutely critical periods of an Option I attack. Losses during an Option II attack consistently occur in the last few minutes during the final assault phase.

3. Human Factors

a. This Study totally removed the human factors of fear and bravery from the battlefield, and yet these psychological factors would be critical on a battlefield of this size and ferocity. Clearly, Option II has superior psychological advantages over Option I.

b. Option I subjects its crews to fire for much longer periods of time as they attempt to close on the objective. In Option I the psychological impact on the soldiers'

determination to continue to fight might be less certain or predictable than in Option II where the battles are quicker and sharper.

c. Option I allows the Soviets to see the U.S. force at much greater ranges and the defender might gradually adjust to the psychological pressures of the battle. Option II attacks tend to collide with the defender abruptly and violently at close range and create a much greater shock effect.

d. The Study allowed the Soviets in the objective area to continue to fight until almost every vehicle was destroyed as well as every SAGGER and RPG team killed. This had little effect on the performance of Option I attacks except in Scenario #3 where the measure of effectiveness was met. In the Option II attacks, the Soviet defenders might well have broken and run some time earlier rather than fight and die with the extraordinary heroism permitted by the rules of the game.

e. The Study Group allowed the Soviets a distinct advantage in the application of the psychological assumptions so that the costs reflected by the defenders represented an upper limit, especially for Scenarios 1 and 2.

4. Surprise: Although it is difficult to compare the propensity of the alternatives for achieving surprise, the Study Group concluded that neither option had a clear advantage. The conventional approach deploys attacking forces on a wider front and selects avenues based largely

on terrain which shields the maneuver force from enemy view. This increases the probability that part of the attacking force may achieve surprise. Option II requires the battalion to mass most of its forces prior to crossing the Line of Departure (LD) which increases the risk of early detection. The smoke envelope required by Option II should alert the enemy and may telegraph the location and direction of the attacking force. This disadvantage may be mitigated by a deception plan which includes the construction of decoy envelopes, but will do little to assist in achieving surprise. Option I has a similar disadvantage since it uses smoke to screen known and suspected enemy locations. However, if the defending force is alert its reconnaissance elements will most likely provide early warning in both options.

5. Vulnerability to Massed Fires: The mass formation used in Option II increases the danger of conventional or nuclear fires being directed at the attacking force. This danger is reduced if the mass formation is able to move to its objective quickly and the smoke curtains are well constructed so that enemy forward observers are unable to determine the precise location of the force within the envelope. Similar observations can be made concerning the vulnerability of the battalion to enemy close air support and attack helicopters.

6. Fire Distribution

Given time constraints the Study assumed near perfect fire distribution for all U.S. and Soviet engagements. An explanation of the fire distribution employed and the game rules associated with it are found in ANNEX B (ASSUMPTIONS). The following qualitative observations were made concerning the effect of fire distribution on the alternatives.

a. If fire distribution had not been near perfect the Soviets in reality would likely have had an advantage because of the ability of the defender to choose the terrain and preposition his forces.

b. Against Option I, the Soviet units that could observe the attacking force had between one and two minutes prior to initiating engagements to distribute their fires. Against Option II, the Soviets had little time to make any distribution planning before the lead U.S. elements broke through the smoke 300 to 500 meters in front of the Soviet positions.

c. During Option I attacks, the U.S. force was exposed for far longer periods to the fires of the Soviet defenders. The Soviets seldom had a chance to fire more than twice at attackers in Option II before being overwhelmed by the attacking force.

d. Against Option I tactics, the defender was in a better position to select the most advantageous time to open fire. However, against Option II, the attacker was almost on top of the defender when both sides simultaneously initiated fire.

e. The U.S. battalion attacking with Option I tactics faced the difficult task of long range target acquisition (spotting targets through binoculars and in the case of tanks, laying the gunner on the target while driving across rough terrain). Under these conditions any distribution of fires within a platoon trying to maintain the momentum of an attack would be very difficult. At the shorter ranges of Option II engagements, the vehicle commander would not require binoculars for target acquisition nor would laying the tanks' main gun be difficult.

f. At the greater ranges of Option I engagements, the tank commanders must range to the targets further impeding fire distribution as well as the delivery of quick and heavy volumes of return fire. In Option II tactics almost all engagements would occur with battlesights (requiring no ranging). Furthermore, the tank commanders could take many of the engagements from their positions, thus significantly decreasing engagement times.

g. In Option I tactics, many of the engagements occur at such great ranges that only the tank mainguns and long range precision guided missiles enter the U.S. fire distribution equation. In Option II, while the distribution may be only slightly better than in Option I, coax machineguns, 50 cal machineguns, and DRAGONS will add significantly to volume of attackers' fires thus improving the general coverage.

7. Weather: Generally, the attacker gains an advantage when visibility is low. This applies roughly the same to both options. On the other hand, wind is an absolutely critical factor in the effective employment of Option II. It is highly sensitive to both the speed and direction of the wind even to the extent that selection of the axis of advance may be contingent on wind conditions. This subject is developed in more detail in ANNEX I (INTERPRETATION).

8. New Technology: It is difficult to assess the overall impact of new technology on each option. However, the introduction of thermal sights and the increasing cross-country mobility of new tracked vehicles are two areas that clearly will affect the nature of the battlefield.

a. Thermal sights: Thermal sights can be employed effectively through smoke screens using the current HC munitions. If these sights become standard on direct fire systems without a corresponding technological advance in smoke composition to counter them, the effect on Option I might be substantial and the effect on Option II would be devastating.

b. New Tracked Vehicles: The introduction of new tracked vehicles such as the XM1 and IFV with significantly increased speed and overall cross-country mobility will allow the attacker to close on the objective more quickly. This works to the advantage of both options, but

slightly more so to Option II which must move quickly to avoid the vulnerabilities posed by the mass formation (e.g., enemy close air support, attack helicopters, mass artillery fires including artillery delivered mines).

9. Recovery: Recovery of immobilized vehicles was significantly different for the two Options. In Option I VTRs moved with individual attacking companies and some became inundated with recovery requirements within 1,000 meters after the attacking force crossed the line of departure. The speed of the action precluded any significant assistance from general support VTRs. Recovery of vehicles in Option I was usually feasible since attack routes concentrated on covered and concealed approaches. In Option II, all VTR assets were concentrated at the rear of the attack formation, inside the smoke envelope. Any casualties in the approach march were quickly picked up and moved forward with the attack. They stayed within the envelope until they could be dropped into defilade or wooded positions. This contradictory procedure (evacuation forward instead of rearward) was necessary because of the exposed terrain over which the attack was moving combined with the perishability of the smoke envelope. The preponderance of casualties under Option II occurred in the objective area, creating a significant recovery problem during the consolidation phase. The Study was not sufficiently structured to analyze the recovery problem in detail and further study is required to refine proper recovery techniques for Option II.

C. Spillovers

1. Tank Battalion. Although the Study was not designed to analyze the effectiveness of one organization compared to another, some qualitative observations were made regarding the 5-3-3 and the 4-3-4 battalions. Even though both organizations contained the same number of major combat systems (tanks, TOWs, DRAGONS, etc), the 4-3-4 battalion with its fourth company was consistently more flexible and responsive. This was particularly apparent when Option I tactics were employed. Option II seemed less sensitive to organizational factors because most of the combat elements were grouped in a mass formation. However, when 4-3-4 closed on the objective and penetrated the enemy's second echelon with Option II tactics, the four smaller companies could break out of the mass formation and begin the consolidation more quickly.

2. Infantry Battalion. All scenarios were conducted using a tank battalion organization. However, there are strong indications that Option II tactics are useful, perhaps in some situations even more relevant, to a mechanized infantry task force. Infantry battalions lack the organic long range, rapid fire capability that tanks provide. Intuitively one could conclude that the use of a mass formation and smoke envelope would conceal the soft-skinned carriers of an infantry force from Soviet long range anti-armor systems and allow it to close to the reduced ranges which optimize its direct fire systems. Scenario 1 was a particularly useful

example. The open approaches to the objective were ideal for tank units while the wooded nature of the objective area called for the use of infantry. This does not suggest that infantry or tank units should not be employed as a team. To the contrary, each scenario validated the combined arms concept.

3. Equipment Improvements

a. Smoke Generation. If the commander of the attacking force elects to screen his maneuver force, he need not depend solely on artillery and mortar-delivered smoke. In addition to smoke pots, which this Study used extensively, the U.S. Army should consider making available for employment the following equipment for generating smoke:

(1) U.S. tracked vehicles could profitably employ internal smoke generators similar to those used by the Soviets in their tanks and BMPs.

(2) Small, tracked, remotely controlled vehicles with smoke generators could assist in laying smoke screens. This would likely reduce the casualties suffered by the scouts while placing smoke pots to cover gaps in the smoke envelope.

(3) Under certain circumstances, aircraft could be used to lay down or maintain smoke screens. For example, low flying helicopters might provide an additional band of smoke by flying inside the original smoke envelope provided by the artillery and mortars. Such concepts deserve

further analysis to determine their feasibility given the vulnerability of the aircraft and the effectiveness of the smoke they could deliver.

b. Infantry Fighting Vehicle. Although the M113A1 has proven to be an excellent fighting vehicle, several improvements would enhance its capabilities during the assault phase of the attack.

(1) A rapid fire gun that could defeat lightly armored vehicles up to approximately 1,200 meters.

(2) A standard system for launching and tracking the DRAGON while buttoned up in defilade.

(3) An internal smoke generating system.

c. Multiple Rocket Launcher. Unquestionably, the most effective indirect fire system on the battlefield was the Soviet 122mm Multiple Rocket Launcher (BM21). Its fires proved particularly effective against massed armored forces (See Scenario 2, Options I and II). A multiple rocket launcher system firing munitions designed to defeat armor vehicles would be a useful addition to U.S. indirect fire resources.

XIV. CONCLUSION

A. The results of the analysis clearly indicate that Option II tactics were superior to Option I in all scenarios. The Study Group concluded that Option II with its employment of a battalion mass formation and smoke envelopes represents a potentially significant improvement in U.S. Army offensive

tactical doctrine under certain battlefield conditions.

Option II provides the commander an alternative approach to accomplish his wartime mission. It is not a panacea, nor is it even presented to replace the current tactics. It is simply another option in the maneuver commander's repertoire.

B. Although it has some limitations and vulnerabilities which deserve further analysis, Option II offers the possibility of revamping our traditional concepts of how to gain superior attacker to defender force ratios. Similarly, it provides an alternative to the conventional and often obvious use of covered and concealed avenues of approach to the objective. In sum, Option II presents another way of isolating the enemy and focusing the necessary combat power to destroy him with minimum losses.

C. The Study Group concluded that Option II tactics may be equally useful for mechanized infantry task forces which lack the long range, rapid fire capability inherent in tank units. This would be particularly appropriate in parts of Central Europe where the dominant terrain is wooded and more appropriate as an infantry objective, but the approaches are open and tend to require more tanks. The mechanized infantry task force could screen its movement across the open with Option II techniques and take advantage of its short range systems once it reaches the objective area.

D. It was concluded that both options require a larger basic load of smoke munitions for our mortar and artillery

units. Additionally, U.S. forces need improved smoke munitions to counter the anticipated development and refinement of thermal sights.

XV. RECOMMENDATION

The Study Group recommends that the U.S. Army conduct further analysis to exploit the preliminary findings of this Study. Field testing of tactical principles contained in Option II should be conducted particularly as they relate to the use of smoke envelopes. The amount of smoke munitions available in the basic load of mortar and artillery units must be increased significantly if they are to maximize their contribution on the battlefield. Further, the Study Group strongly recommends that research efforts be intensified to improve the overall effectiveness of smoke and develop munitions that counter the use of thermal sights.

ANNEX A

METHODOLOGY

ANNEX A (METHODOLOGY)

I. SIMULATION MODEL

A. The Study Group used a computer-assisted manual war game called BATTLE (Battalion Analyzer and Tactical Trainer for Local Engagements) developed by TRADOC Systems Analysis Activity to simulate the engagements. BATTLE's four components are: (1) scale model terrain boards, (2) a set of miniature weapons systems, (3) a minicomputer, and (4) a software package.

1. The terrain boards modelled 80 square kilometers of terrain northeast of Hunfeld, Germany (NA 5414). Cartographers reproduced projections of color positives (scale 1:50,000) on plywood-backed styrafoam, obtaining a horizontal scale of one inch equals 50 meters and a vertical scale of one inch equals 40 meters (a 25% vertical distortion). The scale model terrain boards were a critical factor in determination of intervisibility.

2. The Study Group utilized miniatures of every weapons system evaluated. The scale of these models, however, exceeded the scale of the terrain by a factor of four. To compensate for the intervisibility distortion, the Study Group used the right front fender to represent the actual size and location of the vehicle in a direct fire engagement.

3. The minicomputer comprises the major element of the model and includes: (a) Central processing unit, with 64K, 8-bit bytes, (b) Dual-disk drive, 2 Discs at 262K,

8-bit bytes, (c) Cathode Ray Tube Console and Keyboard, (d) High-speed printer, and (e) High-speed punch/mark sense card reader.

4. BATTLE's software, stored on flexible disks used in the dual-disk drive, performs four basic functions - data management, game/computer initialization, action processing, and post processing.

(a) Data management incorporates the storage of both U.S. and Soviet weapons systems performance data from Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity.

(b) Initialization requires the players to define to the computer Soviet and U.S. organizations, fire support forces, minefield composition, preparatory fires, and items for recording the exercise.

(c) Action processing uses the data base to evaluate and announce results of player moves and engagements.

(d) Post processing provides a print-out of the results of the game.

II. INITIAL DEPLOYMENT

A. Each iteration began with an order for a hasty attack issued to the U.S. Commander, followed by a map reconnaissance to plan his scheme of maneuver and fire support. The Soviet defender emplaced his MR battalion in a hasty defense with three belts, including his security outposts. He had 6 hours (exercise time) in which to prepare his defense. In Option II the attacker's planning required close coordination

between the scheme of maneuver and the fire support plan to emplace the smoke envelope which concealed the assault force.

B. Upon initiation of the artillery preparation the U.S. and Soviet players were committed to their initial deployment and axes of advance until some event (e.g., a visual sighting or receipt of direct fire) logically provided them with intelligence upon which to alter their previous plans.

III. INITIAL ENGAGEMENT RULES

A. The defender, starting in a position of defilade and able to move by covered routes, always opened the direct fire portion of the battle. In order to engage a target, the firing vehicle needed to have intervisibility with the target. The players determined intervisibility by stretching a string from the right front bumper of the firer to the right front bumper of the target. If the string did not touch any terrain feature between the two vehicles, then the firer had intervisibility with the target. (See Appendix 1 [Intervisibility])

B. In order to create the elements of local surprise that the defender normally possesses over his attacker, the Study Group used the following rules:

1. If the defender initiated direct fire at a range greater than 1300 meters from a defilade position from which no previous Soviet system had ever fired, the defender could fire an initial, and for tanks, a Burst On Target (BOT) round, before the target could return fire.

2. If all of the above conditions existed but the range was between 600 and 1300 meters, then the defender could only fire an initial round before the target could return fire.

3. If the range was less than 600 meters or any other conditions described in A. above did not exist, then both sides could engage simultaneously.

IV. DIRECT FIRE

A. Players input all direct fire information to the computer through IBM mark sense cards (see Appendix 2 [Computer Hardware]). On all direct fire input cards the players provide the computer with the following information:

1. The type vehicle firing
2. The type ammunition fired
3. The vehicle number of the firer (all vehicles on the board had a unique number)
4. Whether the firer was moving or stationary when firing
5. The number of rounds being fired
6. The range from the firer to the target
7. The type vehicle that is the target
8. The vehicle number of the target
9. Whether the target is moving or stationary
10. Whether the target is fully exposed or in hull defilade
11. Whether the target is facing the firer or flank to the firer

12. Whether the firer has acquired the target and has "a round in the chamber" ready to fire.

V. FIREPOWER AND MOVEMENT INTERVAL

Training and Doctrine Command's System Analysis Agency (TRASANA) designed BATTLE so that the players could establish any interval of fire and maneuver they desire.

A. This Study used 30 second intervals because that is the approximate time lapse required for a tank to engage a target with two rounds, back into total defilade, load a third round, and occupy an adjacent fighting position. This is also approximately the time an ATGM crew needs to load and fire a missile, track it to the target, and reload a second round.

B. The BATTLE program contains performance data on all engagement times (i.e., loading, firing, and time of flight) and the program will randomize these data to render a firing order among all Soviet and U.S. systems.

C. At the start of each firepower interval, both Soviet and U.S. players input all vehicles they desire to fire during the 30 seconds of interval. The BATTLE Program will accept up to 80 of these cards during a single interval period.

D. As the computer runs through this 30 second interval, it will visually display the results of each engagement as it occurs (hit or miss, kill or no kill) and store the results. (See Appendix 3 [Computer Hardware in Operation]).

E. If an ATGM team dies during the flight of a missile, the missile will always miss. If a vehicle is killed before it can fire, the computer will remove that vehicle from the computer's randomized firing order.

F. At the end of the 30 second firepower interval the program informs the players that they should take a 30 second maneuver interval. During this 30 seconds, the players can move their vehicles a scaled distance equal to the distance the vehicle could move during actual combat. Another 30 second firepower interval then follows and this rotation continues until the game's end.

VI. INDIRECT FIRE

Players input indirect fire through IBM cards in a similar manner as they input direct fire.

A. For each indirect fire mission, a player must provide the following data:

1. Whether the mission is for a direct or general support battery or battalion.
2. The battery number of the battery (all batteries have a number and location stored within the program).
3. The status of the forward observer (not trained, will adjust, will not adjust).
4. Target type
5. Status of target (in open, in woods, in town)
6. Time by which last volley must land
7. Ammo choice

8. Number of volleys

9. Radius of target area

B. Based upon mean time to deliver the rounds, the computer will then tell the players during the sequence of firepower events when and where the volleys landed. Unlike direct fire evaluation, however, indirect fire evaluation is not totally a Monte Carlo computer determined result. Indirect fire evaluation is only computer assisted and the player must input the following information before the computer can determine results of the mission:

1. Target type (on a mechanized battlefield what a commander originally shot at may have moved and a different type maneuvered under the indirect fire mission).

2. Board numbers of all targets within the radius of lethality.

3. Condition in the target areas (open, wood or town)

4. Azimuth and distance from the targets to artillery aim point (must input a single target at a time). (See Appendix 4 [Calculating the Location of Incoming Artillery])

VII. SMOKE

The players of BATTLE must use both computer and manual operations to play the vital element of smoke.

A. A player desiring a smoke screen must input to the computer an indirect fire mission designating smoke.

B. After the computer has determined mean time to get smoke rounds on the ground, the computer tells the players

at the proper time during a firepower event where the smoke rounds have landed.

C. The players must then place a series of templates on the ground to show the build up of smoke over two minutes.

D. Then during the ten minutes following the complete build up of smoke, at each successive maneuver event the players must move the smoke at the speed and in the direction of the wind.

E. At the end of twelve minutes, the players must lift the template from the terrain board.

F. All indirect fire smoke screens were assumed to be forty meters in height.

G. Vehicular and hand-activated smoke were emplaced manually. These smoke screens were ten meters high, two hundred meters long, and spread into the direction to which the wind was blowing. They were also laid on the terrain boards manually with a template.

VIII. MINEFIELDS

The Soviet force was not given the capability of emplacing minefields due to the short time available to prepare for a hasty defense. The consensus was that priority of logistical effort would have been on direct and indirect fire ordnance since the Soviet force was conducting an attack across the entire front.

IX. PLAYER LEARNING CURVE

Unquestionably, both the Soviet and U.S. players became

more adept with every iteration. Not only did they become more skilled in the use of organic and attached weapons to complement each other, they also became familiar with how to use the particular terrain and the screening effects of smoke to greater advantage. In order to offset the advantages of a learning curve, the Study followed two procedures:

1. It changed the terrain and general direction of movement for each attack scenario thereby creating a fundamentally different situation and negating learning curve effects; and


2. It alternated the battalion commanders playing the U.S. force. Consequently, no single commander played a particular organization in two successive scenarios.

X. SUMMARY

The general methodology, game rules, key factors, and assumptions could not possibly cover all situations prior to their occurrence. During every iteration, the players had to decide in peculiar situations what methodology would approximate the reality of combat in Central Europe. (See Appendix 5 [Game in Progress]).


Appendices

1. Intervisibility
2. Computer Hardware
3. Computer Hardware in Operation
4. Calculating the Location of Incoming Artillery
5. Game in Progress



APPENDIX 1 (INTERVISIBILITY)

A-10



APPENDIX 2 (COMPUTER HARDWARE)

A-11





APPENDIX 5 (GAME IN PROGRESS)

A-14

ANNEX B

ASSUMPTIONS

ANNEX B (ASSUMPTIONS)

I. General Assumptions

- a. Neither side will employ toxic chemical munitions.
- b. Neither side will employ nuclear weapons.
- c. Close air support is not available to either side.
- d. Helicopter gunship support is not available to either side.
- e. Both sides possess smoke munitions.
 - (1) Once a smoke round impacts, smoke requires two minutes to build up to its full potential.
 - (2) The screen effect of smoke lasts for ten minutes after full build up.
 - (3) The 4.2in. mortar platoon and 122mm Howitzer Battery lay a smoke screen with one volley that is 300 meters by 150 meters.
 - (4) The 155mm Howitzer Battery and 152mm Howitzer Battery lay smoke screens with one volley that are 600 meters by 150 meters.
 - (5) The wind blows in the Hunfeld Area from the southwest at an average speed of 8 miles per hour.
 - (6) Neither side has the capability on the battlefield to look through the smoke (e.g., no thermal sights).
- f. Both sides possess unlimited quantities of artillery munitions.
- g. The BATTLE Program contains all engagement data (e.g., hit/kill probabilities, rates of fire, firing sequences)

times of flight etc.). These data, supplied by the Army Material Analysis Agency, are taken as given and representative of the battlefield.

h. Maneuver unit radio nets will not be jammed.

i. The BATTLE Program jams fire requirements on a random basis.

j. Fire distribution is near perfect for both sides (i.e., the senior U.S. or Soviet player decides the fire distribution plan for every system on his side).

k. Both U.S. and Soviet forces begin the battle at 100 percent operational ready rate.

l. If a firing vehicle is engaging at ranges greater than 1300 meters, in hull defilade, from a position previously not used (surprise shot), it may shoot both an initial and, in the case of tanks, a burst on target (BOT) round before the target can return fire.

m. If a firing vehicle is engaging at ranges between 600 and 1300 meters, in hull defilade, from a position previously not used (surprise shot), it may shoot an initial round before the target can return fire.

n. If an engagement is initiated at less than 600 meters both vehicles may begin the engagement at the same time.

o. Dismounted Teams (i.e., Dragon, LAW, RPG-7) receive one surprise shot without return fire regardless of range if they are firing from a new or previously undetected position.

p. Dismounted Teams may be suppressed by either direct or indirect fire. When under suppression, a dismounted team will have to reload and reacquire targets at the start of every engagement.

q. All firepower and maneuver intervals are 30 seconds in duration.

r. To account for the time to get up to speed, all halted vehicles can move at only half speed for the first 30 seconds of movement.

s. Neither side uses radars.

t. Opposing forces have no intelligence of the other side until they can see their adversary.

u. Once one force has seen its adversary the force with visual contact has perfect intelligence about the size and location of that organization but no intelligence about its scheme of maneuver.

v. Vehicles knocked out on restricted routes (e.g., wooded trails or village streets) become obstacles. Other vehicles attempting to bypass knocked out vehicles must delay 30 seconds for each two knocked out vehicles it wants to bypass.

w. Leadership and training are perfect and neither side will make any command and control errors (e.g., map reading errors, misunderstood radio communications, etc.).

II. United States Forces

a. Scout and Infantry Platoons carry smoke pots.

(1) The Scouts and Infantry may employ smoke pots be either throwing them onto the ground or attaching them to their vehicles.

(2) Smoke pots burn for five minutes.

(3) Smoke from smoke pots persists for five minutes after the pot burns out.

b. The U.S. battalion attacks at the following movement rates:

18 KPH.....	tracked vehicle moving cross country
12 KPH.....	tracked vehicle in the assault/firing
12 KPH.....	tracked vehicle moving in smoke
24 KPH.....	tracked vehicles on the road
30 KPH.....	wheeled vehicles on the road
6 KPH.....	dismounted personnel running (3 min. max)
4 KPH.....	dismounted personnel (sustained)

c. Once a VTR arrives at an immobilized vehicle it can hook up in 30 seconds.

d. A VTR can tow a disabled vehicle at one half the speed that the vehicle could normally move under its own power.

e. A VTR can tow two disabled tanks at one time.

f. If a vehicle carrying a commander is destroyed the commander is assumed dead.

g. Effective leadership at the company level is the company commander. If the company commander is killed, the senior platoon leader becomes the effective leadership. The platoon leader does not need to relocate, and the company suffers no degradation in performance because a platoon leader is commanding.

h. Effective leadership at the platoon level is either the platoon leader or the platoon sergeant. If both the platoon leader and the platoon sergeant are killed, the company must either move a leader to the platoon or move the platoon leader before the platoon can continue to participate in the battle.

i. The basic load of U.S. vehicles is as follows:

(1) M-60A1

40	-	APDS
15	-	HEAT
8	-	HEP
1,000	-	50 Cal
10,000	-	7.62mm

(2) TOW

10	-	TOW
1,000	-	50 Cal

(3) Dragon Team

6	-	Dragons
---	---	---------

(4) LAW Team

3	-	LAWs
---	---	------

III. Soviet Force

The basic load of Soviet vehicles is as follows:

T-62

14	-	APFDS
7	-	HEAT
19	-	HE

IV. Warsaw Pact

The Soviet Motorized Rifle Battalion had six hours in which to prepare its defense:

(a) This is sufficient time to prepare foxholes for dismounted personnel in all three bands of the battalion's position.

(b) This is sufficient time to prepare one hull down position for each Soviet tank.

(c) This is insufficient time to prepare minefields.

ANNEX C

TACTICAL SETTING

ANNEX C (TACTICAL SETTING)

This analysis examines a U.S. tank battalion conducting a hasty attack against a Soviet motorized rifle battalion. The U.S. battalion is operating as part of a brigade counter-attack which occurs after a Soviet breakthrough attack has been blunted. During the discussion of the tactical setting which follows, the precise disposition of Soviet forces will not be specified since they will vary by scenario. However, the schemes of maneuver and general concepts of operation by both friendly and enemy commanders will remain approximately the same for all scenarios except for the organic composition of the threat forces.

Soviet forces have attacked using breakthrough tactics into the division sector. The friendly covering forces succeeded in stripping away the enemy reconnaissance elements prior to handing off the battle to combat forces in the Main Battle Area (MBA). The 1st Brigade has taken the brunt of the attack within its sector and is credited with stopping an enemy division. Within the 1st Brigade area, the enemy attacked with 3 regiments on two avenues of approach (See Appendix 1 - Soviet Attack). The main attack contained 2 Soviet regiments and the secondary attack was conducted by the third regiment.

The main attack was defeated by one friendly tank battalion task force and one mechanized infantry task force which were in battle positions A1 and B1 astride that avenue.

Although successful, the friendly task forces had to occupy subsequent battle positions (D2 and R2) deeper in the Main Battle Area (MBA) when the second echelon of the Soviet division attacked.

The secondary attack was defeated by a friendly tank heavy task force in battle position C1 astride Avenue B near the Forward Edge of the Battle Area (FEBA). The secondary attack was blunted in a quick, violent battle which left the two lead battalions of the enemy regiment decimated. The third battalion of the enemy regiment subsequently referred to as RED 1 was following at approximately 4 kilometers behind the lead elements and in the judgments of the Soviet Regimental and Division Commanders would have been piecemealed and defeated had it been committed. Instead RED 1 was ordered into a defensive position on a dominant piece of terrain protecting the division's flank (see Appendix 2 - Soviet Dispositions). The order was consistent with those given to the remnants of the Soviet division which directed them into a defensive posture in an attempt to hold the small penetration already achieved until a follow-on division could continue the attack. RED 1 has had approximately 6 hours to prepare its defense when the friendly attack is launched.

Once the U.S. division commander saw that the enemy's attack had been blunted across the front of the 1st Brigade he looked for opportunities to seize the initiative and


disrupt the Soviet situation prior to the arrival of following echelons. To the flank of the 1st, the 2nd Brigade's forces in the MBA were largely uncommitted. Some sporadic covering force actions were taking place to their front but it appeared that major elements of the brigade could be committed in a hasty attack to penetrate the flank of the attacking enemy division and seize objectives in their rear. These disruptive actions might further destroy his forces, particularly artillery, and delay and disrupt the conduct of future attacks. With that in mind the division ordered the 2nd Brigade to penetrate the enemy's flank and seize objective GOLD to the rear of the Soviet main attack. (See Appendix 3 - Hasty Attack Order). He allocated additional combat assets, primarily FA fires, to the brigade.

The commander of the 2nd Brigade considered the assets available to him sufficient to accomplish the assigned mission. He assigned one tank battalion the mission of seizing Objective SILVER, key terrain on the flank of the enemy penetration to enable the passage of other brigade elements. RED 1 is located on Objective Silver. The tank battalion in question will serve as the system under analysis.


Appendices

1. Soviet Attack
2. Soviet Dispositions
3. Hasty Attack Order


Appendix 1 (Soviet Attack) to ANNEX C



Appendix 2 (Soviet Dispositions) to ANNEX C



Appendix 3 (Hasty Attack Order) to ANNEX C



ANNEX D

SOVIET DEFENSIVE DISPOSITIONS

ANNEX D (SOVIET DEFENSIVE DISPOSITIONS)

1. The organization of the motorized rifle battalion is displayed at Appendix 1. In addition, the following indirect fire units were available:

Unit Size	# of Units	Caliber	# Weapons Per Unit	Organization	Equivalent U.S. Mission
Battery	1	122mm	6	From Regimental Artillery Group (RAG)	immediately responsive (From DS unit)
Battery	1	152mm	6	From RAG	immediately responsive (From DS unit)
Battery	2	122mm	6	From RAG	less responsive (From DS unit)
Battery	2	152mm	6	From RAG	less responsive (From DS unit)
Battery	3	122mm	6	From Division Artillery Group (DAG)	less responsive (From GSR unit)
Battery	6	152mm	6	From DAG	less responsive (From GSR unit)
Battalion	2	130mm	18	From DAG	less responsive (From GS unit)
Battalion	1	122 MRL	24 launchers	From DAG	less responsive (From GS unit)

2. In Scenarios 1 and 2 the mission of the commander of the motorized rifle battalion (MRB) was to defend the high ground north of Rossbach (NA 5517). He knew that his unit would

protect the right flank of the 3d division's penetration from any U.S. counterattack from the West or Southwest. Furthermore, the terrain he chose to defend largely controlled the avenues of approach into the division's rear area. Soviet forces controlled the southern edge of Eiterfeld (NA 5623) and the high ground to the West of Hunfeld (NA 5414) and crossings of the Haune River at Hunfeld.

The terrain chosen for defense controlled the approaches into the division's rear area and provided excellent observation and fields of fire to the West. To the Southwest observation and fields of fire were good but limited by the hills and wooded areas to the East of the Haune River. The northern half of Hill 429 (NA 5520) was critical to his defense. He considered the U.S. attack could use avenues of approach passing to the North or South of Steinbach (NA 5520). An attacking force passing to the North of Steinbach might come under fire from Soviet forces in the town of Eiterfeld. A schematic illustration of the Soviet disposition of forces is found in Appendix 2 (Scenarios 1 and 2).

3. In Scenario 3 the mission of the commander of the MRB was to defend the high ground South of Grossenbach (NA 5615). He knew that his unit would protect the right flank of the 3d Division's penetration from any U.S. counterattack from the North or Northwest. Soviet forces controlled crossings of Haune River at Nust (NA 5314) and the high ground from Eiterfeld (NA 5623) to Haselstein (NA 6014).


The terrain chosen for defense controlled an approach into the division's rear area. It overlooked open and gently rolling terrain to the North and Northwest and provided excellent observation and fields of fire in those directions. To the East observation and fields of fire were limited by the town of Hunfeld. The commander considered the high ground overlooking Grossenbach to be critical to his defense and that a U.S. attack force (tank battalion) could use avenues of approach passing to the North or South of Rossbach (NA 5517). An attacking force to the North of Rossbach might come under fire from Soviet forces occupying the high ground to the North. A schematic illustration of the Soviet defense is found in Appendix 3 (Scenario 3).

Appendices

1. Organization of an MRB
2. Scenario 1 and 2
3. Scenario 3

MOTORIZED RIFLE BATTALION


(W/BMP) REINFORCED W/MED TANK CO AND SUPPORTING ASSETS




★ ONE SAGGER LAUNCHER AND ONE 73mm SMOOTH BORE GUN WITH AUTOMATIC LOADER MOUNTED ON EACH BMP. EACH BMP CARRIES FIVE SAGGERS-ONE MOUNTED AND FOUR IN THE BASIC LOAD. THERE ARE ALSO TWO MAN-PACK LAUNCHERS IN THE BATTALION, EACH WITH TWO MISSILES.

★★ A MINIMUM OF ONE IN EACH PLATOON (9) AND ONE IN BN HQ

Appendix 2 (Scenario 1 and 2) to ANNEX D





Appendix 3 (Scenario 3) to ANNEX D

ANNEX E

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES

ANNEX E (Biographical Sketches)

LTC Gerald P. Schurtz, Armor
DOR April 23, 1973

Assignment	Organization	Location
Troop XO	10th Cavalry	Korea
Troop Plt Ldr/XO	8th Cavalry	Ft. Lewis, WA
Regt S-2	11th ACR	RVN
Sqdn Cndr	11th ACR	Germany
G-3 Plans	V Corps	Germany

LTC Frederick J. McConville, Field Artillery
DOR April 4, 1974

Assignment	Organization	Location
S-3 Officer	24th Inf Div	Germany
S-3 Officer	1st Cav Div	RVN
Asst G-2	1st Cav Div	RVN
Dist Sr Adv	MACV	RVN
Asst Sec	MACV	RVN
BN XO	1st Cav Div	Ft. Hood, TX
Div Arty S-3	1st Cav Div	Ft. Hood, TX
BN CO	1st Cav Div	Ft. Hood, TX

MAJ Henry J. Lowe, Armor
DOR October 10, 1975

Assignment	Organization	Location
Plt Ldr	12th Cavalry	Germany
Troop CO	12th Cavalry	Germany
Sqdn S-3	12th Cavalry	Germany
Regt S-3 Air	11th ACR	RVN
Asst J-3 Opns	III MAF	RVN
Troop CO	11th ACR	Germany
Sqdn S-3	11th ACR	Germany
Sqdn XO	11th ACR	Germany

MAJ James J. Steele, Armor
DOR June 8, 1976

Assignment	Organization	Location
Plt Ldr	13th Armor	Ft. Hood, TX
CO XO	13th Armor	Ft. Hood, TX
Plt Ldr	11th ACR	RVN
Troop CO	11th ACR	RVN
S-3 Air	11th ACR	RVN
Regt S-1	11th ACR	Germany
Troop CO	11th ACR	Germany
Sqdn S-3	11th ACR	Germany
Sqdn XO	11th ACR	Germany

ANNEX F

SCENARIO #1

ANNEX F (Scenario #1)

1. For both Option I and Option II attacks, the Soviet Motorized Rifle Battalion (MRB) assumed identical three band defenses on the same terrain (see Appendix 1 and 2).
2. The Soviet MRB was organized in the same manner for both attacks:

- 31 BMPs (3 MR companies)
- 13 T-62s (1 tank company)
- 3 BRDM-2/1 PT 76 (1 reconnaissance platoon)
- 1 SPG 9

3. The Soviets had the following artillery support:

- 1 Battery 120mm mortar (immediately responsive)
- 1 Battery 122mm Howitzers RAG (immediately responsive)
- 1 Battery 152mm Guns RAG (immediately responsive)
- 2 Battery 122mm Howitzers RAG (less responsive)
- 2 Battery 152mm Guns RAG (less responsive)
- 1 Battalion 122mm Howitzers DAG (in support)
- 2 Battalions 130mm Gun-Howitzers DAG (in support)
- 2 Battalions 152mm Guns DAG (in support)
- 1 Battalion 122mm MRL DAG (in support)

4. The weather was the same for both options:

- visibility - 2200 meters
- wind - 8mph from the Southwest

5. The rates of movement were the same for both options:

- 18KPH Track Cross Country Sustained
- 12KPH Track in Smoke
- 12KPH Track Cross Country Assault (Firing)
- 24KPH Track on the Road
- 6KPH Soldier Running (3 minutes)
- 4KPH Soldier Cross Country (Sustained)

6. The attacking U.S. battalions were organized in an identical manner:

- 4 tanks per platoon
- 3 platoons per company
- 4 companies in the battalion
- 1 TOW Company (12 TOWs)

- 1 Mortar Platoon (6 M106s)
- 1 Scout Platoon (7 M113s: 1 C+C, 3 TOW Carriers,
3 APCs w/Dragon)

7. The attacking U.S. battalions had the same attachment:

- 1 Mechanized Infantry Company

- 12 Dragon Teams
- 24 LAW Teams
- 3 81mm Mortars

8. The attacking U.S. battalions had the same artillery support:

- 1 Battalion 155 Howitzers (DS)
- 1 Battalion 8in. Howitzers (Reinf)
- 1 Battalion 155 Howitzers (GSR)
- 1 Battalion 8in. Howitzers (GS)

Appendices

1. Scenario #1, Option I
2. Scenario #1, Option II

Appendix 1 (Scenario #1, Option I) to ANNEX F (Scenario #1)

1. The U.S. battalion initiated the offensive by conducting a three volley prep, the third of which directed smoke against likely Soviet positions (see page F-6).
2. The U.S. battalion then conducted a two-pronged attack:
 - a. A&B Companies attacked from the woods vicinity NA 515230 toward Betzenrod (NA 545205). The Scout Platoon screened the left (east) flank of this attack.
 - b. C&D Companies attacked from the woods vicinity NA 508217 toward Steinbach (NA 525205) and from Steinbach toward Betzenrod. The Infantry Company accompanied this attack, entered Steinbach, and screened the right (west) flank.
3. This attack featured an exchange of fire at long range with a number of elements of the Soviet battalion's first band; however, neither side suffered heavy casualties until C and D Companies tried to turn North of Steinbach and move toward Betzenrod. As C and D Companies crested a ridge North of Steinbach, the first band of the Soviet battalion engaged the lead elements with a volley of Saggars that forced the two companies into defilade behind Steinbach until the Soviet first band, whose positions were now fully revealed, could be countered with smoke.
4. A and B Companies had lost five tanks and two TOWs in a series of long range engagements that also resulted in the total destruction of the Soviet tank platoon on Hill 362 (NA 540216) and the Soviet reconnaissance elements in front

of A and B Company (almost a one for one exchange).

5. A Company took up an attack position behind Hill 362, B Company assumed an attack position behind the woods vicinity, NA 546218, and TOW Company established a base of fire on Hill 362; all three were awaiting screening smoke to build up so that C&D Company could emerge from defilade from behind Steinbach and join the final assault.

6. As C&D Company made their run from Steinbach to the final assault they lost 30% of their forces to long range Sagger fires from scattered Soviet first band elements shooting between smoke screens. The Infantry Company attempting to screen this movement on the right flank was all but totally destroyed by medium range fires of Sappers, BMPs, (73mm HEAT), PT 76s and BRDM-2s. The final three vehicles had to seek cover in the woods to avoid this fire and the Infantry Company participated no further in the battle.

7. In the final assault, much of the maneuver force was piecemealed by smoke drifting across the battlefield.

a. The base of fire provided by the TOW Company from Hill 362 was completely screened by Soviet smoke.


b. B Company, attacking around the left (east) flank, was destroyed completely in one minute by a volley of sappers from the Soviet right flank (second band).

c. Elements of the assault companies emerged from the smoke in a piecemeal fashion, and the Soviet second and third bands cut them down with few Soviet losses.

d. The remnants of the assault force had to retreat into the smoke to avoid the destruction of the entire battalion.

e. While the odd piecemealing of the U.S. force by the smoke contributed to the rapid defeat of the U.S. battalion, the U.S. force in the final assault could not have breached the second Soviet band even if the smoke had not been there. The U.S. battalion had lost eighteen tanks (one third of its force) before it began its assault. The Soviets had excellent position, and it would merely have taken a little longer for the Soviets to finish off the U.S. battalion.

8. As in every other iteration, employing Option I tactics, trying to screen the Soviet positions with smoke simply is not effective enough. Some long range precision guided missiles teams are not screened, and these few teams attrite the attacking force to death. Time sequenced photographs (pages F-7 to F-11) show the progress of the battle.



U. S.

SOVIET

➔ INITIAL
ATTACK
PSN


---➔ AXIS & LIMIT
OF ADVANCE

↑ TOW PLT

(...) INF PLT

(T) TANK PLT

(R) RECON SEC




F-7



F-8



F-9



F-10



SCENARIO #1, OPTION I

SOVIET SYSTEMS KILLED BY U.S. SYSTEMS

	T-62	BMP	Sagger Team	RPG Team	BRDM-2
M-60A1	9	4	3	0	0
TOW	0	0	4	0	1
DRAGON ¹	0	1	0	0	1
LAW	0	0	0	0	0
Indirect Fire	$\frac{1^2}{10}$	$\frac{1}{6}$	$\frac{1}{8}$	$\frac{1}{1}$	$\frac{1}{2}$

U.S. SYSTEMS KILLED BY SOVIET SYSTEMS

	M-60	TOW	M113	Dragon	LAW
T-62	9	0	3	1	2
BRDM-2	3	3	1	0	1
SAGGER TM	23	0	2	1	2
RPG TM	0	0	0	0	0
SPG 9	1	0	0	0	0
BMP (73 HEAT)	5	0	1	0	0
Indirect Fire	$\frac{0}{41}$	$\frac{0}{3}$	$\frac{0}{7}$	$\frac{0}{23}$	$\frac{0}{54}$

1. Fired while mounted on a M113.
2. Killed by own MRL.
3. All Dragons were killed while riding M113s.
4. All LAW Teams were killed while riding M113s.

THIS PAGE IS BEST QUALITY PRACTICABLE
FROM COPY FURNISHED TO DDG

TASK FORCE 4-3-4		EX-STATUS		TIME		EXPENDED	
BLGIN	EXERCISE	RESOURCES	NOW	AMMUNITION	W/SURV	W/CASU	1140
54	M60A1	29					
17	M113(APC)	5		105 HEAT	405	359	46
				105 APDS	1134	992	34
				105 SOF TLT	232	200	0
				50 CAL	57350	49714	936
				7.62 MG	58000	50000	0
				LAW	30	72	0
				50 CAL	4844	11740	416
				DRAGON	15	38	37
				7.62 MG	49995	99990	0
15	M113(TOW)	13		TOW	95	17	38
				105 SOF TST	1	12	0
				50 CAL	13000	2000	0
				LAW	72	0	0
2	M113(CAC)	2		LAW	5	0	0
				50 CAL	2000	0	0
6	M106(MTR)	6		50 CAL	4000	0	0
37	LAW TM	31		LAW	126	24	0
15	DRAGON TM	12		DRAGON	72	18	0
1	ASP-1	1		105 HEAT	50	0	0
				105 APDS	200	0	0
				TOW	60	0	0
				DRAGON	60	0	0
				LAW	120	0	0
				50 CAL	9000	0	0
1	ASP-2	1		105 HEAT	50	0	0
				105 APDS	200	0	0
				TOW	60	0	0
				DRAGON	60	0	0
				LAW	120	0	0
				50 CAL	9000	0	0

EXERCISE TEAM HQ STATUS
NWC 4-3-4, EX- TIME 1140

15	105	HEAT	0
40	105	AFDS	0
8	105	SOF TGT	0
2000	50	CAL	0
2000	7.62	MG	0

15	105	HEAT	0
40	105	APDS	0
8	105	SDF TGT	0
2000	50	CAL	0
2000	7.62	MG	0

BEGIN	RESOURCES	NOW	TOTAL	AMMUNITION	W/SURV	W/CASU	EXPENDED
2	M60A1	1					
			30	105 HEAT	15	15	0
			80	105 APDS	40	40	0
			16	105 SOF IGT	8	8	0
			4000	50 CAL	2000	2000	0
			4000	7.62 MG	2000	2000	0

TEAM ALPHA STATUS
EXERCISE NWC 4-3-4, EX. TIME 1140

1101	M60A1	TOTK	15 105 HEAT	0
			40 105 APDS	0
			8 105 SDF IGT	0
			2000 50 CAL	0
			2000 7.62 MG	0
1102	M60A1	TOTK	15 105 HEAT	0
			40 105 APDS	0
			8 105 SDF IGT	0
			2000 50 CAL	0
			2000 7.62 MG	0
1103	M60A1	TOTK	15 105 HEAT	0
			40 105 APDS	0
			8 105 SDF IGT	0
			2000 50 CAL	0
			2000 7.62 MG	0
1104	M60A1	TOTK	15 105 HEAT	0
			39 105 APDS	0
			8 105 SDF IGT	0
			1974 50 CAL	25
			2000 7.62 MG	0
1111	M60A1	TOTK	15 105 HEAT	0
			40 105 APDS	0
			8 105 SDF IGT	0
			2000 50 CAL	0
			2000 7.62 MG	0
1112	M60A1	TOTK	15 105 HEAT	0
			40 105 APDS	0
			8 105 SDF IGT	0
			2000 50 CAL	0
			2000 7.62 MG	0

THIS PAGE IS BEST QUALITY PRACTICABLE
FROM COPY FURNISHED TO DDC

1113	M60A1	TOT	14	105 HEAT	1		
			40	105 APDS	0		
			8	105 SOF TGT	0		
			2000	50 CAL	0		
			2000	7.62 MG	0		
1114	M60A1	TOT	15	105 HEAT	0		
			40	105 APDS	0		
			8	105 SOF TGT	0		
			1937	50 CAL	12		
			2000	7.62 MG	0		
1121	M60A1	TOT	15	105 HEAT	0		
			40	105 APDS	0		
			8	105 SOF TGT	0		
			1961	50 CAL	39		
			2000	7.62 MG	0		
1122	M60A1	TOT	14	105 HEAT	1		
			40	105 APDS	0		
			8	105 SOF TGT	0		
			2000	50 CAL	0		
			2000	7.62 MG	0		
1123	M60A1	LIVE	15	105 HEAT	0		
			39	105 APDS	1		
			8	105 SOF TGT	0		
			1961	50 CAL	39		
			2000	7.62 MG	0		
1124	M60A1	LIVE	14	105 HEAT	1		
			38	105 APDS	2		
			8	105 SOF TGT	0		
			1961	50 CAL	39		
			2000	7.62 MG	0		
1136	M60A1	TOT	15	105 HEAT	0		
			40	105 APDS	0		
			8	105 SOF TGT	0		
			2000	50 CAL	0		
			2000	7.62 MG	0		
BEGIN	RESOURCES	NOW	TOTAL	AMMUNITION	W/SURV	W/CASU	EXPENDED
13	M60A1	5					
			195	105 HEAT	72	118	5
			520	105 APDS	197	319	4
			104	105 SOF TGT	40	64	0
			26000	50 CAL	9331	15974	195
			26000	7.62 MG	10000	16000	0

THIS PAGE IS BEST QUALITY PRACTICABLE
FROM COPY FURNISHED TO DDC

TEAM BROOD 210105
EXERCISE NWC 4-3-4, EX. TIME 1140

1141	M60A1	LIVE	13 105 HEAT	2
			39 105 APDS	1
			8 105 SDF IGT	0
			2000 50 CAL	0
			2000 7.62 MG	0
1142	M60A1	LIVE	13 105 HEAT	2
			38 105 APDS	0
			8 105 SDF IGT	0
			1961 50 CAL	39
			2000 7.62 MG	0
1143	M60A1	LIVE	9 105 HEAT	6
			38 105 APDS	0
			8 105 SDF IGT	0
			1974 50 CAL	0
1144	M60A1	TOTK	15 105 HEAT	0
			40 105 APDS	0
			8 105 SDF IGT	0
			2000 50 CAL	0
			2000 7.62 MG	0
1151	M60A1	LIVE	14 105 HEAT	1
			39 105 APDS	1
			8 105 SDF IGT	0
			1967 50 CAL	17
			2000 7.62 MG	0
1152	M60A1	TOTK	14 105 HEAT	1
			38 105 APDS	0
			8 105 SDF IGT	0
			1961 50 CAL	39
			2000 7.62 MG	0

1153	M60A1	LIVE	15	105 HEAT	0		
			37	105 APDS	3		
			8	105 SDF TGT	0		
			961	50 CAL	59		
			2000	7.62 MG	0		
1154	M60A1	LIVE	14	105 HEAT	1		
			40	105 APDS	0		
			8	105 SDF TGT	0		
			2000	50 CAL	0		
			2000	7.62 MG	0		
1151	M60A1	LIVE	15	105 HEAT	0		
			40	105 APDS	0		
			8	105 SDF TGT	0		
			961	50 CAL	59		
			2000	7.62 MG	0		
1162	M60A1	LIVE	14	105 HEAT	1		
			40	105 APDS	0		
			8	105 SDF TGT	0		
			2000	50 CAL	0		
			2000	7.62 MG	0		
1163	M60A1	LIVE	15	105 HEAT	0		
			40	105 APDS	0		
			8	105 SDF TGT	0		
			2000	50 CAL	0		
			2000	7.62 MG	0		
1164	M60A1	LIVE	14	105 HEAT	1		
			40	105 APDS	0		
			8	105 SDF TGT	0		
			2000	50 CAL	0		
			2000	7.62 MG	0		
1176	M60A1	TOT	15	105 HEAT	0		
			37	105 APDS	1		
			8	105 SDF TGT	0		
			2000	50 CAL	0		
			2000	7.62 MG	0		
BEGIN	RESOURCES	NOW	TOTAL	AMMUNITION	W/SURV	W/CASU	EXPENDED
13	M60A1	10					
			195	105 HEAT	136	41	18
			520	105 APDS	391	117	12
			104	105 SDF TGT	80	24	0
			26000	50 CAL	19818	5961	221
			26000	7.62 MG	20000	6000	0

THIS PAGE IS BEST QUALITY PRACTICABLE
FROM COPY FURNISHED TO DDG

TEAM CHARLIE SIGJUS
EXERCISE NWC 4-3-4, EX. TIME 1140

1201	M60A1	TOTK	15 105 HEAT 40 105 APDS 8 105 SDF TGT 2000 50 CAL 2000 7.62 HC	0 0 0 0 0
1202	M60A1	TOTK	14 105 HEAT 39 105 APDS 8 105 SDF TGT 1922 50 CAL 2000 7.62 HC	1 1 0 78 0
1203	M60A1	TOTK	14 105 HEAT 40 105 APDS 8 105 SDF TGT 1987 50 CAL	1 0 0 17 0
1204	M60A1	TOTK	15 105 HEAT 40 105 APDS 8 105 SDF TGT 1922 50 CAL 2000 7.62 HC	0 0 0 78 0
1211	M60A1	TOTK	15 105 HEAT 40 105 APDS 8 105 SDF TGT 2000 50 CAL 2000 7.62 HC	0 0 0 0 0
1212	M60A1	LIVE	15 105 HEAT 40 105 APDS 8 105 SDF TGT 1981 50 CAL 2000 7.62 HC	0 0 0 39 0

THIS PAGE IS BEST QUALITY PRACTICABLE
FROM COPY FURNISHED TO DDG

THIS PAGE IS BEST QUALITY PRACTICABLE
FROM COPY FURNISHED TO DDG

1213	M60A1	LIVE	15	105 HEAT	0		
			40	105 APDS	0		
			8	105 SDF TGT	0		
			1987	50 CAL	13		
			2000	7.62 MC	0		
1214	M60A1	TOTK	15	105 HEAT	0		
			40	105 APDS	0		
			8	105 SDF TGT	0		
			1974	50 CAL	26		
			2000	7.62 MC	0		
1221	M60A1	LIVE	13	105 HEAT	2		
			40	105 APDS	0		
			8	105 SDF TGT	0		
			1961	50 CAL	39		
			2000	7.62 MC	0		
1222	M60A1	TOTK	13	105 HEAT	2		
			40	105 APDS	0		
			8	105 SDF TGT	0		
			1987	50 CAL	13		
			2000	7.62 MC	0		
1223	M60A1	LIVE	11	105 HEAT	4		
			40	105 APDS	0		
			8	105 SDF TGT	0		
			1974	50 CAL	26		
			2000	7.62 MC	0		
1224	M60A1	TOTK	14	105 HEAT	1		
			40	105 APDS	0		
			8	105 SDF TGT	0		
			1987	50 CAL	13		
			2000	7.62 MC	0		
1236	M60A1	TOTK	15	105 HEAT	0		
			40	105 APDS	0		
			8	105 SDF TGT	0		
			2000	50 CAL	0		
			2000	7.62 MC	0		
BEGIN	RESOURCES	NOW	TOTAL	AMMUNITION	W/SURV	W/CASU	EXPENDED
13	M60A1	4					
			195	105 HEAT	54	130	11
			520	105 APDS	140	359	1
			104	105 SDF TGT	32	72	0
			26000	50 CAL	1983	17729	339
			26000	7.62 MC	3000	18000	0

TEAM DELTA STATUS
EXERCISE NWC 4-3-4, EX. TIME 1140

1241	M60A1	LIVE	15 105 HEAT	0
			40 105 APDS	0
			8 105 SOF TGT	0
			1961 50 CAL	39
			2000 7.62 MG	0
1242	M60A1	TOTK	15 105 HEAT	0
			39 105 APDS	1
			8 105 SOF TGT	0
			2000 50 CAL	0
			2000 7.62 MG	0
1243	M60A1	LIVE	14 105 HEAT	1
			40 105 APDS	0
			8 105 SOF TGT	0
			2000 50 CAL	0
			2000 7.62 MG	0
1244	M60A1	LIVE	15 105 HEAT	0
			40 105 APDS	0
			8 105 SOF TGT	0
			1974 50 CAL	26
			2000 7.62 MG	0
1251	M60A1	LIVE	14 105 HEAT	1
			36 105 APDS	4
			8 105 SOF TGT	0
			1987 50 CAL	13
			2000 7.62 MG	0

THIS PAGE IS BEST QUALITY PRACTICALLY
FROM COPY FURNISHED TO DDC

1252	M60A1	LIVE	14	105 HEAT	1		
			35	105 APDS	5		
			8	105 SDF TGT	0		
			1987	50 CAL	13		
			2000	7.62 MG	0		
1253	M60A1	LIVE	15	105 HEAT	0		
			35	105 APDS	5		
			8	105 SDF TGT	0		
			1961	50 CAL	39		
			2000	7.62 MG	0		
1254	M60A1	TOTK	15	105 HEAT	0		
			38	105 APDS	2		
			8	105 SDF TGT	0		
			2000	50 CAL	0		
			2000	7.62 MG	0		
1261	M60A1	TOTK	12	105 HEAT	3		
			40	105 APDS	0		
			8	105 SDF TGT	0		
			2000	50 CAL	0		
			2000	7.62 MG	0		
1262	M60A1	LIVE	14	105 HEAT	1		
			40	105 APDS	0		
			8	105 SDF TGT	0		
			1987	50 CAL	13		
			2000	7.62 MG	0		
1263	M60A1	TOTK	13	105 HEAT	2		
			40	105 APDS	0		
			8	105 SDF TGT	0		
			2000	50 CAL	0		
			2000	7.62 MG	0		
1264	M60A1	LIVE	13	105 HEAT	2		
			40	105 APDS	0		
			8	105 SDF TGT	0		
			2000	50 CAL	0		
			2000	7.62 MG	0		
1276	M60A1	LIVE	14	105 HEAT	1		
			40	105 APDS	0		
			8	105 SDF TGT	0		
			1961	50 CAL	39		
			2000	7.62 MG	0		
BEGIN	RESOURCES	NOW	TOTAL	AMMUNITION	W/SURV	W/CASU	EXPENDED
13	M60A1	9					
			195	105 HEAT	128	55	12
			520	105 APDS	346	157	17
			104	105 SDF TGT	72	32	0
			26000	50 CAL	17818	8000	182
			76000	7.62 MG	18000	8000	0

TEAM TOW STATUS
EXERCISE NWC 4-3-4, EX. TIME 1140

1701	M113(TOW)	LIVE	7 6 1000	TOW LAW 50 CAL	3 0 0
1702	M113(TOW)	LIVE	7 6 1000	TOW LAW 50 CAL	3 0 0
1703	M113(TOW)	LIVE	7 6 1000	TOW LAW 50 CAL	3 0 0
1704	M113(TOW)	LIVE	7 6 1000	TOW LAW 50 CAL	3 0 0
1711	M113(TOW)	LIVE	8 6 1000	TOW LAW 50 CAL	2 0 0
1712	M113(TOW)	LIVE	8 6 1000	TOW LAW 50 CAL	2 0 0

1713	M113(TOW)	LIVE	8 6 1000	TOW LAW 50 CAL	2 0 0	
1714	M113(TOW)	LIVE	8 6 1000	TOW LAW 50 CAL	2 0 0	
1721	M113(TOW)	LIVE	8 6 1000	TOW LAW 50 CAL	2 0 0	
1722	M113(TOW)	LIVE	8 6 1000	TOW LAW 50 CAL	2 0 0	
1723	M113(TOW)	LIVE	6 6 1000	TOW LAW 50 CAL	4 0 0	
1724	M113(TOW)	LIVE	5 6 1000	TOW LAW 50 CAL	5 0 0	
1726	M113(C&C)	LIVE	6 1000	LAW 50 CAL	0 0	
BEGIN 12	RESOURCES M113(TOW)	TOTAL	AMMUNITION	W/SURV	W/CASU	EXPENDED
		12	TOW LAW 50 CAL	87 72 12000	0 0 0	33 0 0
1	M113(C&C)	1	LAW 50 CAL	6 1000	0 0	0 0

TEAM SCOUT STATUS 1140
EXERCISE NWC 4-3-4, EX. TIME

1526	M113(APC)	MOBK	6	LAW	0
			948	50 CAL	52
1731	M113(TOW)	MOBK	9	TOW	1
			6	105 SOF TGT	0
			1000	50 CAL	0
1732	M113(TOW)	TOTK	8	TOW	2
			6	105 SOF TGT	0
			1000	50 CAL	0
1733	M113(TOW)	LIVE	8	TOW	2
			6	105 SOF TGT	0
			1000	50 CAL	0
1501	M113(APC)	LIVE	2	DRAGON	4
			4	LAW	0
			1000	50 CAL	0
			9999	7.62 MG	0

F-26

TEAM INFANTRY STATUS
EXERCISE NWC 4-3-4, EX. TIME 1140

1624	M113(APC)	LIVE	5	DRAGON	1
			6	LAW	0
			1000	50 CAL	0
			9999	7.62 MG	0
1623	M113(APC)	MOBK	3	DRAGON	3
			6	LAW	0
			974	50 CAL	26
			9999	7.62 MG	0
1622	M113(APC)	MOBK	3	DRAGON	3
			6	LAW	0
			1000	50 CAL	0
			9999	7.62 MG	0
1621	M113(APC)	MOBK	3	DRAGON	3
			6	LAW	0
			935	50 CAL	65
			9999	7.62 MG	0
1614	M113(APC)	TOTK	4	DRAGON	2
			6	LAW	0
			987	50 CAL	13
			9999	7.62 MG	0
1613	M113(APC)	LIVE	3	DRAGON	3
			6	LAW	0
			948	50 CAL	52
			9999	7.62 MG	0
1612	M113(APC)	LIVE	4	DRAGON	2
			6	LAW	0
			948	50 CAL	52
			9999	7.62 MG	0
1611	M113(APC)	MOBK	4	DRAGON	2
			6	LAW	0
			987	50 CAL	13
			9999	7.62 MG	0

THIS PAGE IS BEST QUALITY PRACTICABLE
FROM COPY FURNISHED TO DDG

1604	M113(APC)	MOBK	4 6 987 999	DRAGON LAW 50 CAL 7.62 MG	2 0 13 0
1601	M113(APC)	TOTK	4 6 1000 9999	DRAGON LAW 50 CAL 7.62 MG	2 0 0 0
1602	M113(APC)	TOTK	4 6 961 9999	DRAGON LAW 50 CAL 7.62 MG	2 0 39 0
1601	M113(APC)	MOBK	4 6 961 9999	DRAGON LAW 50 CAL 7.62 MG	2 0 39 0
1626	M113(APC)	TOTK	6 1000	LAW 50 CAL	0 0
2901	DRAGON TM	LIVE	6	DRAGON	0
2902	DRAGON TM	TOTK	6	DRAGON	0
2903	DRAGON TM	TOTK	6	DRAGON	0
2904	DRAGON TM	LIVE	6	DRAGON	0
2905	DRAGON TM	LIVE	6	DRAGON	0
2906	DRAGON TM	LIVE	6	DRAGON	0

2907	DRAGON TM	LIVE	6	DRAGON	0
2908	DRAGON TM	LIVE	6	DRAGON	0
2909	DRAGON TM	LIVE	6	DRAGON	0
2910	DRAGON TM	LIVE	6	DRAGON	0
2911	DRAGON TM	LIVE	6	DRAGON	0
2912	DRAGON TM	LIVE	6	DRAGON	0
2801	LAW TM	LIVE	3	LAW	0
2802	LAW TM	LIVE	3	LAW	0
2803	LAW TM	LIVE	3	LAW	0
2804	LAW TM	LIVE	3	LAW	0
2805	LAW TM	LIVE	3	LAW	0
2806	LAW TM	LIVE	3	LAW	0
2807	LAW TM	LIVE	3	LAW	0
2808	LAW TM	LIVE	3	LAW	0
2809	LAW TM	LIVE	3	LAW	0
2810	LAW TM	LIVE	3	LAW	0
2811	LAW TM	LIVE	3	LAW	0
2812	LAW TM	LIVE	3	LAW	0

THIS PAGE IS BEST QUALITY PRACTICABLE
FROM COPY FURNISHED TO DDC

2831	LAW TM	LIVE	3	LAW	0		
2832	LAW TM	LIVE	3	LAW	0		
2833	LAW TM	LIVE	3	LAW	0		
2834	LAW TM	LIVE	3	LAW	0		
2835	LAW TM	LIVE	3	LAW	0		
2836	LAW TM	LIVE	3	LAW	0		
2837	LAW TM	LIVE	3	LAW	0		
2838	LAW TM	LIVE	3	LAW	0		
2839	LAW TM	LIVE	3	LAW	0		
2840	LAW TM	LIVE	3	LAW	0		
2841	LAW TM	LIVE	3	LAW	0		
2842	LAW TM	LIVE	3	LAW	0		
2731	M106(MTR)	LIVE	1000	50 CAL	0		
2732	M106(MTR)	LIVE	1000	50 CAL	0		
2733	M106(MTR)	LIVE	1000	50 CAL	0		
2736	M113(C&C)	LIVE	1000	50 CAL	0		
BEGIN	RESOURCES	NOW	TOTAL	AMMUNITION	W/SURV	W/CASU	EXPENDED
13	M113(AFC)	3	72	DRAGON	12	35	25
			78	LAW	18	60	0
			13000	50 CAL	2896	9792	312
			119988	7.62 MG	29997	89991	0
1	M113(C&C)	1	1000	50 CAL	1000	0	0
4	M106(MTR)	4	4000	50 CAL	4000	0	0
24	LAW TM	20	72	LAW	60	12	0
12	DRAGON TM	9					

1140

THIS PAGE IS BEST QUALITY PRACTICABLE
FROM COPY FURNISHED TO DDC

BEGIN	RESOURCES	NOW	TOTAL	AMMUNITION	W/SURV	W/CASU	EXP
3301	ASP-1			LIVE			
			50	105 HEAT	50	105 HEAT	0
			200	105 APDS	200	105 APDS	0
			60	TOW	60	TOW	0
			60	DRAGON	60	DRAGON	0
			120	LAW	120	LAW	0
			9000	50 CAL	9000	50 CAL	0
3302	ASP-2			LIVE			
			50	105 HEAT	50	105 HEAT	0
			200	105 APDS	200	105 APDS	0
			60	TOW	60	TOW	0
			60	DRAGON	60	DRAGON	0
			120	LAW	120	LAW	0
			9000	50 CAL	9000	50 CAL	0
1	ASP-1	1					
			50	105 HEAT	50		0
			200	105 APDS	200		0
			60	TOW	60		0
			60	DRAGON	60		0
			120	LAW	120		0
			9000	50 CAL	9000		0
1	ASP-2	1					
			50	105 HEAT	50		0
			200	105 APDS	200		0
			60	TOW	60		0
			60	DRAGON	60		0
			120	LAW	120		0
			9000	50 CAL	9000		0

EXERCISE NAME: NWC 4-3-4

F-32

BMP	(6107)	DIED AT TIME	780 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1141),	FIRING	105 APDS	AT RANGE	250
BMP	(5107)	DIED AT TIME	780 OF MOBIL KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1104),	FIRING	105 APDS	AT RANGE	250
T62	(5510)	DIED AT TIME	780 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1176),	FIRING	105 APDS	AT RANGE	300
M60A1	(1102)	DIED AT TIME	780 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	T62	(5510),	FIRING	115 HUAFESD	AT RANGE	250
BMP	(6109)	DIED AT TIME	780 OF MOBIL KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1151),	FIRING	105 APDS	AT RANGE	200
T62	(5510)	DIED AT TIME	781 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1153),	FIRING	105 APDS	AT RANGE	250
T62	(5510)	DIED AT TIME	781 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1123),	FIRING	105 APDS	AT RANGE	300
BMP	(6109)	DIED AT TIME	784 OF MOBIL KILL DUE TO	M113(APC)	(1614),	FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE	300
BMP	(6107)	DIED AT TIME	791 OF MOBIL KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1152),	FIRING	105 APDS	AT RANGE	200
T62	(5258)	DIED AT TIME	792 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1124),	FIRING	105 APDS	AT RANGE	300
BMP	(6109)	DIED AT TIME	799 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1142),	FIRING	105 APDS	AT RANGE	250
M60A1	(141)	DIED AT TIME	812 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	RPG TM	(9960),	FIRING	RPG 7	AT RANGE	80
M60A1	(1176)	DIED AT TIME	813 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	RPG TM	(9966),	FIRING	RPG 7	AT RANGE	80
C&C ELEMENT	(3208)	DIED AT TIME	813 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	RPG TM	(9966),	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	50
RPG TM	(9966)	DIED AT TIME	840 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1143),	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	75
RPG TM	(9966)	DIED AT TIME	840 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1104),	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	50
RPG TM	(9966)	DIED AT TIME	840 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M113(APC)	(1614),	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	50
M60A1	(1254)	DIED AT TIME	840 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1151),	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	60
RPG TM	(9966)	DIED AT TIME	841 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(5168),	FIRING	115 HUAFESD	AT RANGE	500
RPG TM	(9966)	DIED AT TIME	841 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1213),	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	75
RPG TM	(9966)	DIED AT TIME	841 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1152),	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	50
RPG TM	(9966)	DIED AT TIME	842 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M113(APC)	(1621),	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	75
RPG TM	(9966)	DIED AT TIME	860 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1612),	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	75
RPG TM	(9966)	DIED AT TIME	860 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1212),	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	100
RPG TM	(9966)	DIED AT TIME	860 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1142),	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	50
RPG TM	(9966)	DIED AT TIME	861 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1214),	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	75
T62	(5168)	DIED AT TIME	871 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M113(APC)	(1612),	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	50
T62	(5168)	DIED AT TIME	872 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1253),	FIRING	105 APDS	AT RANGE	600
RPG TM	(9986)	DIED AT TIME	872 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1252),	FIRING	105 APDS	AT RANGE	600
RPG TM	(9986)	DIED AT TIME	874 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1143),	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	50
RPG TM	(9986)	DIED AT TIME	880 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1142),	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	75
RPG TM	(9986)	DIED AT TIME	891 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1103),	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	75
RPG TM	(9986)	DIED AT TIME	893 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1161),	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	75
RPG TM	(9986)	DIED AT TIME	893 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1244),	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	75
RPG TM	(9986)	DIED AT TIME	900 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1152),	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	50
SAGGER TM	(8845)	DIED AT TIME	900 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1221),	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	150
M60A1	(1112)	DIED AT TIME	900 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	RPG TM	(9956),	FIRING	RPG 7	AT RANGE	50
M60A1	(1111)	DIED AT TIME	900 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	RPG TM	(9960),	FIRING	RPG 7	AT RANGE	80
C&C ELEMENT	(3232)	DIED AT TIME	900 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	RPG TM	(9960),	FIRING	RPG 7	AT RANGE	80
SAGGER TM	(8894)	DIED AT TIME	901 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1223),	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	100
BMP	(6164)	DIED AT TIME	901 OF MOBIL KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1224),	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	300
BMP	(1101)	DIED AT TIME	901 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	RPG TM	(9997),	FIRING	RPG 7	AT RANGE	150
C&C ELEMENT	(3201)	DIED AT TIME	901 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	RPG TM	(9997),	FIRING	RPG 7	AT RANGE	150
BMP	(6164)	DIED AT TIME	902 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1203),	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	300
BMP	(6164)	DIED AT TIME	902 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1203),	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	300
M113(TOW)	(1731)	DIED AT TIME	902 OF MOBIL KILL DUE TO	BMP	(6158),	FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	250
RPG TM	(9972)	DIED AT TIME	904 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M113(APC)	(1623),	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	50
BMP	(6173)	DIED AT TIME	905 OF MOBIL KILL DUE TO	M113(APC)	(1503),	FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE	400
BMP	(6114)	DIED AT TIME	905 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M113(APC)	(1612),	FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE	400
BMP	(6158)	DIED AT TIME	905 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M113(APC)	(1501),	FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE	400

M113(TOW)	(1732)	DIED AT TIME	907 OF	FR&MO KILL	DUE TO	SAGGER TH	(8869),	FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE	600
SAGGER TH	(8873)	DIED AT TIME	913 OF	FR&MO KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1222),	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	100
RPG TH	(9968)	DIED AT TIME	931 OF	FR&MO KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1104),	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	50
SAGGER TH	(8898)	DIED AT TIME	932 OF	FR&MO KILL	DUE TO	BMP	(1224),	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	100
M113(APC)	(1626)	DIED AT TIME	932 OF	FR&MO KILL	DUE TO	BMP	(6173),	FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	250
CAC ELEMENT	(1228)	DIED AT TIME	932 OF	FR&MO KILL	DUE TO	BMP	(6173),	FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	250
BMP	(6173)	DIED AT TIME	935 OF	MOBIL KILL	DUE TO	M113(APC)	(1501),	FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE	300
BMP	(6114)	DIED AT TIME	935 OF	FR&MO KILL	DUE TO	M113(APC)	(1503),	FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE	400
BMP	(6173)	DIED AT TIME	936 OF	FR&MO KILL	DUE TO	M113(APC)	(1623),	FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE	400
M60A1	(1104)	DIED AT TIME	937 OF	FR&MO KILL	DUE TO	SAGGER TH	(8869),	FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE	600
SAGGER TH	(8869)	DIED AT TIME	938 OF	FR&MO KILL	DUE TO	M113(TOW)	(1704),	FIRING	TOW	AT RANGE	1900
RPG TH	(9968)	DIED AT TIME	942 OF	FR&MO KILL	DUE TO	M113(APC)	(1621),	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	50
RPG TH	(9956)	DIED AT TIME	944 OF	FR&MO KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1241),	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	50
M60A1	(1203)	DIED AT TIME	948 OF	FR&MO KILL	DUE TO	BRODM-2	(6660),	FIRING	SAGGER BRDM	AT RANGE	620
RPG TH	(9957)	DIED AT TIME	949 OF	FR&MO KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1204),	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	150
RPG TH	(9956)	DIED AT TIME	955 OF	FR&MO KILL	DUE TO	M113(APC)	(1613),	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	75
RPG TH	(9982)	DIED AT TIME	955 OF	FR&MO KILL	DUE TO	M113(APC)	(1526),	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	100
RPG TH	(6178)	DIED AT TIME	960 OF	FR&MO KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1261),	FIRING	12, 8 IN HE	AT RANGE	300
SAGGER TH	(8851)	DIED AT TIME	960 OF	FR&MO KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1152),	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	600
BMP	(6178)	DIED AT TIME	961 OF	FR&MO KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1143),	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	500
BRODM-2	(7660)	DIED AT TIME	970 OF	FR&MO KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1251),	FIRING	105 AFDS	AT RANGE	550
SAGGER TH	(8898)	DIED AT TIME	971 OF	FR&MO KILL	DUE TO	M113(APC)	(1601),	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	100
M60A1	(1152)	DIED AT TIME	974 OF	FR&MO KILL	DUE TO	SAGGER TH	(8874),	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	1370
SAGGER TH	(8851)	DIED AT TIME	982 OF	FR&MO KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1103),	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	600
M113(APC)	(1576)	DIED AT TIME	990 OF	MOBIL KILL	DUE TO	T62	(5155),	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	200
M60A1	(1224)	DIED AT TIME	990 OF	FR&MO KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1221),	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	400
SAGGER TH	(8878)	DIED AT TIME	990 OF	FR&MO KILL	DUE TO	BMP	(6172),	FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	200
M113(APC)	(1502)	DIED AT TIME	991 OF	MOBIL KILL	DUE TO	BMP	(6108),	FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	400
M113(APC)	(1614)	DIED AT TIME	991 OF	FR&MO KILL	DUE TO	BMP	(6108),	FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	400
M113(APC)	(2908)	DIED AT TIME	991 OF	FR&MO KILL	DUE TO	BMP	(6108),	FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	400
LAW TH	(2808)	DIED AT TIME	991 OF	FR&MO KILL	DUE TO	BMP	(6108),	FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	400
LAW TH	(2838)	DIED AT TIME	991 OF	FR&MO KILL	DUE TO	RPG TH	(9964),	FIRING	RPG 7	AT RANGE	50
M113(APC)	(1622)	DIED AT TIME	991 OF	MOBIL KILL	DUE TO	BMP	(6118),	FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	300
M113(APC)	(1621)	DIED AT TIME	992 OF	MOBIL KILL	DUE TO	BMP	(1613),	FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE	300
BMP	(6113)	DIED AT TIME	994 OF	FR&MO KILL	DUE TO	M113(APC)	(1611),	FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE	300
BMP	(6172)	DIED AT TIME	994 OF	MOBIL KILL	DUE TO	M113(APC)	(1621),	FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE	300
T62	(5551)	DIED AT TIME	994 OF	FR&MO KILL	DUE TO	M113(APC)	(1612),	FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE	300
T62	(5504)	DIED AT TIME	995 OF	MOBIL KILL	DUE TO	M113(APC)	(1601),	FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE	350
BMP	(6175)	DIED AT TIME	995 OF	FR&MO KILL	DUE TO	M113(APC)	(1622),	FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE	400
BMP	(6181)	DIED AT TIME	995 OF	MOBIL KILL	DUE TO	M113(APC)	(1602),	FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE	350
BMP	(6175)	DIED AT TIME	996 OF	FR&MO KILL	DUE TO	M113(APC)	(1702),	FIRING	TOW	AT RANGE	2000
SAGGER TH	(8883)	DIED AT TIME	996 OF	FR&MO KILL	DUE TO	M113(TOW)	(7794),	FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	300
M60A1	(1222)	DIED AT TIME	1003 OF	FR&MO KILL	DUE TO	SPC 9	(1223),	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	200
SPC 9	(7794)	DIED AT TIME	1015 OF	FR&MO KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(6113),	FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	200
M60A1	(1214)	DIED AT TIME	1020 OF	FR&MO KILL	DUE TO	BMP	(6172),	FIRING	115 HEAT	AT RANGE	250
M113(APC)	(1611)	DIED AT TIME	1020 OF	MOBIL KILL	DUE TO	BMP	(6108),	FIRING	115 HEAT	AT RANGE	50
RPG TH	(9981)	DIED AT TIME	1020 OF	FR&MO KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1263),	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	200
BMP	(6172)	DIED AT TIME	1020 OF	FR&MO KILL	DUE TO	T62	(1253),	FIRING	115 HEAT	AT RANGE	200
M113(APC)	(1601)	DIED AT TIME	1021 OF	MOBIL KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1252),	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	50
SPC TH	(9984)	DIED AT TIME	1021 OF	FR&MO KILL	DUE TO	M113(APC)	(1604),	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	50
SAGGER TH	(8851)	DIED AT TIME	1021 OF	FR&MO KILL	DUE TO	BMP	(6181),	FIRING	115 HEAT	AT RANGE	400

BMP	(6118)	DIED AT TIME 1021	1021	OF	MOBIL KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1122)	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	200
M60A1	(1113)	DIED AT TIME 1021	1021	OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	T62	(6531)	FIRING	115 CAL	AT RANGE	150
RPG TH	(9977)	DIED AT TIME 1021	1021	OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1251)	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	50
BMP	(6165)	DIED AT TIME 1023	1023	OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M113(AFC)	(1622)	FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE	300
BMP	(6118)	DIED AT TIME 1025	1025	OF	MOBIL KILL DUE TO	M113(AFC)	(1501)	FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE	300
BMP	(6113)	DIED AT TIME 1025	1025	OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M113(AFC)	(1502)	FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE	300
BMP	(6181)	DIED AT TIME 1025	1025	OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M113(AFC)	(1621)	FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE	300
BMP	(6116)	DIED AT TIME 1028	1028	OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M113(TOW)	(1503)	FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE	400
SAGGER TH	(8874)	DIED AT TIME 1031	1031	OF	MOBIL KILL DUE TO	RPG TH	(1704)	FIRING	TOW	AT RANGE	1700
M113(AFC)	(1611)	DIED AT TIME 1031	1031	OF	MOBIL KILL DUE TO	RPG TH	(9958)	FIRING	RPG 7	AT RANGE	100
T62	(5160)	DIED AT TIME 1035	1035	OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1143)	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	200
M60A1	(1122)	DIED AT TIME 1037	1037	OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	RPG TH	(9964)	FIRING	RPG 7	AT RANGE	50
M60A1	(1126)	DIED AT TIME 1039	1039	OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	RPG TH	(9988)	FIRING	RPG 7	AT RANGE	50
RPG TH	(9951)	DIED AT TIME 1040	1040	OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1221)	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	75
RPG TH	(9954)	DIED AT TIME 1042	1042	OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1223)	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	50
RPG TH	(9976)	DIED AT TIME 1050	1050	OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M113(AFC)	(1623)	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	50
BMP	(6112)	DIED AT TIME 1050	1050	OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1243)	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	500
BMP	(6113)	DIED AT TIME 1051	1051	OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1275)	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	400
BMP	(6118)	DIED AT TIME 1051	1051	OF	MOBIL KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1162)	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	500
M113(AFC)	(1602)	DIED AT TIME 1051	1051	OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	BMP	(6164)	FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	200
DRAGON TH	(2902)	DIED AT TIME 1051	1051	OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	BMP	(6164)	FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	200
LAW TH	(2802)	DIED AT TIME 1051	1051	OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	BMP	(6164)	FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	200
LAW TH	(2832)	DIED AT TIME 1051	1051	OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	BMP	(6164)	FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	200
RPG TH	(9964)	DIED AT TIME 1051	1051	OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	BMP	(6164)	FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	200
BMP	(6108)	DIED AT TIME 1051	1051	OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M113(AFC)	(1525)	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	50
M60A1	(1204)	DIED AT TIME 1051	1051	OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1262)	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	500
RPG TH	(9964)	DIED AT TIME 1051	1051	OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	IMF	(6117)	FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	750
RPG TH	(9964)	DIED AT TIME 1051	1051	OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1275)	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	50
BMP	(6113)	DIED AT TIME 1051	1051	OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1143)	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	450
BMP	(6108)	DIED AT TIME 1051	1051	OF	MOBIL KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1263)	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	500
BMP	(6112)	DIED AT TIME 1052	1052	OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1164)	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	500
RPG TH	(9992)	DIED AT TIME 1052	1052	OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M113(AFC)	(1611)	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	75
M60A1	(1202)	DIED AT TIME 1052	1052	OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	BMP	(6161)	FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	250
T62	(5531)	DIED AT TIME 1052	1052	OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1124)	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	500
T62	(5531)	DIED AT TIME 1052	1052	OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1143)	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	550
BMP	(6119)	DIED AT TIME 1053	1053	OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M113(TOW)	(1724)	FIRING	TOW	AT RANGE	700
BMP	(6108)	DIED AT TIME 1054	1054	OF	MOBIL KILL DUE TO	M113(AFC)	(1502)	FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE	300
BMP	(6113)	DIED AT TIME 1054	1054	OF	MOBIL KILL DUE TO	M113(AFC)	(1501)	FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE	300
BMP	(6164)	DIED AT TIME 1055	1055	OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M113(AFC)	(1603)	FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE	400
BMP	(6119)	DIED AT TIME 1055	1055	OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M113(AFC)	(1601)	FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE	700
BMP	(6112)	DIED AT TIME 1056	1056	OF	MOBIL KILL DUE TO	M113(AFC)	(1621)	FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE	500
BMP	(6108)	DIED AT TIME 1057	1057	OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M113(AFC)	(1522)	FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE	500
M60A1	(1263)	DIED AT TIME 1059	1059	OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	RPG TH	(9971)	FIRING	RPG 7	AT RANGE	50
RPG TH	(9977)	DIED AT TIME 1061	1061	OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1253)	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	50
BMP	(6170)	DIED AT TIME 1065	1065	OF	MOBIL KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1223)	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	200
T62	(5253)	DIED AT TIME 1067	1067	OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1252)	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	300
RPG TH	(9958)	DIED AT TIME 1070	1070	OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M113(AFC)	(1503)	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	75
BMP	(6119)	DIED AT TIME 1071	1071	OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1221)	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	400
M60A1	(1261)	DIED AT TIME 1117	1117	OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	RPG TH	(9988)	FIRING	RPG 7	AT RANGE	50
C&C ELEMENT	(3215)	DIED AT TIME 1117	1117	OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	RPG TH	(9988)	FIRING	RPG 7	AT RANGE	50

*** CORONER'S REPORT ***

EXERCISE NAME: NWC 4-3-4

BLUE FORCE

M113(APC)	(1603)	DIED AT TIME	259 OF	F8&M	KILL DUE TO	BROM-2	(7662),	FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE	2000
DRAGON TM	(2903)	DIED AT TIME	259 OF	F8&M	KILL DUE TO	BROM-2	(7662),	FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE	2000
LAW TM	(2803)	DIED AT TIME	259 OF	F8&M	KILL DUE TO	BROM-2	(7662),	FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE	2000
LAW TM	(2833)	DIED AT TIME	259 OF	F8&M	KILL DUE TO	BROM-2	(7662),	FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE	2000
M113(APC)	(1604)	DIED AT TIME	288 OF	MOBIL	KILL DUE TO	BROM-2	(7662),	FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE	2000
M60A1	(1201)	DIED AT TIME	452 OF	F8&M	KILL DUE TO	T62	(5527),	FIRING	115 HEAT	AT RANGE	360
CAC ELEMENT(3209)	(1209)	DIED AT TIME	452 OF	F8&M	KILL DUE TO	T62	(5527),	FIRING	115 HEAT	AT RANGE	360
M60A1	(1242)	DIED AT TIME	601 OF	F8&M	KILL DUE TO	T62	(5527),	FIRING	115 HEAT	AT RANGE	360
M60A1	(1242)	DIED AT TIME	601 OF	F8&M	KILL DUE TO	T62	(5527),	FIRING	115 HEAT	AT RANGE	360
M60A1	(1211)	DIED AT TIME	691 OF	F8&M	KILL DUE TO	T62	(5233),	FIRING	115 HVAPFSD	AT RANGE	800
CAC ELEMENT(3210)	(1210)	DIED AT TIME	691 OF	F8&M	KILL DUE TO	T62	(5233),	FIRING	115 HVAPFSD	AT RANGE	800
M60A1	(1236)	DIED AT TIME	691 OF	F8&M	KILL DUE TO	T62	(5110),	FIRING	115 HVAPFSD	AT RANGE	800
CAC ELEMENT(3212)	(1212)	DIED AT TIME	691 OF	F8&M	KILL DUE TO	T62	(5110),	FIRING	115 HVAPFSD	AT RANGE	800
M60A1	(1144)	DIED AT TIME	692 OF	F8&M	KILL DUE TO	BMP	(6173),	FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	250
M60A1	(1198)	DIED AT TIME	701 OF	F8&M	KILL DUE TO	SAGGER TM	(9960),	FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE	1150
M60A1	(1136)	DIED AT TIME	780 OF	F8&M	KILL DUE TO	T62	(5258),	FIRING	115 HVAPFSD	AT RANGE	250
CAC ELEMENT(3204)	(1204)	DIED AT TIME	780 OF	F8&M	KILL DUE TO	T62	(5258),	FIRING	115 HVAPFSD	AT RANGE	250
M60A1	(1141)	DIED AT TIME	812 OF	F8&M	KILL DUE TO	RPG TM	(9960),	FIRING	RPG 7	AT RANGE	50
M60A1	(1176)	DIED AT TIME	813 OF	F8&M	KILL DUE TO	RPG TM	(9960),	FIRING	RPG 7	AT RANGE	50
CAC ELEMENT(3208)	(1208)	DIED AT TIME	813 OF	F8&M	KILL DUE TO	RPG TM	(9960),	FIRING	RPG 7	AT RANGE	50
M60A1	(1254)	DIED AT TIME	840 OF	F8&M	KILL DUE TO	T62	(5168),	FIRING	115 HVAPFSD	AT RANGE	600
M60A1	(1112)	DIED AT TIME	900 OF	F8&M	KILL DUE TO	RPG TM	(9956),	FIRING	RPG 7	AT RANGE	50
M60A1	(1111)	DIED AT TIME	900 OF	F8&M	KILL DUE TO	RPG TM	(9956),	FIRING	RPG 7	AT RANGE	50
CAC ELEMENT(3202)	(1202)	DIED AT TIME	900 OF	F8&M	KILL DUE TO	RPG TM	(9960),	FIRING	RPG 7	AT RANGE	50
M60A1	(1101)	DIED AT TIME	901 OF	F8&M	KILL DUE TO	RPG TM	(9960),	FIRING	RPG 7	AT RANGE	50
CAC ELEMENT(3201)	(1201)	DIED AT TIME	901 OF	F8&M	KILL DUE TO	RPG TM	(9960),	FIRING	RPG 7	AT RANGE	50
M113(TOW)	(1731)	DIED AT TIME	902 OF	MOBIL	KILL DUE TO	RMP	(1418),	FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	250
M113(TOW)	(1732)	DIED AT TIME	907 OF	F8&M	KILL DUE TO	SAGGER TM	(8869),	FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE	400
M113(APC)	(1626)	DIED AT TIME	932 OF	F8&M	KILL DUE TO	BMP	(6173),	FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	250
CAC ELEMENT(3228)	(1228)	DIED AT TIME	932 OF	F8&M	KILL DUE TO	BMP	(6173),	FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	250
M60A1	(1104)	DIED AT TIME	937 OF	F8&M	KILL DUE TO	SAGGER TM	(9869),	FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE	400

M60A1	(1203)	DIED AT TIME	949	OF	FP&MO	KILL	DUE TO	SDRM 2	FIRING	SAGGER	SDRM	AT RANGE	420
M60A1	(1152)	DIED AT TIME	974	OF	FP&MO	KILL	DUE TO	SAGGER	FIRING	SAGGER	SDRM	AT RANGE	1370
M113(AFC)	(1526)	DIED AT TIME	990	OF	MOBIL	KILL	DUE TO	T62	FIRING	115 HEAT		AT RANGE	200
M60A1	(1224)	DIED AT TIME	990	OF	FP&MO	KILL	DUE TO	RPG TM	FIRING	RPG 7		AT RANGE	100
M113(AFC)	(1502)	DIED AT TIME	991	OF	MOBIL	KILL	DUE TO	BMP	FIRING	73 HEAT		AT RANGE	200
M113(AFC)	(1614)	DIED AT TIME	991	OF	FP&MO	KILL	DUE TO	BMP	FIRING	73 HEAT		AT RANGE	400
DRAGON TM	(2908)	DIED AT TIME	991	OF	FP&MO	KILL	DUE TO	BMP	FIRING	73 HEAT		AT RANGE	400
LAW TM	(2808)	DIED AT TIME	991	OF	FP&MO	KILL	DUE TO	BMP	FIRING	73 HEAT		AT RANGE	400
LAW TM	(2838)	DIED AT TIME	991	OF	FP&MO	KILL	DUE TO	BMP	FIRING	73 HEAT		AT RANGE	400
M113(AFC)	(1622)	DIED AT TIME	991	OF	MOBIL	KILL	DUE TO	RPG TM	FIRING	RPG 7		AT RANGE	50
M113(AFC)	(1621)	DIED AT TIME	992	OF	MOBIL	KILL	DUE TO	BMP	FIRING	73 HEAT		AT RANGE	300
M60A1	(1222)	DIED AT TIME	1003	OF	FP&MO	KILL	DUE TO	SPG 9	FIRING	76 HEAT		AT RANGE	300
M60A1	(1214)	DIED AT TIME	1020	OF	FP&MO	KILL	DUE TO	BMP	FIRING	73 HEAT		AT RANGE	200
M113(AFC)	(1611)	DIED AT TIME	1020	OF	MOBIL	KILL	DUE TO	BMP	FIRING	115 HEAT		AT RANGE	200
M113(AFC)	(1623)	DIED AT TIME	1020	OF	MOBIL	KILL	DUE TO	BMP	FIRING	115 HEAT		AT RANGE	200
M60A1	(1601)	DIED AT TIME	1021	OF	MOBIL	KILL	DUE TO	BMP	FIRING	115 HEAT		AT RANGE	200
M60A1	(1113)	DIED AT TIME	1021	OF	FP&MO	KILL	DUE TO	BMP	FIRING	115 HEAT		AT RANGE	200
M60A1	(1113)	DIED*AT TIME	1021	OF	FP&MO	KILL	DUE TO	T62	FIRING	115 HEAT		AT RANGE	150
M113(AFC)	(1611)	DIED*AT TIME	1031	OF	MOBIL	KILL	DUE TO	RPG TM	FIRING	RPG 7		AT RANGE	100
M60A1	(1122)	DIED AT TIME	1037	OF	FP&MO	KILL	DUE TO	RPG TM	FIRING	RPG 7		AT RANGE	50
M60A1	(1126)	DIED AT TIME	1039	OF	FP&MO	KILL	DUE TO	RPG TM	FIRING	RPG 7		AT RANGE	50
M113(AFC)	(1602)	DIED AT TIME	1051	OF	FP&MO	KILL	DUE TO	BMP	FIRING	73 HEAT		AT RANGE	200
DRAGON TM	(2902)	DIED AT TIME	1051	OF	FP&MO	KILL	DUE TO	BMP	FIRING	73 HEAT		AT RANGE	200
LAW TM	(2802)	DIED AT TIME	1051	OF	FP&MO	KILL	DUE TO	BMP	FIRING	73 HEAT		AT RANGE	200
LAW TM	(2832)	DIED AT TIME	1051	OF	FP&MO	KILL	DUE TO	BMP	FIRING	73 HEAT		AT RANGE	200
M60A1	(1204)	DIED AT TIME	1051	OF	FP&MO	KILL	DUE TO	BMP	FIRING	73 HEAT		AT RANGE	200
M60A1	(1202)	DIED AT TIME	1052	OF	FP&MO	KILL	DUE TO	BMP	FIRING	73 HEAT		AT RANGE	200
M60A1	(1263)	DIED AT TIME	1053	OF	FP&MO	KILL	DUE TO	RPG TM	FIRING	RPG 7		AT RANGE	250
M60A1	(1261)	DIED AT TIME	1117	OF	FP&MO	KILL	DUE TO	RPG TM	FIRING	RPG 7		AT RANGE	50
CAC ELEMENT	(3215)	DIED AT TIME	1117	OF	FP&MO	KILL	DUE TO	RPG TM	FIRING	RPG 7		AT RANGE	50

*** COKNER'S REPORT ***

EXERCISE NAME: NWC 4-3-4

SAGGER TH	(8857)	DIED AT TIME	42 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	INDIRECT FIRE, BATTERY NO.	6, 155 MM SI	AT RANGE 1050
SAGGER TH	(8858)	DIED AT TIME	42 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	INDIRECT FIRE, BATTERY NO.	4, 155 MM SI	AT RANGE 1050
BROTH-2	(7662)	DIED AT TIME	305 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M113(TOW)	TOW	AT RANGE 1050
MDM	(7663)	DIED AT TIME	305 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M113(TOW)	TOW	AT RANGE 1050
T62	(5152)	DIED AT TIME	367 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M113(TOW)	TOW	AT RANGE 1050
T62	(5274)	DIED AT TIME	491 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	105 APDS	AT RANGE 500
T62	(5527)	DIED AT TIME	601 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	105 APDS	AT RANGE 550
T62	(5110)	DIED AT TIME	694 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M113(TOW)	TOW	AT RANGE 1000
T62	(5233)	DIED AT TIME	695 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M113(TOW)	TOW	AT RANGE 1000
T62	(5233)	DIED AT TIME	695 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M113(TOW)	TOW	AT RANGE 1000
T62	(5147)	DIED AT TIME	695 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M113(TOW)	TOW	AT RANGE 1000
BMP	(8876)	DIED AT TIME	708 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	DRAGON	AT RANGE 450
SAGGER TH	(8876)	DIED AT TIME	710 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	105 HEAT	AT RANGE 200
SAGGER TH	(8876)	DIED AT TIME	710 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	105 HEAT	AT RANGE 250
BMP	(6128)	DIED AT TIME	715 OF MOBIL KILL DUE TO	M60A1	105 APDS	AT RANGE 1050
BMP	(6128)	DIED AT TIME	718 OF MOBIL KILL DUE TO	M60A1	105 APDS	AT RANGE 1050
BMP	(6176)	DIED AT TIME	720 OF MOBIL KILL DUE TO	M60A1	105 HEAT	AT RANGE 200
BMP	(9965)	DIED AT TIME	723 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	INDIRECT FIRE, BATTERY NO.	1, 81 MM HE	AT RANGE 1050
BMP	(6126)	DIED AT TIME	725 OF MOBIL KILL DUE TO	M113(TOW)	TOW	AT RANGE 1050
BMP	(6126)	DIED AT TIME	725 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M113(TOW)	TOW	AT RANGE 1050
BMP	(6126)	DIED AT TIME	725 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M113(TOW)	TOW	AT RANGE 1050
BMP	(6126)	DIED AT TIME	725 OF MOBIL KILL DUE TO	M113(TOW)	TOW	AT RANGE 1050
BMP	(6126)	DIED AT TIME	726 OF MOBIL KILL DUE TO	M113(TOW)	TOW	AT RANGE 1050
BMP	(6126)	DIED AT TIME	731 OF MOBIL KILL DUE TO	M60A1	105 APDS	AT RANGE 200
BMP	(6167)	DIED AT TIME	738 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	105 APDS	AT RANGE 1000
SAGGER TH	(8876)	DIED AT TIME	740 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	105 HEAT	AT RANGE 200
RPG TH	(9990)	DIED AT TIME	751 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M113(TOW)	50 CAL	AT RANGE 75
RPG TH	(9990)	DIED AT TIME	752 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M113(TOW)	50 CAL	AT RANGE 100
BMP	(6176)	DIED AT TIME	752 OF MOBIL KILL DUE TO	M60A1	105 HEAT	AT RANGE 200
BMP	(6176)	DIED AT TIME	754 OF MOBIL KILL DUE TO	M113(TOW)	TOW	AT RANGE 1050
BMP	(6176)	DIED AT TIME	754 OF MOBIL KILL DUE TO	M113(TOW)	TOW	AT RANGE 1050
BMP	(6176)	DIED AT TIME	756 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M113(TOW)	DRAGON	AT RANGE 400
RPG TH	(9990)	DIED AT TIME	771 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M113(TOW)	50 CAL	AT RANGE 50
BMP	(6107)	DIED AT TIME	780 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	105 APDS	AT RANGE 250
BMP	(5107)	DIED AT TIME	780 OF MOBIL KILL DUE TO	M60A1	105 APDS	AT RANGE 300
T62	(5107)	DIED AT TIME	780 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	105 APDS	AT RANGE 200
BMP	(6109)	DIED AT TIME	780 OF MOBIL KILL DUE TO	M60A1	105 APDS	AT RANGE 250
T62	(5510)	DIED AT TIME	781 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	105 APDS	AT RANGE 300
BMP	(6109)	DIED AT TIME	784 OF MOBIL KILL DUE TO	M113(TOW)	DRAGON	AT RANGE 300

BMP	(6107)	DIED AT TIME	791 OF	MORIL	KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1152)	FIRING	105 APDS	AT RANGE	200
T62	(5258)	DIED AT TIME	792 OF	FP8MO	KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1124)	FIRING	105 APDS	AT RANGE	300
BMP	(6109)	DIED AT TIME	799 OF	FP8MO	KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1142)	FIRING	105 APDS	AT RANGE	250
RPG TH	(9966)	DIED AT TIME	840 OF	FP8MO	KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1143)	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	50
RPG TH	(9966)	DIED AT TIME	840 OF	FP8MO	KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1104)	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	75
RPG TH	(9966)	DIED AT TIME	840 OF	FP8MO	KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1614)	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	50
RPG TH	(9966)	DIED AT TIME	840 OF	FP8MO	KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1151)	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	60
RPG TH	(9966)	DIED AT TIME	841 OF	FP8MO	KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1213)	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	75
RPG TH	(9966)	DIED AT TIME	841 OF	FP8MO	KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1152)	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	50
RPG TH	(9962)	DIED AT TIME	841 OF	FP8MO	KILL	DUE TO	M113(APC)	(1621)	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	75
RPG TH	(9966)	DIED AT TIME	842 OF	FP8MO	KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1612)	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	75
RPG TH	(9966)	DIED AT TIME	860 OF	FP8MO	KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1212)	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	100
RPG TH	(9966)	DIED AT TIME	860 OF	FP8MO	KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1142)	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	50
RPG TH	(9966)	DIED AT TIME	860 OF	FP8MO	KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1214)	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	75
RPG TH	(9966)	DIED AT TIME	861 OF	FP8MO	KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1613)	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	50
RPG TH	(5168)	DIED AT TIME	871 OF	FP8MO	KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1253)	FIRING	105 APDS	AT RANGE	600
T62	(5168)	DIED AT TIME	872 OF	FP8MO	KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1252)	FIRING	105 APDS	AT RANGE	600
RPG TH	(9954)	DIED AT TIME	874 OF	FP8MO	KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1142)	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	50
RPG TH	(9960)	DIED AT TIME	880 OF	FP8MO	KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1103)	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	75
RPG TH	(9986)	DIED AT TIME	891 OF	FP8MO	KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1161)	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	75
RPG TH	(9954)	DIED AT TIME	893 OF	FP8MO	KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1244)	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	75
RPG TH	(9986)	DIED AT TIME	893 OF	FP8MO	KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1152)	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	50
SAGGER TH	(8894)	DIED AT TIME	900 OF	FP8MO	KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1221)	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	150
SAGGER TH	(8894)	DIED AT TIME	901 OF	FP8MO	KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1223)	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	100
BMP	(6164)	DIED AT TIME	901 OF	MORIL	KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1224)	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	100
BMP	(6154)	DIED AT TIME	902 OF	FP8MO	KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1222)	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	100
BMP	(6163)	DIED AT TIME	902 OF	FP8MO	KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1202)	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	300
RPG TH	(9972)	DIED AT TIME	904 OF	FP8MO	KILL	DUE TO	M113(APC)	(1623)	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	50
BMP	(6173)	DIED AT TIME	905 OF	MORIL	KILL	DUE TO	M113(APC)	(1503)	FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE	400
BMP	(6114)	DIED AT TIME	905 OF	FP8MO	KILL	DUE TO	M113(APC)	(1612)	FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE	400
BMP	(6158)	DIED AT TIME	905 OF	FP8MO	KILL	DUE TO	M113(APC)	(1501)	FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE	400
SAGGER TH	(8873)	DIED AT TIME	913 OF	FP8MO	KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1222)	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	100
RPG TH	(9968)	DIED AT TIME	931 OF	FP8MO	KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1104)	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	50
SAGGER TH	(8898)	DIED AT TIME	932 OF	FP8MO	KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1224)	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	100
BMP	(6173)	DIED AT TIME	935 OF	MORIL	KILL	DUE TO	M113(APC)	(1501)	FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE	300
BMP	(6114)	DIED AT TIME	935 OF	FP8MO	KILL	DUE TO	M113(APC)	(1503)	FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE	400
BMP	(6173)	DIED AT TIME	936 OF	FP8MO	KILL	DUE TO	M113(APC)	(1523)	FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE	400
SAGGER TH	(8869)	DIED AT TIME	936 OF	FP8MO	KILL	DUE TO	M113(TW)	(1704)	FIRING	TOW	AT RANGE	1900
RPG TH	(9968)	DIED AT TIME	942 OF	FP8MO	KILL	DUE TO	M113(APC)	(1621)	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	50
RPG TH	(9956)	DIED AT TIME	944 OF	FP8MO	KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1241)	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	50
RPG TH	(9997)	DIED AT TIME	949 OF	FP8MO	KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1204)	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	150
RPG TH	(9956)	DIED AT TIME	955 OF	FP8MO	KILL	DUE TO	M113(APC)	(1613)	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	75
RPG TH	(9956)	DIED AT TIME	955 OF	FP8MO	KILL	DUE TO	M113(APC)	(1623)	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	100
RPG TH	(9982)	DIED AT TIME	957 OF	FP8MO	KILL	DUE TO	INDIRECT FIRE, BATTERY NO.	12, 3 IN	HE			
BMP	(6178)	DIED AT TIME	960 OF	FP8MO	KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1261)	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	300
SAGGER TH	(8851)	DIED AT TIME	960 OF	FP8MO	KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1152)	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	600
BMP	(6178)	DIED AT TIME	961 OF	FP8MO	KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1143)	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	600
BDM-2	(7660)	DIED AT TIME	970 OF	FP8MO	KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1253)	FIRING	105 APDS	AT RANGE	550

SAGGER TH	(8898)	DIED*AT	TIME	971	OF	FP&MO	KILL	DUE TO	M113(AFC)	(1601),	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	100
SAGGER TH	(8851)	DIED*AT	TIME	982	OF	FP&MO	KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1103),	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	600
SAGGER TH	(8878)	DIED AT	TIME	990	OF	FP&MO	KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1221),	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	50
BMP	(6113)	DIED AT	TIME	994	OF	FP&MO	KILL	DUE TO	M113(AFC)	(1613),	FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE	300
BMP	(6172)	DIED AT	TIME	994	OF	MOBIL	KILL	DUE TO	M113(AFC)	(1611),	FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE	300
T62	(5551)	DIED AT	TIME	994	OF	FP&MO	KILL	DUE TO	M113(AFC)	(1621),	FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE	300
T62	(5504)	DIED AT	TIME	994	OF	FP&MO	KILL	DUE TO	M113(AFC)	(1612),	FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE	300
BMP	(6175)	DIED AT	TIME	995	OF	FP&MO	KILL	DUE TO	M113(AFC)	(1601),	FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE	350
BMP	(6181)	DIED AT	TIME	995	OF	MOBIL	KILL	DUE TO	M113(AFC)	(1622),	FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE	400
BMP	(6175)	DIED*AT	TIME	996	OF	FP&MO	KILL	DUE TO	M113(AFC)	(1602),	FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE	350
SAGGER TH	(8883)	DIED AT	TIME	999	OF	FP&MO	KILL	DUE TO	M113(TOW)	(1702),	FIRING	TOW	AT RANGE	2000
SPG 9	(7794)	DIED AT	TIME	1015	OF	FP&MO	KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1223),	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	300
RPG TH	(9981)	DIED AT	TIME	1020	OF	FP&MO	KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1253),	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	50
BMP	(6172)	DIED*AT	TIME	1021	OF	FP&MO	KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1253),	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	200
RPG TH	(9984)	DIED AT	TIME	1021	OF	FP&MO	KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1604),	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	50
SAGGER TH	(8853)	DIED AT	TIME	1021	OF	FP&MO	KILL	DUE TO	M113(AFC)	(1604),	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	50
BMP	(6118)	DIED AT	TIME	1021	OF	MOBIL	KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1122),	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	200
RPG TH	(9977)	DIED AT	TIME	1021	OF	FP&MO	KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1251),	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	50
BMP	(6165)	DIED AT	TIME	1023	OF	FP&MO	KILL	DUE TO	M113(AFC)	(1251),	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	50
BMP	(6118)	DIED*AT	TIME	1025	OF	FP&MO	KILL	DUE TO	M113(AFC)	(1501),	FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE	200
BMP	(6113)	DIED*AT	TIME	1025	OF	MOBIL	KILL	DUE TO	M113(AFC)	(1502),	FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE	300
BMP	(6181)	DIED*AT	TIME	1025	OF	FP&MO	KILL	DUE TO	M113(AFC)	(1621),	FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE	300
BMP	(6115)	DIED AT	TIME	1025	OF	FP&MO	KILL	DUE TO	M113(AFC)	(1503),	FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE	400
SAGGER TH	(8874)	DIED AT	TIME	1028	OF	FP&MO	KILL	DUE TO	M113(TOW)	(1704),	FIRING	TOW	AT RANGE	1200
T62	(5160)	DIED AT	TIME	1035	OF	FP&MO	KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1143),	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	200
RPG TH	(9951)	DIED AT	TIME	1040	OF	FP&MO	KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1251),	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	50
RPG TH	(9954)	DIED*AT	TIME	1042	OF	FP&MO	KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1251),	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	50
RPG TH	(9976)	DIED AT	TIME	1050	OF	FP&MO	KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1243),	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	500
BMP	(6112)	DIED AT	TIME	1050	OF	FP&MO	KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1243),	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	400
BMP	(6113)	DIED*AT	TIME	1051	OF	FP&MO	KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1276),	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	500
BMP	(6118)	DIED*AT	TIME	1051	OF	MOBIL	KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1143),	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	50
RPG TH	(9964)	DIED AT	TIME	1051	OF	FP&MO	KILL	DUE TO	M113(AFC)	(1526),	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	500
BMP	(6108)	DIED AT	TIME	1051	OF	FP&MO	KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1252),	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	500
RPG TH	(6108)	DIED AT	TIME	1051	OF	FP&MO	KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1114),	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	50
RPG TH	(9964)	DIED*AT	TIME	1051	OF	FP&MO	KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1212),	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	50
BMP	(6113)	DIED*AT	TIME	1051	OF	MOBIL	KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1143),	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	450
BMP	(6108)	DIED*AT	TIME	1051	OF	FP&MO	KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1243),	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	500
BMP	(6112)	DIED*AT	TIME	1052	OF	MOBIL	KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1184),	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	500
RPG TH	(9972)	DIED AT	TIME	1052	OF	FP&MO	KILL	DUE TO	M113(AFC)	(1611),	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	75
T62	(5531)	DIED AT	TIME	1052	OF	FP&MO	KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1243),	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	500
T62	(5531)	DIED*AT	TIME	1052	OF	FP&MO	KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1143),	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	550
BMP	(6119)	DIED AT	TIME	1054	OF	FP&MO	KILL	DUE TO	M113(TOW)	(1724),	FIRING	TOW	AT RANGE	200
BMP	(6108)	DIED*AT	TIME	1054	OF	MOBIL	KILL	DUE TO	M113(AFC)	(1502),	FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE	300
BMP	(6113)	DIED*AT	TIME	1054	OF	MOBIL	KILL	DUE TO	M113(AFC)	(1501),	FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE	300
BMP	(6119)	DIED*AT	TIME	1055	OF	FP&MO	KILL	DUE TO	M113(AFC)	(1604),	FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE	400
BMP	(6119)	DIED*AT	TIME	1055	OF	FP&MO	KILL	DUE TO	M113(AFC)	(1601),	FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE	300
BMP	(6112)	DIED*AT	TIME	1056	OF	MOBIL	KILL	DUE TO	M113(AFC)	(1621),	FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE	500
BMP	(6108)	DIED*AT	TIME	1057	OF	FP&MO	KILL	DUE TO	M113(AFC)	(1622),	FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE	500
RPG TH	(9977)	DIED*AT	TIME	1061	OF	FP&MO	KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1253),	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	50
BMP	(6170)	DIED AT	TIME	1065	OF	MOBIL	KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1253),	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	300
BMP	(5253)	DIED AT	TIME	1067	OF	FP&MO	KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1252),	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	300
T62	(5253)	DIED*AT	TIME	1068	OF	FP&MO	KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1252),	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	300
RPG TH	(9958)	DIED AT	TIME	1070	OF	FP&MO	KILL	DUE TO	M113(AFC)	(1503),	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	75
BMP	(6119)	DIED*AT	TIME	1071	OF	FP&MO	KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1221),	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	400


Appendix 2 (Scenario #1, Option II) to ANNEX F (Scenario #1)

1. The U.S. battalion opened its attack with a short three volley prep, the third volley of which started developing the smoke envelope around the attacking force.
2. One platoon of TOW Company moved into positions North of Steinbach (NA 525207) to overwatch outside the smoke envelope and limit Soviet lateral movement against the assault element. The other two platoons of the TOW Company accompanied the assault force as far as Hill 362 (NA 540217) where they overwatched other flank of the smoke envelope.
3. The assault force exited their attack position in the woods, vicinity NA 515223, and immediately entered the smoke envelope leading toward Betzenrod (NA 545205) and ultimately Hill 419 (NA 554199).
4. The Soviet tank platoon originally located on Hill 362 left their positions because of the smoke and tried to maneuver around the east flank of the assault force only to be destroyed in the maneuver.
5. The first determined opposition the assault met was in Betzenrod, the second band of the Soviet defense.
6. The battle from Betzenrod to Hill 419 was a bloody close range (most engagements were between 50 to 100 meters in range) fight with the U.S. suffering a disproportionate number of kills from RPG 7s and BMPs (73mm HEAT). The Infantry Company and the Scout Platoon (previously used to emplace smoke pots to fill gaps and thicken the smoke curtains led


this attack up the hill and consequently lost a large number of vehicles.


7. One tank company and two platoons of the TOW Company split off the final assault on Hill 419 to attack the forces on the ridge running North from Hill 419 (NA 555210) and quickly overran this force.

8. At the end of the attack, the U.S. battalion had opened a three kilometer wide penetration in the Soviet line and totally shattered the Soviet MRB. An exploiting force could easily have maneuvered through this penetration. Time sequenced photographs (pages F-44 to F-50) show the progress of the battle.




F-44






F-45



F-46


F-47




F-48



F-49



F-50



SCENARIO #1, OPTION II

SOVIET SYSTEMS KILLED BY U.S. SYSTEMS

	<u>T-62</u>	<u>BMP</u>	<u>Sagger Team</u>	<u>RPG Team</u>	<u>BRDM-2</u>
M-60A1	8	12	7 ²	12 ¹	1
TOW	3	2	3	0	1
DRAGON	2	10	1 ¹	6 ¹	0
LAW	0	0	0	0	0
Indirect Fire	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>0</u>
	13	24	13	20	2

U.S. SYSTEMS KILLED BY SOVIET SYSTEMS

	<u>M-60</u>	<u>TOW</u>	<u>M113</u>	<u>Dragon</u>	<u>LAW</u>
T-62	7	0	2		
BRDM-2	1		2	1 ³	2 ³
SAGGER TM	3	1			
RPG TM	10		1		
SPG 9	1				
BMP (73 HEAT)	5	1	7	2 ³	4 ³
Indirect Fire	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
	27	2	12	3	6

1. Killed by MG fire from system vehicle.
2. Includes two killed by MG fire from system vehicle.
3. Killed while riding in M113.

TASK FORCE 4-3-4 STATUS							
EXERCISE NWC 4-3-4, EX. TIME 1094							
BEGIN	RESOURCES	NDW	TOTAL	AMMUNITION	W/SURV	W/CASU	EXPENDED
54	M60A1	17					
			810	105 HEAT	243	534	33
			2160	105 APDS	668	1439	53
			432	105 SOF TGT	136	296	0
			108000	50 CAL	33909	73805	286
			108000	7.62 MG	34000	74000	0
17	M113(APC)	15					
			102	LAW	90	12	0
			17000	50 CAL	15000	2000	0
			90	DRAGON	78	12	0
			149985	7.62 MG	129987	19998	0
15	M113(TOW)	6					
			150	TOW	54	81	15
			18	105 SOF TGT	12	6	0
			15000	50 CAL	6000	9000	0
			72	LAW	24	48	0
2	M113(C&C)	1					
			6	LAW	0	6	0
			2000	50 CAL	1000	1000	0
4	M106(MTR)	4					
			4000	50 CAL	4000	0	0
37	LAW TM	29					
			150	LAW	108	42	0
15	DRAGON TM	14					
			90	DRAGON	84	6	0
26	C&C ELEMENT	12					
1	ASP-1	1					
			50	105 HEAT	50	0	0
			200	105 APDS	200	0	0
			60	TOW	60	0	0
			60	DRAGON	60	0	0
			120	LAW	120	0	0
			9000	50 CAL	9000	0	0
1	ASP-2	1					
			50	105 HEAT	50	0	0
			200	105 APDS	200	0	0
			60	TOW	60	0	0
			60	DRAGON	60	0	0
			120	LAW	120	0	0
			9000	50 CAL	9000	0	0

TEAM HQ STATUS
NWC 4-3-4, EX.

LIVE

YOTK

ADMINISTRATION

TEAM ALPHA STATUS
EXERCISE NWC 4-3-4, EX. TIME 1094

1101	M60A1	TOTK	15	105 HEAT	0
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SOF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1102	M60A1	MOBK	15	105 HEAT	0
			38	105 APDS	2
			8	105 SOF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1103	M60A1	TOTK	15	105 HEAT	0
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SOF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1104	M60A1	MOBK	13	105 HEAT	2
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SOF TGT	0
			1961	50 CAL	39
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1111	M60A1	LIVE	15	105 HEAT	0
			39	105 APDS	1
			8	105 SOF TGT	0
			1974	50 CAL	26
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1112	M60A1	TOTK	15	105 HEAT	0
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SOF TGT	0
			1974	50 CAL	26
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1113	M60A1	TOTK	15	105 HEAT	0
			38	105 APDS	2
			8	105 SOF TGT	0
			1974	50 CAL	26
			2000	7.62 MG	0

1114	M60A1	MORR	15	105 HEAT	0
			38	105 APDS	2
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			1961	50 CAL	39
			2000	7.62 MG	0

1121	M60A1	MORR	13	105 HEAT	2
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			1974	50 CAL	26
			2000	7.62 MG	0

1122	M60A1	LIVE	13	105 HEAT	2
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			1961	50 CAL	39
			2000	7.62 MG	0

1123	M60A1	TOTK	14	105 HEAT	1
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			1961	50 CAL	39
			2000	7.62 MG	0

1124	M60A1	LIVE	13	105 HEAT	2
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			1974	50 CAL	26
			2000	7.62 MG	0

1136	M60A1	TOTK	15	105 HEAT	0
			39	105 APDS	1
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0

BEGIN	RESOURCES	NOV	TOTAL	AMMUNITION	W/SURV	W/DASH	EXPENDED
13	M60A1	3	195	105 HEAT	41	145	9
			520	105 APDS	119	393	8
			104	105 SDF TGT	24	80	0
			26000	50 CAL	5909	19805	286
			26000	7.62 MG	6000	20000	0

TEAM BRAVO STATUS
EXERCISE NWC 4-3-4, EX. TIME 1094

1141	M60A1	MURK	15	105 HEAT	0
			39	105 APDS	1
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1142	M60A1	LIVE	15	105 HEAT	0
			38	105 APDS	2
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1143	M60A1	TOTK	15	105 HEAT	0
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1144	M60A1	LIVE	15	105 HEAT	0
			38	105 APDS	2
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1151	M60A1	TOTK	15	105 HEAT	0
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1152	M60A1	LIVE	13	105 HEAT	2
			39	105 APDS	1
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0

1153	M60A1	LIVE	15	105 HEAT	0
			38	105 APDS	2
			8	105 SOF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1154	M60A1	FRONT	15	105 HEAT	0
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SOF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1161	M60A1	TOT	15	105 HEAT	0
			38	105 APDS	2
			8	105 SOF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1162	M60A1	TOT	15	105 HEAT	0
			38	105 APDS	2
			8	105 SOF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1163	M60A1	LIVE	13	105 HEAT	2
			38	105 APDS	2
			8	105 SOF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1164	M60A1	TOT	13	105 HEAT	2
			39	105 APDS	1
			8	105 SOF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1176	M60A1	LIVE	13	105 HEAT	2
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SOF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0

BEGIN	RESOURCES	NOW	TOTAL	AMMUNITION	W/SURV	W/CASU	EXPENDED
13	M60A1	6	195	105 HEAT	84	103	8
			520	105 APDS	231	274	15
			104	105 SOF TGT	48	56	0
			26000	50 CAL	12000	14000	0
			26000	7.62 MG	12000	14000	0

TEAM CHARLIE STATUS
EXERCISE NWC 4-3-4, EX. TIME 1094

1201	M60A1	LIVE	15	105 HEAT	0
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1202	M60A1	TOTK	15	105 HEAT	0
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1203	M60A1	LIVE	15	105 HEAT	0
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1204	M60A1	LIVE	15	105 HEAT	0
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1211	M60A1	TOTK	15	105 HEAT	0
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1212	M60A1	LIVE	15	105 HEAT	0
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1213	M60A1	TOTK	13	105 HEAT	2
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0

1214	M60A1	LIVE	15	105 HEAT	0		
			40	105 APDS	0		
			8	105 SOF TGT	0		
			2000	50 CAL	0		
			2000	7.62 MG	0		
1221	M60A1	TOTK	15	105 HEAT	0		
			40	105 APDS	0		
			8	105 SOF TGT	0		
			2000	50 CAL	0		
			2000	7.62 MG	0		
1222	M60A1	TOTK	15	105 HEAT	0		
			40	105 APDS	0		
			8	105 SOF TGT	0		
			2000	50 CAL	0		
			2000	7.62 MG	0		
1223	M60A1	LIVE	15	105 HEAT	0		
			40	105 APDS	0		
			8	105 SOF TGT	0		
			2000	50 CAL	0		
			2000	7.62 MG	0		
1224	M60A1	TOTK	13	105 HEAT	2		
			40	105 APDS	0		
			8	105 SOF TGT	0		
			2000	50 CAL	0		
			2000	7.62 MG	0		
1236	M60A1	TOTK	14	105 HEAT	1		
			40	105 APDS	0		
			8	105 SOF TGT	0		
			2000	50 CAL	0		
			2000	7.62 MG	0		
BEGIN	RESOURCES	NOW	TOTAL	AMMUNITION	W/SURV	W/CASU	EXPENDED
13	M60A1	6	195	105 HEAT	90	100	5
			520	105 APDS	240	280	0
			104	105 SOF TGT	48	56	0
			16000	50 CAL	12000	14000	0
			26000	7.62 MG	12000	14000	0

TEAM DELTA STATUS
EXERCISE NWC 4-3-4, EX. TIME 1094

1241	M60A1	TOTL	15	105 HEAT	0
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1242	M60A1	TOTL	14	105 HEAT	1
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1243	M60A1	LIVE	15	105 HEAT	0
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1244	M60A1	TOTL	15	105 HEAT	0
			38	105 APDS	2
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1251	M60A1	TOTL	13	105 HEAT	2
			38	105 APDS	2
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1252	M60A1	TOTL	15	105 HEAT	0
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0

1253	M60A1	TOTK	15	105 HEAT	0
			38	105 APDS	2
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1254	M60A1	TOTK	13	105 HEAT	2
			38	105 APDS	2
			9	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1261	M60A1	TOTK	15	105 HEAT	0
			37	105 APDS	3
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1262	M60A1	TOTK	15	105 HEAT	0
			34	105 APDS	6
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1263	M60A1	TOTK	12	105 HEAT	3
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1264	M60A1	TOTK	14	105 HEAT	1
			38	105 APDS	2
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1276	M60A1	TOTK	15	105 HEAT	0
			31	105 APDS	9
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0

BEGIN	RESOURCES	NOW	TOTAL	AMMUNITION	W/SURV	W/CASU	EXPENDED
13	M60A1	1	195	105 HEAT	15	171	9
			520	105 APDS	40	452	28
			104	105 SDF TGT	8	96	0
			26000	50 CAL	2000	24000	0
			26000	7.62 MG	2000	24000	0

TEAM SCOUT STATUS
EXERCISE NWC 4-3-4, EX. TIME 1094

1526	M113(AFC)	LIVE	6 1000	LAW 50 CAL	0		
1731	M113(TOW)	LIVE	10 5 1000	TOW 105 SOF TGT 50 CAL	0 0 0		
1732	M113(TOW)	LIVE	10 5 1000	TOW 105 SOF TGT 50 CAL	0 0 0		
1733	M113(TOW)	LIVE	10 5 1000	TOW 105 SOF TGT 50 CAL	0 0 0		
1501	M113(AFC)	LIVE	6 6 1000 9999	DRAGON LAW 50 CAL 7.62 MG	0 0 0 0		
1502	M113(AFC)	LIVE	6 5 1000 9999	DRAGON LAW 50 CAL 7.62 MG	0 0 0 0		
1503	M113(AFC)	MODE	6 6 1000 9999	DRAGON LAW 50 CAL 7.62 MG	0 0 0 0		
2931	DRAGON TM	LIVE	6	DRAGON	0		
2932	DRAGON TM	LIVE	6	DRAGON	0		
2933	DRAGON TM	LIVE	6	DRAGON	0		
BEGIN 4	RESOURCES M113(AFC)	NOW 3	TOTAL 24 4000 18 29997	AMMUNITION LAW 50 CAL DRAGON 7.62 MG	W/SURV 18 3000 12 19998	W/CASU 6 1000 6 9999	EXPENDED 0 0 0 0
3	M113(TOW)	2	30 18 3000	TOW 105 SOF TGT 50 CAL	20 12 2000	10 6 1000	0 0 0
3	DRAGON TM	3	18	DRAGON	18	0	0

TEAM TOW STATUS
EXERCISE NWC 4-5-4, EX. TIME 1094

1701	M113(TOW)	LIVE	8	TOW	2
			5	LAW	0
			1000	50 CAL	0
1702	M113(TOW)	MODE	10	TOW	0
			6	LAW	0
			1000	50 CAL	0
1703	M113(TOW)	LIVE	9	TOW	1
			6	LAW	0
			1000	50 CAL	0
1704	M113(TOW)	TOTR	10	TOW	0
			6	LAW	0
			1000	50 CAL	0
1711	M113(TOW)	LIVE	9	TOW	1
			6	LAW	0
			1000	50 CAL	0
1712	M113(TOW)	TOTR	10	TOW	0
			6	LAW	0
			1000	50 CAL	0
1713	M113(TOW)	TOTR	8	TOW	2
			5	LAW	0
			1000	50 CAL	0

BEGIN 12	RESOURCES M113(TOW)	NDW	TOTAL	AMMUNITION	W/SURV	W/CASU	EXPENDED
1714	M113(TOW)		LIVE	8 6 1000	TOW LAW 50 CAL		2 0 0
1721	M113(TOW)		TOTK	9 6 1000	TOW LAW 50 CAL		1 0 0
1722	M113(TOW)		MOBK	7 6 1000	TOW LAW 50 CAL		3 0 0
1723	M113(TOW)		MOBK	9 6 1000	TOW LAW 50 CAL		1 0 0
1724	M113(TOW)		TOTK	8 6 1000	TOW LAW 50 CAL		2 0 0
1726	M113(C&C)		TOTK	6 1000	LAW 50 CAL		0 0
1	M113(C&C)	0					
			120 72 12000	TOW LAW 50 CAL	34 24 4000	71 48 8000	15 0 0
			6 1000	LAW 50 CAL	0 0	6 1000	0 0

TEAM INFANTRY STATUS
EXERCISE NWC 4-3-4, EX. TIME 1094

1624	M113(APC)	LIVE	5	DRAGON	0
			5	LAW	0
			1000	50 CAL	0
			9999	7.62 MG	0
1623	M113(APC)	LIVE	5	DRAGON	0
			5	LAW	0
			1000	50 CAL	0
			9999	7.62 MG	0
1622	M113(APC)	LIVE	5	DRAGON	0
			5	LAW	0
			1000	50 CAL	0
			9999	7.62 MG	0
1621	M113(APC)	LIVE	5	DRAGON	0
			5	LAW	0
			1000	50 CAL	0
			9999	7.62 MG	0
1614	M113(APC)	LIVE	5	DRAGON	0
			5	LAW	0
			1000	50 CAL	0
			9999	7.62 MG	0
1613	M113(APC)	LIVE	5	DRAGON	0
			5	LAW	0
			1000	50 CAL	0
			9999	7.62 MG	0
1612	M113(APC)	LIVE	5	DRAGON	0
			5	LAW	0
			1000	50 CAL	0
			9999	7.62 MG	0
1611	M113(APC)	TOTL	5	DRAGON	0
			5	LAW	0
			1000	50 CAL	0
			9999	7.62 MG	0

1604	M113(AFC)	LIVE	6	DRAGON	0
			6	LAW	0
			1000	50 CAL	0
			9999	7.62 MG	0
1603	M113(AFC)	LIVE	6	DRAGON	0
			6	LAW	0
			1000	50 CAL	0
			9999	7.62 MG	0
1602	M113(AFC)	LIVE	6	DRAGON	0
			6	LAW	0
			1000	50 CAL	0
			9999	7.62 MG	0
1601	M113(AFC)	LIVE	6	DRAGON	0
			6	LAW	0
			1000	50 CAL	0
			9999	7.62 MG	0
1626	M113(AFC)	LIVE	6	LAW	0
			1000	50 CAL	0
2901	DRAGON TM	LIVE	6	DRAGON	0
2902	DRAGON TM	LIVE	6	DRAGON	0
2903	DRAGON TM	LIVE	6	DRAGON	0
2904	DRAGON TM	LIVE	6	DRAGON	0
2905	DRAGON TM	TOTK	6	DRAGON	0
2906	DRAGON TM	LIVE	6	DRAGON	0
2907	DRAGON TM	LIVE	6	DRAGON	0
2908	DRAGON TM	LIVE	6	DRAGON	0

2909	DRAGON TM	LIVE	6	DRAGON	0
2910	DRAGON TM	LIVE	6	DRAGON	0
2911	DRAGON TM	LIVE	6	DRAGON	0
2912	DRAGON TM	LIVE	6	DRAGON	0
2801	LAW TM	LIVE	3	LAW	0
2802	LAW TM	LIVE	3	LAW	0
2803	LAW TM	LIVE	3	LAW	0
2804	LAW TM	LIVE	3	LAW	0
2805	LAW TM	TOTK	3	LAW	0
2806	LAW TM	LIVE	3	LAW	0
2807	LAW TM	LIVE	3	LAW	0
2808	LAW TM	LIVE	3	LAW	0
2809	LAW TM	LIVE	3	LAW	0
2810	LAW TM	LIVE	3	LAW	0
2811	LAW TM	LIVE	3	LAW	0
2812	LAW TM	LIVE	3	LAW	0
2831	LAW TM	LIVE	3	LAW	0

2832	LAW TH	LIVE	3	LAW	0
2833	LAW TH	LIVE	3	LAW	0
2834	LAW TH	LIVE	3	LAW	0
2835	LAW TH	TOT	3	LAW	0
2836	LAW TH	LIVE	3	LAW	0
2837	LAW TH	LIVE	3	LAW	0
2838	LAW TH	LIVE	3	LAW	0
2839	LAW TH	LIVE	3	LAW	0
2840	LAW TH	LIVE	3	LAW	0
2841	LAW TH	LIVE	3	LAW	0
2842	LAW TH	LIVE	3	LAW	0
2731	M106(MTR)	LIVE	1000	50 CAL	0
2732	M106(MTR)	LIVE	1000	50 CAL	0
2733	M106(MTR)	LIVE	1000	50 CAL	0
2734	M106(MTR)	LIVE	1000	50 CAL	0

BEGIN	RESOURCES	NOW	TOTAL	AMMUNITION	W/SURV	W/CASU	EXPENDED
13	M113(AFC)	12	72	DRAGON	66	6	0
			78	LAW	72	6	0
			13000	50 CAL	12000	1000	0
			119988	7.62 MG	109989	9999	0
1	M113(C&C)	1	1000	50 CAL	1000	0	0
4	M106(MTR)	4	4000	50 CAL	4000	0	0
24	LAW TH	22	72	LAW	66	6	0
12	DRAGON TH	11	72	DRAGON	66	6	0

TEAM TRAINS STATUS 1094
EXERCISE NMC 4-3-4, EX. TIME

3301	ASP-1	LIVE	50	105 HEAT	0
			200	105 APDS	0
			60	TOW	0
			60	DRAGON	0
			120	LAW	0
			9000	50 CAL	0
3302	ASP-2	LIVE	50	105 HEAT	0
			200	105 APDS	0
			60	TOW	0
			60	DRAGON	0
			120	LAW	0
			9000	50 CAL	0

BEGIN	RESOURCES	NOW	TOTAL	AMMUNITION	W/SURV	W/CASU	EXPENDED
1	ASP-1	1	50	105 HEAT	50	0	0
			200	105 APDS	200	0	0
			60	TOW	60	0	0
			60	DRAGON	60	0	0
			120	LAW	120	0	0
			9000	50 CAL	9000	0	0
1	ASP-2	1	50	105 HEAT	50	0	0
			200	105 APDS	200	0	0
			60	TOW	60	0	0
			60	DRAGON	60	0	0
			120	LAW	120	0	0
			9000	50 CAL	9000	0	0

*** CORONER'S REPORT ***

EXERCISE NAME: NWC 4-3-4

SACGER TH	(8874)	DIED AT TIME	25 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	INDIRECT FIRE, BATTERY NO.	11. B IN	SI
M60A1	(1241)	DIED AT TIME	426 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	162	(5510), FIRING	115 HVAFPSD AT RANGE 1600
C&C ELEMENT	(3213)	DIED AT TIME	426 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	162	(5510), FIRING	115 HVAFPSD AT RANGE 1600
M60A1	(1252)	DIED AT TIME	435 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	BRDM-2	(7662), FIRING	SACGER AT RANGE 1000
M60A1	(1266)	DIED AT TIME	440 OF	MOBIL KILL DUE TO	SACGER TH	(8870), FIRING	SACGER AT RANGE 1450
M60A1	(1243)	DIED AT TIME	440 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	SACGER TH	(8856), FIRING	SACGER AT RANGE 1450
M60A1	(1252)	DIED AT TIME	440 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	SACGER TH	(8851), FIRING	SACGER AT RANGE 1450
SACGER TH	(8956)	DIED AT TIME	451 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1251), FIRING	105 HEAT AT RANGE 1400
M60A1	(1198)	DIED AT TIME	451 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	162	(5253), FIRING	115 HVAFPSD AT RANGE 1700
M60A1	(1242)	DIED AT TIME	452 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	162	(5551), FIRING	115 HVAFPSD AT RANGE 1700
M60A1	(1274)	DIED AT TIME	462 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1253), FIRING	105 APOS AT RANGE 1450
T62	(1244)	DIED AT TIME	462 OF	MOBIL KILL DUE TO	BRDM-2	(7662), FIRING	SACGER AT RANGE 1000
M60A1	(1253)	DIED AT TIME	463 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	162	(5152), FIRING	115 HVAFPSD AT RANGE 1550
M60A1	(1253)	DIED AT TIME	465 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	SACGER TH	(8870), FIRING	SACGER AT RANGE 1450
M60A1	(1198)	DIED AT TIME	465 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	162	(5327), FIRING	115 HVAFPSD AT RANGE 1700
M60A1	(1244)	DIED AT TIME	469 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	162	(5110), FIRING	115 HVAFPSD AT RANGE 1550
M113(TOW)	(1704)	DIED AT TIME	495 OF	MOBIL KILL DUE TO	SACGER TH	(8849), FIRING	SACGER AT RANGE 1500
M60A1	(1151)	DIED AT TIME	495 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	BRDM-2	(7663), FIRING	SACGER AT RANGE 1450
C&C ELEMENT	(3206)	DIED AT TIME	553 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	BRDM-2	(7663), FIRING	SACGER AT RANGE 1100
M60A1	(1262)	DIED AT TIME	602 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1276), FIRING	105 APOS AT RANGE 900
BRDM-2	(1102)	DIED AT TIME	602 OF	MOBIL KILL DUE TO	RMP	(6101), FIRING	78 HEAT AT RANGE 600
M60A1	(1160)	DIED AT TIME	609 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M113(TOW)	(1701), FIRING	TOW AT RANGE 1700
SACGER TH	(8858)	DIED AT TIME	613 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1262), FIRING	105 APOS AT RANGE 1100
M60A1	(1101)	DIED AT TIME	631 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	PT 76	(7766), FIRING	76 HEAT AT RANGE 500
C&C ELEMENT	(3201)	DIED AT TIME	631 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	PT 76	(7766), FIRING	76 HEAT AT RANGE 500
M60A1	(1263)	DIED AT TIME	632 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	162	(5258), FIRING	115 HVAFPSD AT RANGE 1500
M113(TOW)	(1721)	DIED AT TIME	642 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	BRDM-2	(1154), FIRING	105 APOS AT RANGE 1250
C&C ELEMENT	(3219)	DIED AT TIME	642 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	BRDM-2	(7663), FIRING	SACGER AT RANGE 1100
LAW TH	(1209)	DIED AT TIME	642 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	BRDM-2	(7663), FIRING	SACGER AT RANGE 1100
M60A1	(1251)	DIED AT TIME	645 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	RMP	(6104), FIRING	SACGER AT RANGE 1550
C&C ELEMENT	(3214)	DIED AT TIME	645 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	RMP	(6104), FIRING	SACGER AT RANGE 1550
M60A1	(1254)	DIED AT TIME	646 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	RMP	(6104), FIRING	SACGER AT RANGE 1400
M60A1	(1264)	DIED AT TIME	646 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	RMP	(6176), FIRING	SACGER AT RANGE 1550
M113(TOW)	(1722)	DIED AT TIME	661 OF	MOBIL KILL DUE TO	162	(5504), FIRING	115 HVAFPSD AT RANGE 1400
M113(TOW)	(1723)	DIED AT TIME	662 OF	MOBIL KILL DUE TO	162	(5554), FIRING	115 HVAFPSD AT RANGE 1400
M113(TOW)	(1704)	DIED AT TIME	662 OF	MOBIL KILL DUE TO	162	(5527), FIRING	115 HVAFPSD AT RANGE 1400
BRM	(6103)	DIED AT TIME	667 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M113(TOW)	(1703), FIRING	TOW AT RANGE 1500
T62	(6510)	DIED AT TIME	667 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M113(TOW)	(1711), FIRING	TOW AT RANGE 1500
M60A1	(1261)	DIED AT TIME	672 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	SACGER TH	(8848), FIRING	SACGER AT RANGE 1100
C&C ELEMENT	(3215)	DIED AT TIME	672 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	SACGER TH	(8848), FIRING	SACGER AT RANGE 1100
M113(TOW)	(1702)	DIED AT TIME	673 OF	MOBIL KILL DUE TO	SACGER TH	(8876), FIRING	SACGER AT RANGE 1300
M113(TOW)	(1704)	DIED AT TIME	675 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	SACGER TH	(8870), FIRING	SACGER AT RANGE 1400
LAW TH	(1261)	DIED AT TIME	675 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	SACGER TH	(8870), FIRING	SACGER AT RANGE 1400
M60A1	(1261)	DIED AT TIME	676 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	SACGER TH	(8846), FIRING	SACGER AT RANGE 1600
C&C ELEMENT	(3215)	DIED AT TIME	676 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	SACGER TH	(8846), FIRING	SACGER AT RANGE 1600
M60A1	(1103)	DIED AT TIME	721 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	RPG TH	(9978), FIRING	RPG 7 AT RANGE 50

M60A1	(1276)	DIED AT TIME	728 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	INDIRECT FIRE, BATTERY NO.	14, 122 MRL HE
C&C ELEMENT (3216)	(1276)	DIED AT TIME	728 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	INDIRECT FIRE, BATTERY NO.	14, 122 MRL HE
M113(TOW)	(1726)	DIED AT TIME	728 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	INDIRECT FIRE, BATTERY NO.	14, 122 MRL HE
C&C ELEMENT (3220)	(1726)	DIED AT TIME	728 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	INDIRECT FIRE, BATTERY NO.	14, 122 MRL HE
LAW TM	(2833)	DIED AT TIME	728 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	INDIRECT FIRE, BATTERY NO.	14, 122 MRL HE
M113(APC)	(1724)	DIED AT TIME	728 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	INDIRECT FIRE, BATTERY NO.	14, 122 MRL HE
LAW TM	(2832)	DIED AT TIME	728 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	INDIRECT FIRE, BATTERY NO.	14, 122 MRL HE
M113(APC)	(1713)	DIED AT TIME	728 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	INDIRECT FIRE, BATTERY NO.	14, 122 MRL HE
LAW TM	(2827)	DIED AT TIME	728 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	INDIRECT FIRE, BATTERY NO.	14, 122 MRL HE
M113(TOW)	(1712)	DIED AT TIME	728 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	INDIRECT FIRE, BATTERY NO.	14, 122 MRL HE
LAW TM	(2826)	DIED AT TIME	728 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	INDIRECT FIRE, BATTERY NO.	14, 122 MRL HE
M113(A)	(1611)	DIED AT TIME	734 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	SAGGER TM (8869), FIRING	AT RANGE 1350
DRAGON TM	(2905)	DIED AT TIME	734 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	SAGGER TM (8869), FIRING	AT RANGE 1350
LAW TM	(2803)	DIED AT TIME	734 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	SAGGER TM (8869), FIRING	AT RANGE 1350
LAW TM	(2835)	DIED AT TIME	734 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	SAGGER TM (8869), FIRING	AT RANGE 1350
C&C ELEMENT (3226)	(1734)	DIED AT TIME	734 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	SAGGER TM (8869), FIRING	AT RANGE 1350
RPG TM	(9966)	DIED AT TIME	734 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	SAGGER TM (8869), FIRING	AT RANGE 1350
RPG TM	(9965)	DIED AT TIME	751 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	AT RANGE 150
RPG TM	(9966)	DIED AT TIME	755 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	AT RANGE 150
RPG TM	(9967)	DIED AT TIME	755 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	AT RANGE 100
RPG TM	(9955)	DIED AT TIME	756 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	AT RANGE 100
RPG TM	(9993)	DIED AT TIME	756 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	AT RANGE 100
M113(APC)	(1503)	DIED AT TIME	770 OF	MOBIL KILL	DUE TO	SAGGER TM (8821), FIRING	AT RANGE 2000
M113(TOW)	(1733)	DIED AT TIME	770 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	SAGGER TM (8831), FIRING	AT RANGE 2000
RPG TM	(9966)	DIED AT TIME	771 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	AT RANGE 100
RPG TM	(9900)	DIED AT TIME	775 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	AT RANGE 100
M60A1	(1114)	DIED AT TIME	803 OF	MOBIL KILL	DUE TO	T62	AT RANGE 100
SAGGER TM	(9951)	DIED AT TIME	823 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	INDIRECT FIRE, BATTERY NO.	4, 155 MM SI
T62	(5126)	DIED AT TIME	823 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	AT RANGE 1600
T62	(5527)	DIED AT TIME	824 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	AT RANGE 1600
M60A1	(1136)	DIED AT TIME	834 OF	MOBIL KILL	DUE TO	T62	AT RANGE 1600
M60A1	(1136)	DIED AT TIME	839 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	T62	AT RANGE 1600
C&C ELEMENT (3204)	(1142)	DIED AT TIME	990 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	AT RANGE 1600
M60A1	(1142)	DIED AT TIME	990 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	AT RANGE 1600
M60A1	(1184)	DIED AT TIME	991 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	AT RANGE 1600
M60A1	(1141)	DIED AT TIME	991 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	AT RANGE 1600
BHP	(6163)	DIED AT TIME	991 OF	MOBIL KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	AT RANGE 1600
BHP	(6164)	DIED AT TIME	992 OF	MOBIL KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	AT RANGE 1600
T62	(5168)	DIED AT TIME	996 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	AT RANGE 1600

762	(S152)	DIED AT TIME	998 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1141),	FIRING	105 APDS	AT RANGE	1050
M60A1	(1113)	DIED AT TIME	999 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	SAGGER TM	(9895),	FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE	950
M60A1	(1124)	DIED AT TIME	1000 OF	MOBIL KILL	DUE TO	SAGGER TM	(9894),	FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE	850
OMP	(1124)	DIED*AT TIME	1000 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1224),	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	500
M60A1	(1112)	DIED AT TIME	1000 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	SAGGER TM	(8896),	FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE	950
M60A1	(1222)	DIED AT TIME	1005 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	SAGGER TM	(8808),	FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE	1550
M60A1	(1236)	DIED AT TIME	1006 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	SAGGER TM	(8872),	FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE	1650
C&C ELEMENT	(3212)	DIED AT TIME	1006 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	SAGGER TM	(8872),	FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE	1650
M60A1	(1213)	DIED AT TIME	1006 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	SAGGER TM	(8824),	FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE	1600
M60A1	(1231)	DIED AT TIME	1007 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	SAGGER TM	(8865),	FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE	1550
C&C ELEMENT	(3211)	DIED AT TIME	1007 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	SAGGER TM	(8865),	FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE	1550
M60A1	(1236)	DIED*AT TIME	1007 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	SAGGER TM	(8888),	FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE	1750
C&C ELEMENT	(3212)	DIED*AT TIME	1007 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	SAGGER TM	(8888),	FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE	1750
M60A1	(1123)	DIED AT TIME	1009 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	SAGGER TM	(8861),	FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE	2000
M60A1	(1121)	DIED AT TIME	1009 OF	MOBIL KILL	DUE TO	SAGGER TM	(8870),	FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE	2000
M60A1	(1262)	DIED AT TIME	1020 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	OMP	(6109),	FIRING	76 HEAT	AT RANGE	250
M60A1	(1161)	DIED AT TIME	1029 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	BRDM-2	(7663),	FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE	850
C&C ELEMENT	(3207)	DIED AT TIME	1029 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	BRDM-2	(7663),	FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE	850
M60A1	(1202)	DIED AT TIME	1036 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	SAGGER TM	(8865),	FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE	1500
M60A1	(1211)	DIED AT TIME	1036 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	SAGGER TM	(8877),	FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE	1600
C&C ELEMENT	(3210)	DIED AT TIME	1036 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	SAGGER TM	(8877),	FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE	1600
M60A1	(1224)	DIED AT TIME	1039 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	SAGGER TM	(8885),	FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE	1950
M60A1	(1224)	DIED*AT TIME	1039 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	SAGGER TM	(8859),	FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE	2100
M60A1	(1950)	DIED AT TIME	1040 OF	FRPWR KILL	DUE TO	SAGGER TM	(8888),	FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE	1950
M60A1	(1222)	DIED*AT TIME	1040 OF	MOBIL KILL	DUE TO	SAGGER TM	(8882),	FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE	2100
M60A1	(1143)	DIED AT TIME	1060 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	SAGGER TM	(8876),	FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE	1000
SAGGER TM	(8875)	DIED AT TIME	1064 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	INDIRECT FIRE, BATTERY NO. 10, 155 MM HE					
M60A1	(1164)	DIED AT TIME	1068 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	SAGGER TM	(8884),	FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE	1900

EXERCISE NAME: NWC 4-3-4

[illegible]

*** UNKNOWN S REPORT ***

EXERCISE NAME: NWC 4-3-4

RED FORCE	25 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	INDIRECT FIRE, BATTERY NO.	11, 8 IN	SI
SAGGER TH	(8874)	DIED AT TIME	451 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO M60A1 (1251), FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE 1600
SAGGER TH	(8856)	DIED AT TIME	462 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO M60A1 (1253), FIRING	105 APDS	AT RANGE 1650
T62	(5274)	DIED AT TIME	602 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO M60A1 (1276), FIRING	105 APDS	AT RANGE 900
BROM-C	(7662)	DIED AT TIME	509 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO M113(TOW) (1701), FIRING	TOW	AT RANGE 1700
T62	(5140)	DIED AT TIME	513 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO M60A1 (1262), FIRING	105 APDS	AT RANGE 1100
SAGGER TH	(8853)	DIED AT TIME	632 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO M60A1 (1703), FIRING	105 APDS	AT RANGE 1250
BMP	(7766)	DIED AT TIME	667 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO M113(TOW) (1711), FIRING	TOW	AT RANGE 1500
T62	(6103)	DIED AT TIME	667 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO M113(TOW) (1711), FIRING	TOW	AT RANGE 1500
RPG TH	(5510)	DIED AT TIME	734 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO M60A1 (1104), FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE 50
RPG TH	(9966)	DIED AT TIME	734 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO M60A1 (1121), FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE 150
RPG TH	(9945)	DIED AT TIME	751 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO M60A1 (1121), FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE 150
RPG TH	(9966)	DIED AT TIME	755 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO M60A1 (1111), FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE 100
RPG TH	(9967)	DIED AT TIME	755 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO M60A1 (1112), FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE 100
RPG TH	(9955)	DIED AT TIME	756 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO M60A1 (1124), FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE 100
RPG TH	(9993)	DIED AT TIME	756 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO M60A1 (1113), FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE 100
RPG TH	(9966)	DIED AT TIME	771 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO M60A1 (1104), FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE 50
RPG TH	(9900)	DIED AT TIME	775 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO M60A1 (1114), FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE 100
SAGGER TH	(9931)	DIED AT TIME	823 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO INDIRECT FIRE, BATTERY NO.	4, 155 MM	SI
T62	(5126)	DIED AT TIME	823 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO M60A1 (1111), FIRING	105 APDS	AT RANGE 1600
T62	(5527)	DIED AT TIME	824 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO M60A1 (1136), FIRING	105 APDS	AT RANGE 1600
BMP	(6163)	DIED AT TIME	991 OF MOBIL KILL	DUE TO M60A1 (1236), FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE 400
BMP	(6164)	DIED AT TIME	992 OF MOBIL KILL	DUE TO M60A1 (1123), FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE 500
T62	(5168)	DIED AT TIME	996 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO M60A1 (1152), FIRING	105 APDS	AT RANGE 800
T62	(5152)	DIED AT TIME	998 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO M60A1 (1141), FIRING	105 APDS	AT RANGE 1050
BMP	(6163)	DIED AT TIME	1000 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO M60A1 (1224), FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE 500
SAGGER TH	(8875)	DIED AT TIME	1064 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO INDIRECT FIRE, BATTERY NO.	10, 155 MM	MM HE

ANNEX G

SCENARIO #2

ANNEX G (Scenario #2)

1. For both Option I and Option II attacks, the Soviet Motorized Rifle Battalion (MRB) assumed identical three band defenses on the same terrain (see Appendix 1 and 2).
2. The Soviet MRB was organized in the same manner for both attacks:

- 31 BMPs (3 MR companies)
- 13 T-62s (1 tank company)
- 3 BRDM-2/1 PT 76 (1 reconnaissance platoon)
- 1 SPG 9

3. The Soviets had the following artillery support:

- 1 Battery 120mm mortar (immediately responsive)
- 1 Battery 122mm Howitzers RAG (immediately responsive)
- 1 Battery 152mm Guns RAG (immediately responsive)
- 2 Batteries 122mm Howitzers RAG (less responsive)
- 2 Batteries 152mm Guns RAG (less responsive)
- 1 Battalion 122mm Howitzers DAG (in support)
- 2 Battalions 130mm Gun-Howitzers DAG (in support)
- 2 Battalions 152mm Guns DAG (in support)
- 1 Battalion 122mm MRL DAG (in support)

4. The weather was the same for both options:

- visibility - 2200 meters
- wind - 8mph from the Southwest

5. The rates of movement were the same for both options:

- 18KPH Track Cross Country Sustained
- 12KPH Track in Smoke
- 12KPH Track Cross Country Assault (Firing)
- 24KPH Track on the Road
- 6KPH Soldier Running (3 minutes)
- 4KPH Soldier Cross Country (Sustained)

6. The attacking U.S. battalions were organized in an identical manner:

- 4 tanks per platoon
- 3 platoons per company
- 4 companies in the battalion
- 1 TOW Company (12 TOWs)

- 1 Mortar Platoon (6 M106s)
- 1 Scout Platoon (7 M113s: 1 C+C, 3 TOW Carriers,
3 APCs w/Dragon)

7. The attacking U.S. battalions had the same attachment:

- 1 Mechanized Infantry Company

- 12 Dragon Teams
- 24 LAW Teams
- 3 81mm Mortars

8. The attacking U.S. battalions had the same artillery support:

- 1 Battalion 155 Howitzers (DS)
- 1 Battalion 8in. Howitzers (Reinf)
- 1 Battalion 155 Howitzers (GSR)
- 1 Battalion 8in. Howitzers (GS)

Appendices

- 1. Scenario #2, Option I
- 2. Scenario #2, Option II

Appendix 1 (Scenario #2, Option I) to ANNEX G (Scenario #2)

1. The U.S. battalion opened the attack with an artillery prep on suspected Soviet positions. The final volley of this prep laid a smoke screen on these same suspected Soviet positions. After the first Time-On-Target volley, the artillery prep had little effect on the Soviet force which had invested its six fours of preparation in digging in both tanks and infantry.

2. Concurrently the overwatching force, consisting of one tank company, two infantry platoons, and the TOW Company, took up positions on the southern and eastern outskirts of Steinbach. This force fought a protracted battle at long range with the first band of the Soviet MRB.


Fighting from dug in positions the Soviet force held a decisive edge in that fight when a volley of the MRL Battalion (BM-21) impacted on the overwatching force. Only 1 tank, 2 TOWs and 3 M113s remained; they were no longer a viable force.

3. At the same time, the maneuver force left its attack position behind the Galgenberg (NA 516174) and attacked toward Hill 419 (NA 554199).

4. This force quickly brushed aside the Soviet reconnaissance elements with only minor losses and gathered in its final assault formation in the woods and behind the road (NA 533194 to NA 536185).

5. When it came into the open ground in front of these positions, the U.S. force was hit by a barrage of Sagger missiles that totally destroyed the remaining three companies of the battalion within a minute and a half. While many of the Sagger teams could not fire on the U.S. tanks because of the artillery delivered smoke screen, there were enough gaps in the smoke to allow enough Sagger teams to engage and totally destroy the maneuver force.

7. The U.S. force had to withdraw into defilade to avoid total destruction. At the end of the attack, the U.S. battalion using Option I tactics had not penetrated the Soviet first band. Time sequenced photographs (pages G-6 to G-10) show the progress of the battle.



U.S.

SOVIET

➔ INITIAL
ATTACK
PSN

---➔ AXIS & LIMIT
OF ADVANCE

↑ TOW PLT

(...) INF PLT


(T) TANK PLT

(R) RECON SEC

G-6




G-7




G-8



G-9



G-10



SCENARIO #2, OPTION I

SOVIET SYSTEMS KILLED BY U.S. SYSTEMS

	<u>T-62</u>	<u>BMP</u>	<u>Sagger Tm</u>	<u>RPG</u>	<u>BRDM-2</u>	<u>PT 76</u>
M-60A1	5	2	2	6	1	1
TOW	2	1	0	0	0	0
DRAGON ¹	0	0	0	0	0	0
LAW	0	0	0	0	0	0
Indirect Fire	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
TOTALS	7	3	5	6	1	1

U.S. SYSTEMS KILLED BY SOVIET SYSTEMS

	<u>M-60A1</u>	<u>TOW</u>	<u>M113</u>	<u>DRAGON</u>	<u>LAW</u>
T-62	8	2	0	0	0
BRDM-2	4	1	0	0	1
Sagger Team	18	3	2	1	3
RPG 7	3	0	0	0	0
BMP (73 HEAT)	5	0	0	0	0
PT 76	1	0	0	0	0
Indirect Fire	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>4</u>
TOTALS	40	8	4	1 ²	8 ³

1. Fired while mounted on a M113.
2. All Dragons were killed while riding M113s.
3. All LAW Teams were killed while riding M113s.

BOEIN	EXERCISE	NO	AMMUNITION	W/ASU	W/ASU	EX- TIME	EXTENDED
34	34	34	34	34	34	34	34
17	M113(CAC)	10	105 HEAT	100	541	56	
			105 APDS	510	1400	42	
			105 SOF 101	108	428	0	
			50 CAL	36000	36000	0	
			7.62 MC	26000	36000	0	
15	M113(TOW)	12	105 HEAT	80	42	0	
			50 CAL	10000	2000	0	
			DRAGON	48	42	0	
			7.62 MC	49993	49993	0	
2	M113(CAC)	2	TOW	103	19	28	
			105 SOF 101	12	6	0	
			50 CAL	12000	3000	0	
			LAW	60	12	0	
6	M106(MTR)	6	LAW	6	0	0	
			50 CAL	2000	0	0	
37	LAW TH	32	50 CAL	4000	0	0	
15	DRAGON TH	13	LAW	129	21	0	
			DRAGON	72	12	6	
1	ASP-1	1	105 HEAT	50	0	0	
			105 APDS	200	0	0	
			TOW	60	0	0	
			DRAGON	60	0	0	
			LAW	120	0	0	
			50 CAL	9000	0	0	
1	ASP-2	1	105 HEAT	50	0	0	
			105 APDS	200	0	0	
			TOW	60	0	0	
			DRAGON	60	0	0	
			LAW	120	0	0	
			50 CAL	9000	0	0	

EXERCISE NWC TEAM HQ STATUS 4-3-4, EX- TIME 1110

1196	M60A1	LIVE	15	105 HEAT	0	
			40	105 APDS	0	
			8	105 SDF TGT	0	
			2000	50 CAL	0	
			2000	7.62 MG	0	
1198	M60A1	LIVE	13	105 HEAT	2	
			40	105 APDS	0	
			8	105 SDF TGT	0	
			2000	50 CAL	0	
			2000	7.62 MG	0	
BEGIN	RESOURCES	NOW	TOTAL	AMMUNITION	W/SURV W/CASU	EXPENDED
2	M60A1	2	30	105 HEAT	28	2
			80	105 APDS	80	0
			16	105 SDF TGT	16	0
			4000	50 CAL	4000	0
			4000	7.62 MG	4000	0

TEAM ALPHA STATUS
EXERCISE NWC 4-3-4, EX. TIME 1110

1101	M60A1	TOTK	14	105 HEAT	1
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SOF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1102	M60A1	TOTK	12	105 HEAT	3
			38	105 APDS	2
			8	105 SOF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1103	M60A1	TOTK	12	105 HEAT	3
			38	105 APDS	2
			8	105 SOF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1104	M60A1	TOTK	14	105 HEAT	1
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SOF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1111	M60A1	MOBK	14	105 HEAT	1
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SOF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1112	M60A1	TOTK	13	105 HEAT	2
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SOF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0

1113	M60A1	TOTK	15	105 HEAT	0
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1114	M60A1	LIVE	15	105 HEAT	0
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1121	M60A1	LIVE	12	105 HEAT	3
			38	105 APDS	2
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1122	M60A1	TOTK	13	105 HEAT	2
			38	105 APDS	2
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1123	M60A1	TOTK	14	105 HEAT	1
			36	105 APDS	4
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1124	M60A1	TOTK	13	105 HEAT	2
			38	105 APDS	2
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1135	M60A1	LIVE	15	105 HEAT	0
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0

BEGIN	RESOURCES	NOW	TOTAL	AMMUNITION	W/SURV	W/CASU	EXPENDED
13	M60A1	3	195	105 HEAT	42	134	19
			520	105 APDS	118	388	14
			104	105 SDF TGT	24	80	0
			26000	50 CAL	6000	20000	0
			26000	7.62 MG	6000	20000	0

TEAM BRAVO STATUS
EXERCISE NWC 4-3-4, EX. TIME 1110

1141	M60A1	TOTK	15	105 HEAT	0
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1142	M60A1	TOTK	15	105 HEAT	0
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1143	M60A1	TOTK	15	105 HEAT	0
			38	105 APDS	2
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1144	M60A1	TOTK	15	105 HEAT	0
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1151	M60A1	TOTK	15	105 HEAT	0
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1152	M60A1	TOTK	15	105 HEAT	0
			39	105 APDS	1
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0

1153	M40A1	MOBK	11	105 HEAT	4
			39	105 APDS	1
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1154	M40A1	TOTK	15	105 HEAT	0
			38	105 APDS	2
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1161	M40A1	TOTK	13	105 HEAT	2
			37	105 APDS	3
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1162	M40A1	FRPK	12	105 HEAT	3
			38	105 APDS	2
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1163	M40A1	TOTK	15	105 HEAT	0
			37	105 APDS	3
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1164	M40A1	TOTK	10	105 HEAT	5
			37	105 APDS	3
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1175	M40A1	TOTK	15	105 HEAT	0
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0

BEGIN	RESOURCES	NEW	TOTAL	AMMUNITION	W/SURV	W/CASU	EXPENDED
13	M40A1	0	195	105 HEAT	0	181	14
			520	105 APDS	0	503	17
			104	105 SDF TGT	0	104	0
			26000	50 CAL	0	26000	0
			26000	7.62 MG	0	26000	0

TEAM CHARLIE STATUS
EXERCISE NWC 4-3-4, EX. TIME 1110

1201	M60A1	TOTK	15	105 HEAT	0
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1202	M60A1	TOTK	15	105 HEAT	0
			38	105 APDS	2
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1203	M60A1	TOTK	15	105 HEAT	0
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1204	M60A1	TOTK	15	105 HEAT	0
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1211	M60A1	LIVE	14	105 HEAT	1
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1212	M60A1	LIVE	14	105 HEAT	1
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0

1213	M60A1	LIVE	14	105 HEAT	1
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1214	M60A1	LIVE	13	105 HEAT	2
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1221	M60A1	LIVE	13	105 HEAT	2
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1222	M60A1	LIVE	13	105 HEAT	2
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1223	M60A1	TOTK	15	105 HEAT	0
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1224	M60A1	LIVE	15	105 HEAT	0
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1235	M60A1	LIVE	15	105 HEAT	0
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0

BEGIN	RESOURCES	NOW	TOTAL	AMMUNITION	W/SURV	W/CASU	EXPENDED
13	M60A1	9	195	105 HEAT	111	75	9
			520	105 APDS	320	198	2
			104	105 SDF TGT	64	40	0
			26000	50 CAL	16000	10000	0
			26000	7.62 MG	16000	10000	0

TEAM DELTA STATUS
EXERCISE NWC 4-3-4, EX. TIME 1110

1241	M60A1	TOTK	13	105 HEAT	2
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1242	M60A1	TOTK	12	105 HEAT	3
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1243	M60A1	TOTK	13	105 HEAT	2
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1244	M60A1	MOBK	9	105 HEAT	6
			39	105 APDS	1
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1251	M60A1	TOTK	15	105 HEAT	0
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1252	M60A1	TOTK	15	105 HEAT	0
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0

1253	M60A1	TOTK	15	105 HEAT	0
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1254	M60A1	FRPK	13	105 HEAT	2
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1261	M60A1	TOTK	15	105 HEAT	0
			38	105 APDS	4
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1262	M60A1	TOTK	15	105 HEAT	0
			39	105 APDS	2
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1263	M60A1	MOBK	5	105 HEAT	9
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1264	M60A1	TOTK	15	105 HEAT	0
			38	105 APDS	2
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1276	M60A1	TOTK	15	105 HEAT	0
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0

BEGIN	RESOURCES	NOW	TOTAL	AMMUNITION	W/SURV	W/CASU	EXPENDED
13	M60A1	0	195	105 HEAT	0	171	24
			520	105 APDS	0	511	9
			104	105 SDF TGT	0	104	0
			26000	50 CAL	0	26000	0
			26000	7.62 MG	0	26000	0

TEAM SCOUT STATUS
EXERCISE NWC 4-3-4, EX. TIME 1110

1506	M113(APC)	LIVE	6	LAW	0	
			1000	50 CAL	0	
1731	M113(TOW)	LIVE	8	TOW	2	
			6	105 SOF TGT	0	
			1000	50 CAL	0	
1732	M113(TOW)	MOBK	8	TOW	2	
			6	105 SOF TGT	0	
			1000	50 CAL	0	
1733	M113(TOW)	LIVE	8	TOW	2	
			6	105 SOF TGT	0	
			1000	50 CAL	0	
1801	M113(APC)	MOBK	6	DRAGON	0	
			6	LAW	0	
			1000	50 CAL	0	
			9999	7.62 MG	0	
1802	M113(APC)	LIVE	6	DRAGON	0	
			6	LAW	0	
			1000	50 CAL	0	
			9999	7.62 MG	0	
1803	M113(APC)	LIVE	6	DRAGON	0	
			6	LAW	0	
			1000	50 CAL	0	
			9999	7.62 MG	0	
2931	DRAGON TM	LIVE	4	DRAGON	2	
2932	DRAGON TM	LIVE	5	DRAGON	1	
2933	DRAGON TM	LIVE	5	DRAGON	1	
BEGRN	RESOURCES	CO	TOTAL	AMMUNITION	W/STRT	EXPENDED
4	M113(APC)	3	24	LAW	18	0
			4000	50 CAL	3000	0
			18	DRAGON	12	0
			29997	7.62 MG	19998	0
3	M113(TOW)	1	30	TOW	18	6
			18	105 SOF TGT	12	0
			3000	50 CAL	2000	0
3	DRAGON TM	3	18	DRAGON	14	4

EXERCISE NWC 4-3-4, EX. TIME 1110

1701	M113(TOW)	MOBK	4 6 1000	TOW LAW 50 CAL	6 0 0
1702	M113(TOW)	TOTK	7 6 1000	TOW LAW 50 CAL	3 0 0
1703	M113(TOW)	LIVE	7 6 1000	TOW LAW 50 CAL	3 0 0
1704	M113(TOW)	LIVE	7 6 1000	TOW LAW 50 CAL	3 0 0
1711	M113(TOW)	LIVE	10 6 1000	TOW LAW 50 CAL	0 0 0
1712	M113(TOW)	LIVE	10 6 1000	TOW LAW 50 CAL	0 0 0
1713	M113(TOW)	LIVE	10 6 1000	TOW LAW 50 CAL	0 0 0
1714	M113(TOW)	LIVE	10 6 1000	TOW LAW 50 CAL	0 0 0
1721	M113(TOW)	LIVE	8 6 1000	TOW LAW 50 CAL	2 0 0

G-24

EXERCISE NWC 4-3-4, EX. TIME 1110

1624	M113(APC)	LIVE	6	DRAGON	0
			6	LAW	0
			1000	50 CAL	0
			9999	7.62 MG	0
1623	M113(APC)	LIVE	6	DRAGON	0
			6	LAW	0
			1000	50 CAL	0
			9999	7.62 MG	0
1622	M113(APC)	LIVE	6	DRAGON	0
			6	LAW	0
			1000	50 CAL	0
			9999	7.62 MG	0
1621	M113(APC)	LIVE	6	DRAGON	0
			6	LAW	0
			1000	50 CAL	0
			9999	7.62 MG	0
1614	M113(APC)	MOBK	6	DRAGON	0
			6	LAW	0
			1000	50 CAL	0
			9999	7.62 MG	0
1613	M113(APC)	LIVE	6	DRAGON	0
			6	LAW	0
			1000	50 CAL	0
			9999	7.62 MG	0
1612	M113(APC)	LIVE	6	DRAGON	0
			6	LAW	0
			1000	50 CAL	0
			9999	7.62 MG	0
1611	M113(APC)	TOTK	6	DRAGON	0
			6	LAW	0
			1000	50 CAL	0
			9999	7.62 MG	0

1606	M113(AFC)	MORF	6 6 1000 9999	DRAGON LAW 50 CAL 7.62 MG	0 0 0 0
1607	M113(AFC)	MORF	6 6 1000 9999	DRAGON LAW 50 CAL 7.62 MG	0 0 0 0
1608	M113(AFC)	MORF	6 6 1000 9999	DRAGON LAW 50 CAL 7.62 MG	0 0 0 0
1609	M113(AFC)	TOTK	6 6 1000 9999	DRAGON LAW 50 CAL 7.62 MG	0 0 0 0
1610	M113(AFC)	LIVE	6 6 1000 9999	DRAGON LAW 50 CAL 7.62 MG	0 0 0 0
2901	DRAGON TH	FRPK	6	DRAGON	0
2902	DRAGON TH	LIVE	6	DRAGON	0
2903	DRAGON TH	LIVE	6	DRAGON	0
2904	DRAGON TH	LIVE	6	DRAGON	0
2905	DRAGON TH	TOTK	6	DRAGON	0
2906	DRAGON TH	LIVE	5	DRAGON	1
2907	DRAGON TH	LIVE	5	DRAGON	1

2908	DRAGON TM	LIVE	6	DRAGON	0
2909	DRAGON TM	LIVE	6	DRAGON	0
2910	DRAGON TM	LIVE	6	DRAGON	0
2911	DRAGON TM	LIVE	6	DRAGON	0
2912	DRAGON TM	LIVE	6	DRAGON	0
2801	LAW TM	FRPK	3	LAW	0
2802	LAW TM	LIVE	3	LAW	0
2803	LAW TM	LIVE	3	LAW	0
2804	LAW TM	LIVE	3	LAW	0
2805	LAW TM	TOTK	3	LAW	0
2806	LAW TM	LIVE	3	LAW	0
2807	LAW TM	LIVE	3	LAW	0
2808	LAW TM	LIVE	3	LAW	0

2809	LAW TM	LIVE	3	LAW	0
2810	LAW TM	LIVE	3	LAW	0
2811	LAW TM	LIVE	3	LAW	0
2812	LAW TM	LIVE	3	LAW	0
2831	LAW TM	LIVE	3	LAW	0
2832	LAW TM	LIVE	3	LAW	0
2833	LAW TM	LIVE	3	LAW	0
2834	LAW TM	LIVE	3	LAW	0
2835	LAW TM	TOTK	3	LAW	0
2836	LAW TM	LIVE	3	LAW	0
2837	LAW TM	LIVE	3	LAW	0
2838	LAW TM	LIVE	3	LAW	0
2839	LAW TM	LIVE	3	LAW	0
2840	LAW TM	LIVE	3	LAW	0
2841	LAW TM	LIVE	3	LAW	0
2842	LAW TM	LIVE	3	LAW	0

EXERCISE ILM TRAINING STATUS
 NUC 4-3-4, EX TIME 1110

3301 ASP-1		LIVE					
		50	105 HEAT		0		
		200	105 APDS		0		
		60	TOW		0		
		60	DRAGON		0		
		120	LAW		0		
		9000	50 CAL		0		
3302 ASP-2		LIVE					
		50	105 HEAT		0		
		200	105 APDS		0		
		60	TOW		0		
		60	DRAGON		0		
		120	LAW		0		
		9000	50 CAL		0		
BEGIN	RESOURCES	NOW	TOTAL	AMMUNITION	W/SURV	W/CASU	EXPENDED
1	ASP-1	1	50	105 HEAT	50	0	0
			200	105 APDS	200	0	0
			60	TOW	60	0	0
			60	DRAGON	60	0	0
			120	LAW	120	0	0
			9000	50 CAL	9000	0	0
1	ASP-2	1	50	105 HEAT	50	0	0
			200	105 APDS	200	0	0
			60	TOW	60	0	0
			60	DRAGON	60	0	0
			120	LAW	120	0	0
			9000	50 CAL	9000	0	0

*** TURNER'S REPORT ***

EXERCISE NAME: NW 4-4

M60A1	(1144)	DIED AT TIME	401 OF	FR&MO KILL	DUE TO	SAGGER TM	(7652), FIRMING	SAGGER	AT RANGE 2050
M60A1	(1144)	DIED AT TIME	415 OF	FR&MO KILL	DUE TO	BRDM-2	(7652), FIRMING	SAGGER BRDM	AT RANGE 2000
M60A1	(1141)	DIED AT TIME	421 OF	FR&MO KILL	DUE TO	162	(5266), FIRMING	115 HVAFPSD	AT RANGE 1700
CAC ELEMENT (3205)	(1151)	DIED AT TIME	421 OF	FR&MO KILL	DUE TO	162	(5266), FIRMING	115 HVAFPSD	AT RANGE 1700
M60A1	(1151)	DIED AT TIME	421 OF	FR&MO KILL	DUE TO	162	(5251), FIRMING	115 HVAFPSD	AT RANGE 1700
CAC ELEMENT (3206)	(1144)	DIED AT TIME	421 OF	FR&MO KILL	DUE TO	162	(5251), FIRMING	115 HVAFPSD	AT RANGE 1700
M60A1	(1144)	DIED AT TIME	421 OF	FR&MO KILL	DUE TO	162	(5231), FIRMING	115 HVAFPSD	AT RANGE 1700
BMF	(1108)	DIED AT TIME	427 OF	FR&MO KILL	DUE TO	INDIRECT FIRE, BATTERY NO. 12, 8 IN			
M60A1	(1241)	DIED AT TIME	441 OF	FR&MO KILL	DUE TO	BRDM-2	(7661), FIRMING	SAGGER BRDM	AT RANGE 2000
CAC ELEMENT (3213)	(1203)	DIED AT TIME	441 OF	FR&MO KILL	DUE TO	BRDM-2	(7661), FIRMING	SAGGER BRDM	AT RANGE 2000
M60A1	(1203)	DIED AT TIME	441 OF	MOBIL KILL	DUE TO	SAGGER TM	(8870), FIRMING	SAGGER	AT RANGE 2000
M60A1	(1201)	DIED AT TIME	443 OF	FR&MO KILL	DUE TO	SAGGER TM	(8860), FIRMING	SAGGER	AT RANGE 2200
CAC ELEMENT (3209)	(1204)	DIED AT TIME	443 OF	FR&MO KILL	DUE TO	SAGGER TM	(8860), FIRMING	SAGGER	AT RANGE 2200
M60A1	(1231)	DIED AT TIME	451 OF	FR&MO KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1163), FIRMING	105 AFDS	AT RANGE 1600
T62	(5231)	DIED AT TIME	452 OF	FR&MO KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1153), FIRMING	105 AFDS	AT RANGE 1600
T62	(5170)	DIED AT TIME	453 OF	FR&MO KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1152), FIRMING	105 AFDS	AT RANGE 1700
M113 (10W)	(1701)	DIED AT TIME	470 OF	MOBIL KILL	DUE TO	BRDM-2	(7652), FIRMING	SAGGER BRDM	AT RANGE 2000
M60A1	(1202)	DIED AT TIME	471 OF	FR&MO KILL	DUE TO	SAGGER TM	(8860), FIRMING	SAGGER	AT RANGE 2200
T62	(5266)	DIED AT TIME	481 OF	FR&MO KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1164), FIRMING	105 AFDS	AT RANGE 1600
T62	(5266)	DIED AT TIME	482 OF	FR&MO KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1161), FIRMING	105 AFDS	AT RANGE 1700
BRDM-2	(7652)	DIED AT TIME	490 OF	MOBIL KILL	DUE TO	M113 (TOW)	(1704), FIRMING	TOW	AT RANGE 2200
T62	(5266)	DIED AT TIME	500 OF	FR&MO KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1173), FIRMING	TOW	AT RANGE 1750
BRDM-2	(7652)	DIED AT TIME	520 OF	MOBIL KILL	DUE TO	M113 (TOW)	(1703), FIRMING	TOW	AT RANGE 2200
M113 (10W)	(1702)	DIED AT TIME	530 OF	FR&MO KILL	DUE TO	BRDM-2	(7652), FIRMING	SAGGER BRDM	AT RANGE 2000
LAW TM	(2822)	DIED AT TIME	530 OF	FR&MO KILL	DUE TO	BRDM-2	(7652), FIRMING	SAGGER BRDM	AT RANGE 2000
BRDM-2	(7652)	DIED AT TIME	551 OF	MOBIL KILL	DUE TO	M113 (TOW)	(1701), FIRMING	TOW	AT RANGE 2200
M60A1	(1152)	DIED AT TIME	560 OF	FR&MO KILL	DUE TO	SAGGER TM	(8888), FIRMING	SAGGER	AT RANGE 2000
M60A1	(1143)	DIED AT TIME	589 OF	FR&MO KILL	DUE TO	SAGGER TM	(8870), FIRMING	SAGGER	AT RANGE 1900
BRDM-2	(7652)	DIED AT TIME	611 OF	FR&MO KILL	DUE TO	M113 (TOW)	(1701), FIRMING	TOW	AT RANGE 2200
RPG TM	(9911)	DIED AT TIME	655 OF	FR&MO KILL	DUE TO	INDIRECT FIRE, BATTERY NO. 11, 8 IN			
SAGGER TM	(8888)	DIED AT TIME	590 OF	FR&MO KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1111), FIRMING	105 MEAT	AT RANGE 850
SAGGER TM	(8870)	DIED AT TIME	592 OF	FR&MO KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1124), FIRMING	105 MEAT	AT RANGE 1050
M60A1	(1242)	DIED AT TIME	734 OF	FR&MO KILL	DUE TO	SAGGER TM	(8857), FIRMING	SAGGER	AT RANGE 1450
M60A1	(1244)	DIED AT TIME	734 OF	MOBIL KILL	DUE TO	SAGGER TM	(8877), FIRMING	SAGGER	AT RANGE 1475
M60A1	(1276)	DIED AT TIME	764 OF	FR&MO KILL	DUE TO	BMF	(1450), FIRMING	SAGGER	AT RANGE 1475
CAC ELEMENT (3216)	(1254)	DIED AT TIME	767 OF	FR&MO KILL	DUE TO	BMF	(1450), FIRMING	SAGGER	AT RANGE 1475
M60A1	(1254)	DIED AT TIME	767 OF	FR&MO KILL	DUE TO	BRDM-2	(7661), FIRMING	SAGGER	AT RANGE 1750

M60A1	(1263)	DIED AT TIME	794 OF	MOBIL KILL DUE TO	SAGGER TM	(8860), FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE 1450
M60A1	(1261)	DIED AT TIME	795 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	SAGGER TM	(8870), FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE 1450
C&C ELEMENT	(3215)	DIED AT TIME	796 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	SAGGER TM	(8870), FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE 1450
M60A1	(1223)	DIED AT TIME	795 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	SAGGER TM	(8870), FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE 1450
M113(AFC)	(1614)	DIED AT TIME	822 OF	MOBIL KILL DUE TO	SAGGER TM	(8865), FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE 1050
M60A1	(1264)	DIED AT TIME	823 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	SAGGER TM	(8865), FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE 1050
M60A1	(1262)	DIED AT TIME	823 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	SAGGER TM	(8869), FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE 1300
M60A1	(1264)	DIED AT TIME	824 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	SAGGER TM	(8869), FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE 1300
M113(AFC)	(1604)	DIED AT TIME	825 OF	MOBIL KILL DUE TO	BDM-2	(6114), FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE 1300
M60A3	(1436)	DIED AT TIME	828 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	SAGGER TM	(7661), FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE 1400
BMP	(6168)	DIED AT TIME	821 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	SAGGER TM	(8857), FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE 1700
SAGGER TM	(8878)	DIED AT TIME	872 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1244), FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE 1500
SAGGER TM	(8881)	DIED AT TIME	872 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1263), FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE 1450
M113(AFC)	(1602)	DIED AT TIME	881 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	INDIRECT FIRE, BATTERY NO. 11, B IN HE	(5272), FIRING	115 HVAFSD	AT RANGE 1000
M113(AFC)	(1611)	DIED AT TIME	903 OF	MOBIL KILL DUE TO	BMP	(6181), FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE 775
M113(AFC)	(1611)	DIED AT TIME	909 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	SAGGER TM	(8871), FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE 800
DRAGON TM	(2905)	DIED AT TIME	909 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	SAGGER TM	(8871), FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE 800
LAW TM	(2805)	DIED AT TIME	909 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	SAGGER TM	(8871), FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE 800
LAW TM	(2835)	DIED AT TIME	909 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	SAGGER TM	(8871), FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE 800
C&C ELEMENT	(3226)	DIED AT TIME	910 OF	MOBIL KILL DUE TO	DRAGON TM	(2906), FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE 800
BMP	(6175)	DIED AT TIME	912 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	T62	(5155), FIRING	115 HVAFSD	AT RANGE 1000
M113(AFC)	(1601)	DIED AT TIME	912 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	T62	(5155), FIRING	115 HVAFSD	AT RANGE 1000
DRAGON TM	(2901)	DIED AT TIME	912 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	T62	(5155), FIRING	115 HVAFSD	AT RANGE 1000
LAW TM	(2801)	DIED AT TIME	912 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	T62	(5155), FIRING	115 HVAFSD	AT RANGE 1000
LAW TM	(2831)	DIED AT TIME	912 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	T62	(5155), FIRING	115 HVAFSD	AT RANGE 1000
C&C ELEMENT	(3225)	DIED AT TIME	912 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	T62	(5155), FIRING	115 HVAFSD	AT RANGE 1000
M113(AFC)	(1603)	DIED AT TIME	914 OF	MOBIL KILL DUE TO	T62	(5210), FIRING	115 HVAFSD	AT RANGE 1000
M113(AFC)	(1601)	DIED AT TIME	924 OF	MOBIL KILL DUE TO	T62	(5130), FIRING	115 HVAFSD	AT RANGE 1000
M60A1	(1251)	DIED AT TIME	931 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	T62	(5130), FIRING	115 HVAFSD	AT RANGE 400
C&C ELEMENT	(3214)	DIED AT TIME	931 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	T62	(5130), FIRING	115 HVAFSD	AT RANGE 400
BDM-2	(7450)	DIED AT TIME	937 OF	MOBIL KILL DUE TO	DRAGON TM	(2931), FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE 450
M60A1	(1251)	DIED AT TIME	930 OF	MOBIL KILL DUE TO	SAGGER TM	(8859), FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE 700
M60A1	(1252)	DIED AT TIME	940 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	T62	(5215), FIRING	115 HEAT	AT RANGE 500
M113(TOW)	(1252)	DIED AT TIME	940 OF	MOBIL KILL DUE TO	BDM-2	(7658), FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE 1000
M60A1	(1153)	DIED AT TIME	940 OF	MOBIL KILL DUE TO	SAGGER TM	(8857), FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE 1000
M60A1	(1154)	DIED AT TIME	941 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	SAGGER TM	(8856), FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE 1000
M60A1	(1176)	DIED AT TIME	941 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	SAGGER TM	(8859), FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE 1000
C&C ELEMENT	(3208)	DIED AT TIME	941 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	SAGGER TM	(8859), FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE 1000
M60A1	(1161)	DIED AT TIME	941 OF	MOBIL KILL DUE TO	SAGGER TM	(8859), FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE 1000
M60A1	(1163)	DIED AT TIME	942 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	SAGGER TM	(8864), FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE 1000
M60A1	(1253)	DIED AT TIME	950 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	T62	(5238), FIRING	115 HEAT	AT RANGE 500
M60A1	(1123)	DIED AT TIME	960 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	BMP	(6152), FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE 300
M60A1	(1124)	DIED AT TIME	961 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	T62	(5215), FIRING	115 HEAT	AT RANGE 350

M60A1	(1123)	DIED*AT TIME	961 OF FPMO KILL DUE TO	T62	(1123)	FIRING	115 HEAT	AT RANGE 30
M60A1	(1122)	DIED AT TIME	961 OF FPMO KILL DUE TO	BMP	(1122)	FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE 30
M60A1	(1124)	DIED*AT TIME	961 OF FPMO KILL DUE TO	T62	(1124)	FIRING	115 HEAT	AT RANGE 30
M60A1	(1122)	DIED*AT TIME	961 OF FPMO KILL DUE TO	T62	(1122)	FIRING	115 HEAT	AT RANGE 55
M60A1	(1124)	DIED*AT TIME	961 OF FPMO KILL DUE TO	BMP	(1124)	FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE 30
SAGGER TM	(8879)	DIED AT TIME	966 OF FPMO KILL DUE TO	M113(TOW)	(1123)	FIRING	TOW	AT RANGE 130
M60A1	(1161)	DIED*AT TIME	966 OF FPMO KILL DUE TO	SPC 9	(1161)	FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE 65
CAC ELEMENT (3207)	(3207)	DIED AT TIME	966 OF FPMO KILL DUE TO	SPC 9	(3207)	FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE 65
BRDH-2	(7658)	DIED*AT TIME	969 OF FPMO KILL DUE TO	DRAGON TM	(2832)	FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE 65
BRDH-2	(7658)	DIED*AT TIME	969 OF MOBIL KILL DUE TO	DRAGON TM	(2831)	FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE 65
M60A1	(1161)	DIED*AT TIME	971 OF FPMO KILL DUE TO	SAGGER TM	(8957)	FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE 100
CAC ELEMENT (3207)	(3207)	DIED*AT TIME	971 OF FPMO KILL DUE TO	SAGGER TM	(8857)	FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE 100
M113(APC)	(1501)	DIED AT TIME	971 OF MOBIL KILL DUE TO	SAGGER TM	(8864)	FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE 100
M60A1	(1122)	DIED*AT TIME	981 OF FPMO KILL DUE TO	T62	(5238)	FIRING	115 HEAT	AT RANGE 35
T62	(5238)	DIED AT TIME	984 OF FPMO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1121)	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE 50
M60A1	(1252)	DIED*AT TIME	988 OF FPMO KILL DUE TO	T62	(5176)	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE 40
BMP	(6119)	DIED AT TIME	990 OF MOBIL KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1102)	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE 30
M60A1	(1102)	DIED AT TIME	991 OF FPMO KILL DUE TO	BMP	(6119)	FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE 20
BMP	(6131)	DIED AT TIME	991 OF MOBIL KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1101)	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE 30
T62	(5176)	DIED AT TIME	991 OF FPMO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1213)	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE 30
T62	(5155)	DIED AT TIME	991 OF FPMO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1212)	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE 70
M60A1	(1164)	DIED AT TIME	991 OF FPMO KILL DUE TO	SPC 9	(7792)	FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE 70
M60A1	(1111)	DIED AT TIME	992 OF MOBIL KILL DUE TO	T62	(5210)	FIRING	115 HEAT	AT RANGE 60
M60A1	(1104)	DIED AT TIME	992 OF FPMO KILL DUE TO	BMP	(6131)	FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE 20
M60A1	(1113)	DIED AT TIME	992 OF FPMO KILL DUE TO	T62	(5155)	FIRING	115 HEAT	AT RANGE 70
T62	(5130)	DIED AT TIME	992 OF FPMO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1211)	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE 60
SAGGER TM	(8894)	DIED AT TIME	996 OF FPMO KILL DUE TO	M113(TOW)	(1132)	FIRING	TOW	AT RANGE 120
SAGGER TM	(8886)	DIED AT TIME	996 OF FPMO KILL DUE TO	M113(TOW)	(1722)	FIRING	TOW	AT RANGE 150
M60A1	(1112)	DIED AT TIME	996 OF FPMO KILL DUE TO	SAGGER TM	(8876)	FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE 50
SAGGER TM	(8898)	DIED AT TIME	997 OF FPMO KILL DUE TO	M113(TOW)	(1724)	FIRING	TOW	AT RANGE 150
M60A1	(1162)	DIED AT TIME	998 OF FPMO KILL DUE TO	SAGGER TM	(8859)	FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE 80
M60A1	(1103)	DIED AT TIME	1001 OF FPMO KILL DUE TO	SAGGER TM	(8864)	FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE 100
M60A1	(1101)	DIED AT TIME	1001 OF FPMO KILL DUE TO	SAGGER TM	(8957)	FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE 100
CAC ELEMENT (3201)	(3201)	DIED AT TIME	1001 OF FPMO KILL DUE TO	SAGGER TM	(8857)	FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE 100
T62	(5272)	DIED AT TIME	1002 OF FPMO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1214)	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE 60
BMP	(6152)	DIED AT TIME	1003 OF MOBIL KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1222)	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE 10
T62	(5215)	DIED AT TIME	1010 OF FPMO KILL DUE TO	INDIRECT FIRE, BATTERY NO. 29, 122 MRL HE				

*** (CONTINUED) ***

EXHIBIT 4-3-4

ALPH	PORT	301 OF	FF&MO KILL DUE TO	SAGGER TM	FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE
M60A1	(1243)	DIED AT TIME	301 OF	FF&MO KILL DUE TO	SAGGER TM	(8857),	AT RANGE 2051
M60A1	(1142)	DIED AT TIME	415 OF	FF&MO KILL DUE TO	BRDM-2	(7652),	SAGGER BRDM AT RANGE 2001
M60A1	(1141)	DIED AT TIME	421 OF	FF&MO KILL DUE TO	162	(5266),	115 HVAFPSD AT RANGE 1701
C&C ELEMENT(3205)	DIED AT TIME	421 OF	FF&MO KILL DUE TO	162		(5266),	115 HVAFPSD AT RANGE 1701
M60A1	(1151)	DIED AT TIME	421 OF	FF&MO KILL DUE TO	162	(5251),	115 HVAFPSD AT RANGE 1701
C&C ELEMENT(3206)	DIED AT TIME	421 OF	FF&MO KILL DUE TO	162		(5251),	115 HVAFPSD AT RANGE 1701
M60A1	(1144)	DIED AT TIME	421 OF	FF&MO KILL DUE TO	162	(5231),	115 HVAFPSD AT RANGE 1701
M60A1	(1241)	DIED AT TIME	441 OF	FF&MO KILL DUE TO	BRDM-2	(7661),	SAGGER BRDM AT RANGE 2001
C&C ELEMENT(3213)	DIED AT TIME	441 OF	FF&MO KILL DUE TO	BRDM-2		(7661),	SAGGER BRDM AT RANGE 2001
M60A1	(1202)	DIED AT TIME	441 OF	MOGIL KILL DUE TO	SAGGER TM	(8870),	SAGGER AT RANGE 1901
M60A1	(1203)	DIED AT TIME	441 OF	FF&MO KILL DUE TO	SAGGER TM	(8858),	SAGGER AT RANGE 2001
M60A1	(1201)	DIED AT TIME	443 OF	FF&MO KILL DUE TO	SAGGER TM	(8860),	SAGGER AT RANGE 2201
C&C ELEMENT(3209)	DIED AT TIME	443 OF	FF&MO KILL DUE TO	SAGGER TM		(8860),	SAGGER AT RANGE 2201
M60A1	(1204)	DIED AT TIME	443 OF	FF&MO KILL DUE TO	SAGGER TM	(8876),	SAGGER BRDM AT RANGE 2001
M113(TOW)	(1701)	DIED AT TIME	470 OF	MOGIL KILL DUE TO	BRDM-2	(7652),	SAGGER BRDM AT RANGE 2001
M60A1	(1202)	DIED AT TIME	471 OF	FF&MO KILL DUE TO	SAGGER TM	(8860),	SAGGER BRDM AT RANGE 2001
M113(TOW)	(1702)	DIED AT TIME	530 OF	FF&MO KILL DUE TO	BRDM-2	(7652),	SAGGER BRDM AT RANGE 2001
LAW TM	(2822)	DIED AT TIME	530 OF	FF&MO KILL DUE TO	BRDM-2	(7652),	SAGGER BRDM AT RANGE 2001
M60A1	(1152)	DIED AT TIME	560 OF	FF&MO KILL DUE TO	SAGGER TM	(8888),	SAGGER AT RANGE 2001
M60A1	(1143)	DIED AT TIME	588 OF	FF&MO KILL DUE TO	SAGGER TM	(8870),	SAGGER AT RANGE 1901
M60A1	(1242)	DIED AT TIME	734 OF	FF&MO KILL DUE TO	SAGGER TM	(8857),	SAGGER AT RANGE 1451
M60A1	(1244)	DIED AT TIME	734 OF	MOGIL KILL DUE TO	SAGGER TM	(8877),	SAGGER AT RANGE 1471
M60A1	(1276)	DIED AT TIME	764 OF	FF&MO KILL DUE TO	RMP	(1450),	SAGGER AT RANGE 1471
C&C ELEMENT(3216)	DIED AT TIME	764 OF	FF&MO KILL DUE TO	RMP		(1450),	SAGGER AT RANGE 1471
M60A1	(1254)	DIED AT TIME	767 OF	FF&MO KILL DUE TO	BRDM-2	(7661),	SAGGER AT RANGE 1751
M60A1	(1263)	DIED AT TIME	794 OF	MOGIL KILL DUE TO	SAGGER TM	(8860),	SAGGER AT RANGE 1451
M60A1	(1261)	DIED AT TIME	795 OF	FF&MO KILL DUE TO	SAGGER TM	(8878),	SAGGER AT RANGE 1451
C&C ELEMENT(3215)	DIED AT TIME	795 OF	FF&MO KILL DUE TO	SAGGER TM		(8878),	SAGGER AT RANGE 1451
M60A1	(1223)	DIED AT TIME	795 OF	FF&MO KILL DUE TO	SAGGER TM	(8860),	SAGGER AT RANGE 1551
M113(APC)	(1614)	DIED AT TIME	827 OF	MOGIL KILL DUE TO	SAGGER TM	(8860),	SAGGER AT RANGE 1051
M60A1	(1264)	DIED AT TIME	823 OF	FF&MO KILL DUE TO	SAGGER TM	(8860),	SAGGER AT RANGE 1301
M60A1	(1262)	DIED AT TIME	823 OF	FF&MO KILL DUE TO	SAGGER TM	(8878),	SAGGER AT RANGE 1301
M60A1	(1264)	DIED AT TIME	824 OF	FF&MO KILL DUE TO	RMP	(6113),	SAGGER BRDM AT RANGE 1401
M113(APC)	(1604)	DIED AT TIME	825 OF	MOGIL KILL DUE TO	BRDM-2	(7661),	SAGGER BRDM AT RANGE 1401
M60A1	(1436)	DIED AT TIME	820 OF	FF&MO KILL DUE TO	SAGGER TM	(8857),	SAGGER AT RANGE 1701
M113(APC)	(1602)	DIED AT TIME	901 OF	MOGIL KILL DUE TO	162	(5272),	115 HVAFPSD AT RANGE 1001
M113(APC)	(1611)	DIED AT TIME	903 OF	MOGIL KILL DUE TO	RMP	(6181),	73 HEAT AT RANGE 771
M113(APC)	(1611)	DIED AT TIME	909 OF	FF&MO KILL DUE TO	SAGGER TM	(8871),	SAGGER AT RANGE 801
DRAGON TM	(2905)	DIED AT TIME	909 OF	FF&MO KILL DUE TO	SAGGER TM	(8871),	SAGGER AT RANGE 801
LAW TM	(2805)	DIED AT TIME	909 OF	FF&MO KILL DUE TO	SAGGER TM	(8871),	SAGGER AT RANGE 801
LAW TM	(2835)	DIED AT TIME	909 OF	FF&MO KILL DUE TO	SAGGER TM	(8871),	SAGGER AT RANGE 801
C&C ELEMENT(3226)	DIED AT TIME	909 OF	FF&MO KILL DUE TO	SAGGER TM		(8871),	SAGGER AT RANGE 801

M113(ARC)	(1601)	DIED AT TIME	912 OF	FRP&M KILL	DUE TO	162	(5153),	FIRING	115 HV&P SD	AT RANGE	100
DRAGON TM	(2901)	DIED AT TIME	912 OF	FRP&M KILL	DUE TO	162	(5155),	FIRING	115 HV&P SD	AT RANGE	100
LAW TM	(2801)	DIED AT TIME	912 OF	FRP&M KILL	DUE TO	162	(5155),	FIRING	115 HV&P SD	AT RANGE	100
LAW TM	(2831)	DIED AT TIME	912 OF	FRP&M KILL	DUE TO	162	(5155),	FIRING	115 HV&P SD	AT RANGE	100
C&C ELEMENT(3205)	(1603)	DIED AT TIME	912 OF	FRP&M KILL	DUE TO	162	(5155),	FIRING	115 HV&P SD	AT RANGE	100
M113(APC)	(1603)	DIED AT TIME	914 OF	MUGIL KILL	DUE TO	162	(5210),	FIRING	115 HV&P SD	AT RANGE	100
M113(APC)	(1601)	DIED*AT TIME	924 OF	MUGIL KILL	DUE TO	162	(5130),	FIRING	115 HV&P SD	AT RANGE	100
M60A1	(1251)	DIED AT TIME	931 OF	FR&M KILL	DUE TO	162	(5128),	FIRING	115 HEAT	AT RANGE	40
C&C ELEMENT(3214)	(1251)	DIED AT TIME	931 OF	FR&M KILL	DUE TO	162	(5128),	FIRING	115 HEAT	AT RANGE	40
M60A1	(1251)	DIED*AT TIME	938 OF	MUGIL KILL	DUE TO	162	(8895),	FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE	70
M60A1	(1252)	DIED AT TIME	940 OF	FRP&M KILL	DUE TO	162	(5215),	FIRING	115 HEAT	AT RANGE	50
M113(TOW)	(1732)	DIED AT TIME	940 OF	MUGIL KILL	DUE TO	162	(7658),	FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE	100
M60A1	(1153)	DIED AT TIME	940 OF	MUGIL KILL	DUE TO	162	(8857),	FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE	100
M60A1	(1154)	DIED AT TIME	941 OF	FR&M KILL	DUE TO	162	(8856),	FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE	100
M60A1	(1176)	DIED AT TIME	941 OF	FR&M KILL	DUE TO	162	(8859),	FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE	100
C&C ELEMENT(3208)	(1123)	DIED AT TIME	941 OF	FR&M KILL	DUE TO	162	(8859),	FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE	100
M60A1	(1161)	DIED AT TIME	941 OF	MUGIL KILL	DUE TO	162	(8898),	FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE	100
M60A1	(1163)	DIED AT TIME	942 OF	FR&M KILL	DUE TO	162	(8864),	FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE	100
M60A1	(1253)	DIED AT TIME	950 OF	FR&M KILL	DUE TO	162	(5238),	FIRING	115 HEAT	AT RANGE	50
M60A1	(1123)	DIED AT TIME	960 OF	FR&M KILL	DUE TO	162	(6152),	FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	30
M60A1	(1124)	DIED AT TIME	961 OF	FR&M KILL	DUE TO	162	(5215),	FIRING	115 HEAT	AT RANGE	35
M60A1	(1123)	DIED*AT TIME	961 OF	FR&M KILL	DUE TO	162	(5128),	FIRING	115 HEAT	AT RANGE	30
M60A1	(1122)	DIED AT TIME	961 OF	FR&M KILL	DUE TO	162	(6121),	FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	30
M60A1	(1124)	DIED*AT TIME	961 OF	FR&M KILL	DUE TO	162	(5183),	FIRING	115 HEAT	AT RANGE	30
M60A1	(1122)	DIED*AT TIME	961 OF	FR&M KILL	DUE TO	162	(5155),	FIRING	115 HEAT	AT RANGE	55
M60A1	(1124)	DIED*AT TIME	961 OF	FR&M KILL	DUE TO	162	(6170),	FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	30
M60A1	(1161)	DIED*AT TIME	966 OF	FR&M KILL	DUE TO	162	(7792),	FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	65
C&C ELEMENT(3207)	(1161)	DIED AT TIME	966 OF	FR&M KILL	DUE TO	162	(7792),	FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	65
M60A1	(1161)	DIED*AT TIME	971 OF	FR&M KILL	DUE TO	162	(8857),	FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE	100
C&C ELEMENT(3207)	(1161)	DIED*AT TIME	971 OF	FR&M KILL	DUE TO	162	(8857),	FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE	100
M113(APC)	(1501)	DIED AT TIME	971 OF	MUGIL KILL	DUE TO	162	(8857),	FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE	100
M60A1	(1122)	DIED*AT TIME	981 OF	FR&M KILL	DUE TO	162	(8864),	FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE	100
M60A1	(1252)	DIED*AT TIME	988 OF	FR&M KILL	DUE TO	162	(5238),	FIRING	115 HEAT	AT RANGE	35
M60A1	(1102)	DIED AT TIME	991 OF	FR&M KILL	DUE TO	162	(5176),	FIRING	115 HEAT	AT RANGE	40
M60A1	(1164)	DIED AT TIME	991 OF	FR&M KILL	DUE TO	162	(6119),	FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	20
M60A1	(1111)	DIED AT TIME	992 OF	FR&M KILL	DUE TO	162	(7792),	FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	70
M60A1	(1104)	DIED AT TIME	992 OF	FR&M KILL	DUE TO	162	(5210),	FIRING	115 HEAT	AT RANGE	67
M60A1	(1113)	DIED AT TIME	992 OF	FR&M KILL	DUE TO	162	(6131),	FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	20
M60A1	(1112)	DIED AT TIME	996 OF	FR&M KILL	DUE TO	162	(5155),	FIRING	115 HEAT	AT RANGE	70
M60A1	(1162)	DIED AT TIME	998 OF	FRP&M KILL	DUE TO	162	(8876),	FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE	55
M60A1	(1103)	DIED AT TIME	1001 OF	FR&M KILL	DUE TO	162	(8859),	FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE	80
M60A1	(1101)	DIED AT TIME	1001 OF	FR&M KILL	DUE TO	162	(8864),	FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE	100
C&C ELEMENT(3201)	(1101)	DIED AT TIME	1001 OF	FR&M KILL	DUE TO	162	(8857),	FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE	100

*** CORONER'S REPORT ***

EXERCISE NAME: NWC 4-3-4

BMP	(6108)	DIED AT TIME	427 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	INDIRECT FIRE, BATTERY NO.	10, 8 IN	HE
T62	(5231)	DIED AT TIME	451 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1 (1163), FIRING	105 APDS	AT RANGE 1600
T62	(5251)	DIED AT TIME	452 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1 (1153), FIRING	105 APDS	AT RANGE 1600
T62	(5170)	DIED AT TIME	453 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1 (1152), FIRING	105 APDS	AT RANGE 1700
T62	(5266)	DIED AT TIME	481 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1 (1164), FIRING	105 APDS	AT RANGE 1600
T62	(5266)	DIED AT TIME	482 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1 (1161), FIRING	105 APDS	AT RANGE 1700
BRDM-2	(7652)	DIED AT TIME	490 OF MOGIL KILL DUE TO	M113(TOW) (1704), FIRING	TOW	AT RANGE 2200
T62	(5266)	DIED AT TIME	500 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1 (1123), FIRING	105 APDS	AT RANGE 1750
BRDM-2	(7652)	DIED AT TIME	520 OF MOGIL KILL DUE TO	M113(TOW) (1703), FIRING	TOW	AT RANGE 2200
BRDM-2	(7652)	DIED AT TIME	551 OF MOGIL KILL DUE TO	M113(TOW) (1701), FIRING	TOW	AT RANGE 2200
BRDM-2	(7652)	DIED AT TIME	611 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M113(TOW) (1701), FIRING	TOW	AT RANGE 2200
RPG TM	(9911)	DIED AT TIME	665 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	INDIRECT FIRE, BATTERY NO.	11, 8 IN	HE
SAGGER TM	(8888)	DIED AT TIME	690 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1 (1111), FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE 850
SAGGER TM	(8870)	DIED AT TIME	692 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1 (1114), FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE 1050
BMP	(6168)	DIED AT TIME	871 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1 (1244), FIRING	105 APDS	AT RANGE 1500
SAGGER TM	(8878)	DIED AT TIME	872 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1 (1263), FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE 1450
SAGGER TM	(8881)	DIED AT TIME	881 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	INDIRECT FIRE, BATTERY NO.	11, 8 IN	HE
GMP	(6176)	DIED AT TIME	910 OF MOGIL KILL DUE TO	DRAGON TM (2905), FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE 800
BRDM-2	(7658)	DIED AT TIME	937 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	DRAGON TM (2931), FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE 650
SAGGER TM	(8879)	DIED AT TIME	966 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M113(TOW) (1733), FIRING	TOW	AT RANGE 1300
BRDM-2	(7658)	DIED AT TIME	969 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	DRAGON TM (2932), FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE 650
T62	(5238)	DIED AT TIME	969 OF MOGIL KILL DUE TO	M60A1 (1121), FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE 500
BMP	(6119)	DIED AT TIME	984 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1 (1102), FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE 300
BMP	(6131)	DIED AT TIME	991 OF MOGIL KILL DUE TO	M60A1 (1101), FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE 300
T62	(5176)	DIED AT TIME	991 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1 (1213), FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE 300
T62	(5155)	DIED AT TIME	991 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1 (1212), FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE 700
T62	(5130)	DIED AT TIME	992 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1 (1211), FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE 600
SAGGER TM	(8894)	DIED AT TIME	996 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M113(TOW) (1732), FIRING	TOW	AT RANGE 1200
SAGGER TM	(8886)	DIED AT TIME	996 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M113(TOW) (1722), FIRING	TOW	AT RANGE 1500
SAGGER TM	(8898)	DIED AT TIME	997 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M113(TOW) (1724), FIRING	TOW	AT RANGE 1500
T62	(5272)	DIED AT TIME	1003 OF MOGIL KILL DUE TO	M60A1 (1214), FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE 600
BMP	(6152)	DIED AT TIME	1003 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1 (1222), FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE 100
T62	(5215)	DIED AT TIME	1010 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	INDIRECT FIRE, BATTERY NO.	20, 122 MRL HE	

Appendix 2 (Scenario #2, Option II) to ANNEX G (Scenario #2)

1. The U.S. battalion initiated the battle with a short three volley artillery prep, the third volley of which started building the smoke envelope.
2. The TOW Company maneuvered up a defile from the Haune River to Steinbach (NA 525205) where they established overwatching fires from the eastern outskirts of the town.
3. The lettered companies, and the Infantry Company constituted the assault force, and entered the smoke envelope from their attack position behind the Galgenberg (NA 518175). The scout platoon screened the right (southern) flank of this attack.
4. This advance proceeded with only minor sniping along the right (southern) flank from reconnaissance and first band Soviet forces as the assault force headed for Betzenrod within the smoke envelope. Although repeatedly engaged by Soviet indirect fire, the only opposition came from a platoon on the Roter Berg (NA 537204) which they easily destroyed.
5. As the assault force crossed the Roter Berg, a volley from the Soviet MRL Battalion (BM-21) landed in the middle of the formation killing twelve M-60Als. This was the third attempt by the Soviet commander to engage the attacking force with MRL during this iteration (the first two were cancelled) and the only MRL mission in three iterations to hit an assault force while it maneuvered within the smoke envelope. However, the tight formation of the assault force in Option


II tactics constitutes an exceptionally lucrative target for massed artillery or a tactical nuclear weapon. However, experience with BATTLE shows that 122mm, 130mm and 152mm FA fire is not effective against armored vehicles. Furthermore, it is not easy to deliver accurate fire for effect volleys on a moving target unless that are on-call, pre-planned fires. Lastly, it is difficult to locate the attacking force accurately while it is within the smoke envelope.

6. By the time the assault force reached Betzenrod (NA 545205), the TOW Company had shifted to Hill 362 (NA 540217). This overwatch force operating outside the smoke envelope proved particularly effective in destroying one tank platoon and a number of BMPs attempting to move to switch positions to engage the attacking force.

7. When the maneuver force reached Betzenrod, it turned southeast toward Hill 419 (NA 554199) cutting through the second and third Soviet defensive bands. The Infantry Company led this assault and it was here that the battalion suffered most of its losses (a disproportionate number of these to infantry anti-armor weapons such as the RPG-7 and BMP).

8. At the end of the battle, the U.S. battalion had not only thoroughly penetrated the Soviet MRB to the depth of the second echelon, it had also destroyed all of the armored vehicles in the Soviet battalion except for five BMPs.

Therefore, effective opposition had ended over the entire five kilometer front of the Soviet MRB and an exploiting battalion could easily have driven unopposed through this large gap. Time sequenced photographs (pages G-41 to G-47) show the progress of the battle.



U. S.

SOVIET

➔ INITIAL
ATTACK
PSN

---➔ AXIS & LIMIT
OF ADVANCE


↑ TOW PLT

(...) INF PLT


(T) TANK PLT

(R) RECON SEC

G-41



G-42



G-43



G-44



Time 15
820



G-45



G-47



SCENARIO #2, OPTION II

SOVIET SYSTEMS KILLED BY U.S. SYSTEMS

	<u>T-62</u>	<u>BMP</u>	<u>PT-76</u>	<u>BRDM-2</u>	<u>Sagger Team</u>	<u>RPG Tm</u>
M-60A1	9	14	0	1	0	3
TOW	4	0	0	1	3	12
DRAGON ¹	0	11	0	0	0	3
LAW	0	0	0	0	0	0
Indirect Fire	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>
TOTALS	13	26	1	2	7	23

U.S. SYSTEMS KILLED BY SOVIET SYSTEMS

	<u>M-60</u>	<u>TOW</u>	<u>M113</u>	<u>DRAGON</u>	<u>LAW</u>
T-62	5	1	0	0	0
BRDM-2	0	1	1	0	1
Sagger TM	0	1	0	0	0
RPG-7	3	1	5	3	4
BMP (73 HEAT)	14	2	5	4	10
Indirect Fire	<u>12</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
TOTALS	34	6	11	7 ²	15 ³

1. Fired while mounted on a M113.
2. All Dragon Teams were killed while riding M113s.
3. All LAW Teams were killed while riding M113s.

TASK FORCE 4-3-4		STATUS	
EXERCISE NWC 4-3-4		EX- TIME 986	
REGIN	RESOURCES	W/SURV	W/CASU
54	M60A1	21	EXPENDED
17	M113(AC)	7	
		810	105 HEAT
		2160	105 AFDS
		432	105 SOF TGT
		108000	50 CAL
		108000	7.62 MG
		102	LAW
		17000	50 CAL
		90	DRAGON
		149985	7.62 MG
15	M113(TOW)	8	
		150	TOW
		18	105 SOF TGT
		15000	50 CAL
		72	LAW
2	M113(C&C)	2	
		6	LAW
		2000	50 CAL
6	M106(MIR)	6	
37	LAW TM	22	
15	DRAGON TM	8	
		150	LAW
		90	DRAGON
1	ASF 1	1	
		50	105 HEAT
		200	105 AFDS
		60	TOW
		60	DRAGON
		120	LAW
		9000	50 CAL
1	ASF 2	1	
		50	105 HEAT
		200	105 AFDS
		60	TOW
		60	DRAGON
		120	LAW
		9000	50 CAL

TEAM ALPHA STATUS
EXERCISE NWC 4-3-4, EX. TIME 98.

1101	M60A1	TOT	15	105 HEAT	0
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			1974	50 CAL	25
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1102	M60A1	LIVE	10	105 HEAT	0
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1103	M60A1	LIVE	13	105 HEAT	2
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1104	M60A1	LIVE	13	105 HEAT	2
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1111	M60A1	LIVE	11	105 HEAT	4
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1112	M60A1	LIVE	15	105 HEAT	0
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1113	M60A1	LIVE	15	105 HEAT	0
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0

1114	M60A1	LIVE	13	105 HEAT	0
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SOF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1121	M60A1	LIVE	13	105 HEAT	0
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SOF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1122	M60A1	LIVE	13	105 HEAT	2
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SOF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1123	M60A1	LIVE	14	105 HEAT	1
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SOF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1124	M60A1	LIVE	15	105 HEAT	0
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SOF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1134	M60A1	TOTL	15	105 HEAT	0
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SOF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0

REGIN	RESOURCES	NOW	TOTAL	AMMUNITION	W/SURV	W/CASU	EXPENDED
13	M60A1	11	195	105 HEAT	144	30	21
			520	105 APDS	440	80	0
			104	105 SOF TGT	88	16	0
			26000	50 CAL	22000	3974	26
			26000	7.62 MG	22000	4000	0

EXERCISE NWC 4-3-4, EX. TIME 986
TEAM BRAVO STATUS

1141	M60A1	TOTK	13 105 HEAT	2
			40 105 APDS	0
			8 105 SDF TGT	0
			2000 50 CAL	0
			2000 7.62 MG	0
1142	M60A1	LIVE	15 105 HEAT	0
			40 105 APDS	0
			8 105 SDF TGT	0
			2000 50 CAL	0
			2000 7.62 MG	0
1143	M60A1	TOTK	15 105 HEAT	0
			40 105 APDS	0
			8 105 SDF TGT	0
			2000 50 CAL	0
			2000 7.62 MG	0
1144	M60A1	LIVE	14 105 HEAT	1
			40 105 APDS	0
			8 105 SDF TGT	0
			2000 50 CAL	0
			2000 7.62 MG	0
1151	M60A1	LIVE	12 105 HEAT	3
			40 105 APDS	0
			8 105 SDF TGT	0
			2000 50 CAL	0
			2000 7.62 MG	0
1152	M60A1	TOTK	15 105 HEAT	0
			40 105 APDS	0
			8 105 SDF TGT	0
			2000 50 CAL	0
			2000 7.62 MG	0

1153	M60A1	TOTL	14	105 HEAT	
			40	105 APDS	
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1154	M60A1	TOTL	15	105 HEAT	0
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1161	M60A1	TOTL	15	105 HEAT	0
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1162	M60A1	LIVE	13	105 HEAT	2
			39	105 APDS	1
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1163	M60A1	TOTL	15	105 HEAT	0
			49	105 APDS	1
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1164	M60A1	TOTL	14	105 HEAT	1
			39	105 APDS	2
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1174	M60A1	LIVE	15	105 HEAT	0
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0

REGIN	RESOURCES	NOW	TOTAL	AMMUNITION	W/SURV	W/ASU	EXPENDED
13	M60A1	6	195	105 HEAT	93	102	10
			520	105 APDS	219	277	4
			104	105 SDF TGT	48	56	0
			26000	50 CAL	12000	14000	0
			26000	7.62 MG	12000	14000	0

TEAM CHARLIE STATUS
EXERCISE NWC 4-3-7, EX. TIME 986

1201	M60A1	FIRE	12	105 HEAT	2
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1202	M60A1	TOTK	12	105 HEAT	2
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1203	M60A1	FIRE	14	105 HEAT	1
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1204	M60A1	LIVE	15	105 HEAT	0
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1211	M60A1	TOTK	14	105 HEAT	1
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1212	M60A1	TOTK	15	105 HEAT	0
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0

1213	M60A1	TOTL	15	105 HEAT	0
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1214	M60A1	TOTL	15	105 HEAT	0
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1221	M60A1	TOTL	15	105 HEAT	0
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1222	M60A1	LIVE	14	105 HEAT	1
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1223	M60A1	TOTL	15	105 HEAT	0
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1224	M60A1	TOTL	15	105 HEAT	0
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1236	M60A1	TOTL	15	105 HEAT	0
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0

EGIN	RESOURCES	NOW	TOTAL	AMMUNITION	W/SURV	W/CASU	EXPENDED
13	M60A1	2	195	105 HEAT	29	157	9
			520	105 APDS	80	440	0
			104	105 SDF TGT	16	88	0
			26000	50 CAL	4000	22000	0
			26000	7.62 MG	4000	22000	0

TEAM DELTA STATUS
EXERCISE NWC 4-3-87, EX. TIME 985

1241	M60A1	TOTK	15	105 HEAT	2
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SOF TGT	0
			1987	50 CAL	13
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1242	M60A1	FRPK	12	105 HEAT	2
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SOF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1243	M60A1	FRPK	12	105 HEAT	3
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SOF TGT	0
			1987	50 CAL	13
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1244	M60A1	FRPK	13	105 HEAT	2
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SOF TGT	0
			1974	50 CAL	26
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1251	M60A1	TOTK	15	105 HEAT	0
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SOF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1252	M60A1	TOTK	15	105 HEAT	0
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SOF TGT	0
			1987	50 CAL	13
			2000	7.62 MG	0

1253	M60A1	TOT	15	105 HEAT	0
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			1987	50 CAL	13
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1254	M60A1	TOT	15	105 HEAT	0
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			1987	50 CAL	13
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1261	M60A1	TOT	15	105 HEAT	0
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1262	M60A1	TOT	7	105 HEAT	0
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1263	M60A1	TOT	8	105 HEAT	0
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1264	M60A1	TOT	15	105 HEAT	0
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			1987	50 CAL	13
			2000	7.62 MG	0
1276	M60A1	TOT	15	105 HEAT	0
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
			2000	7.62 MG	0

EGIM	RESOURCES	NOW	TOTAL	AMMUNITION	W/SURV	W/CASU	EXPENDED
13	M60A1	1					
			195	105 HEAT	7	160	28
			520	105 APDS	40	480	0
			104	105 SDF TGT	8	96	0
			2000	50 CAL	2000	23896	104
			2000	7.62 MG	2000	24000	0

**TEAM SCOUT STATUS
EXERCISE NWC 4-3-4, EX. TIME 984**

1526	M113(APC)	TOTK	6	LAW			
			987	50 CAL		1	
1731	M113(TOW)	MOBK	6	TOW			
			6	105 SOF TGT		6	
			987	50 CAL		14	
1732	M113(TOW)	LIVE	6	TOW			
			6	105 SOF TGT		6	
			1000	50 CAL		6	
1733	M113(TOW)	MOBK	10	TOW		0	
			6	105 SOF TGT		0	
			909	50 CAL		91	
1501	M113(APC)	LIVE	0	DRAGON		6	
			6	LAW		0	
			1000	50 CAL		0	
			9999	7.62 MG		0	
1502	M113(APC)	MOBK	6	DRAGON		0	
			6	LAW		0	
			1000	50 CAL		0	
			9999	7.62 MG		0	
1503	M113(APC)	TOTK	6	DRAGON		0	
			6	LAW		0	
			1000	50 CAL		0	
			9999	7.62 MG		0	
2931	DRAGON TM	LIVE	6	DRAGON		0	
2932	DRAGON TM	LIVE	5	DRAGON		1	
2933	DRAGON TM	TOTK	6	DRAGON		0	
BEGIN	RESOURCES	NOW	TOTAL	AMMUNITION	W/SURV	W/CASE	EXPENDED
4	M113(APC)	1	24	LAW	6	18	0
			4000	50 CAL	1000	2987	13
			18	DRAGON	0	12	6
			29997	7.62 MG	9999	19998	0
3	M113(TOW)	1	30	TOW	6	18	5
			18	105 SOF TGT	6	12	0
			3000	50 CAL	1000	1999	104
7	DRAGON TM	0					

TEAM TOW STATUS
EXERCISE NWC 4-3-4, EX. TIME 980

1701	M113(TOW)	LIVE	10	TOW	0
			6	LAW	0
			896	50 CAL	104
1702	M113(TOW)	LIVE	10	TOW	0
			6	LAW	0
			883	50 CAL	117
1703	M113(TOW)	LIVE	10	TOW	0
			6	LAW	0
			909	50 CAL	91
1704	M113(TOW)	LIVE	10	TOW	0
			6	LAW	0
			948	50 CAL	52
1711	M113(TOW)	TOTK	10	TOW	0
			6	LAW	0
			1000	50 CAL	0
1712	M113(TOW)	LIVE	10	TOW	0
			6	LAW	0
			961	50 CAL	39
1713	M113(TOW)	TOTK	10	TOW	0
			6	LAW	0
			1000	50 CAL	0

1714	M113(TOW)	LIVE	10 6 961	TOW LAW 50 CAL	3 3 1
1721	M113(TOW)	MOBK	7 6 1000	TOW LAW 50 CAL	3 3 0
1722	M113(TOW)	TOTR	8 6 1000	TOW LAW 50 CAL	2 0 0
1723	M113(TOW)	MOBK	6 6 1000	TOW LAW 50 CAL	4 0 0
1724	M113(TOW)	LIVE	7 6 1000	TOW LAW 50 CAL	3 0 0
1726	M113(C&C)	LIVE	6 1000	LAW 50 CAL	0 0

EGIN	RESOURCES	NOW	TOTAL	AMMUNITION	W/SURV	W/CASU	EXTENDED
12	M113(TOW)	7	120 72 12000	TOW LAW 50 CAL	62 42 6553	41 30 5000	12 0 442
1	M113(C&C)	1	6 1000	LAW 50 CAL	6 1000	0 0	0 0

TEAM HQ STATUS
EXERCISE NWC 4-3-4, EX. TIME 286

1196 M60A1 L101
14 105 HEAT 1
40 105 APDS 0
8 105 SOF TGT 0
2000 50 CAL 0
2000 7.62 MG 0

1198 M60A1 T0TH
15 105 HEAT 0
40 105 APDS 0
8 105 SOF TGT 0
2000 50 CAL 0
2000 7.62 MG 0

EGIN	RESOURCES	NOW	TOTAL	AMMUNITION	W/SURV	W/DASU	EXPENDED
2	M60A1	1	30	105 HEAT	14	15	1
			80	105 APDS	40	40	0
			16	105 SOF TGT	8	8	0
			4000	50 CAL	2000	2000	0
			4000	7.62 MG	2000	2000	0

TEAM INFANTRY SIGTUS 986 EXERCISE NWC 4-3-4, EX- TIME

1614	M113(APC)	LIVE	3 DRAGON 6 LAW 1000 50 CAL 9999 7.62 MG	3 0 0 0
1623	M113(APC)	LIVE	2 DRAGON 6 LAW 1000 50 CAL 9999 7.62 MG	4 0 0 0
1622	M113(APC)	LIVE	1 DRAGON 6 LAW 974 50 CAL 9999 7.62 MG	5 0 26 0
1621	M113(APC)	TOTV	6 LAW 997 50 CAL 9999 7.62 MG	0 0 13 0
1614	M113(APC)	TOTK	6 DRAGON 6 LAW 1000 50 CAL 9999 7.62 MG	0 0 0 0
1613	M113(APC)	TOTK	6 DRAGON 6 LAW 1000 50 CAL 9999 7.62 MG	0 0 0 0
1612	M113(APC)	LIVE	2 DRAGON 6 LAW 961 50 CAL 9999 7.62 MG	0 0 39 0

1611	M113(APC)	LIVE	1 5 1000 9999	DRAGON LAW 50 CAL 7.62 MG	5 0 0 0
1604	M113(APC)	WORK	3 6- 935 9999	DRAGON LAW 50 CAL 7.62 MG	3 0 65 0
1605	M113(APC)	TOTK	5 5 951 9999	DRAGON LAW 50 CAL 7.62 MG	5 0 39 0
1602	M113(APC)	TOTK	4 1 7- 9999	DRAGON LAW 50 CAL 7.62 MG	4 0 70 0
1601	M113(APC)	TOTK	5 6 987 9999	DRAGON LAW 50 CAL 7.62 MG	5 0 13 0
1576	M113(APC)	LIVE	5 1000	LAW 50 CAL	5 0
2901	DRAGON TM	TOTK	6	DRAGON	0
2902	DRAGON TM	TOTK	4	DRAGON	0
2903	DRAGON TM	TOTK	6	DRAGON	0

2904	DRAGON TM	LIVE	6	DRAGON	0
2905	DRAGON TM	LIVE	6	DRAGON	0
2906	DRAGON TM	LIVE	6	DRAGON	0
2907	DRAGON TM	TOTK	6	DRAGON	0
2908	DRAGON TM	TOTK	6	DRAGON	0
2909	DRAGON TM	TOTK	6	DRAGON	0
2910	DRAGON TM	LIVE	6	DRAGON	0
2911	DRAGON TM	LIVE	6	DRAGON	0
2912	DRAGON TM	LIVE	6	DRAGON	0
2801	LAW TM	TOTK	3	LAW	0
2802	LAW TM	TOTK	1	LAW	2
2803	LAW TM	TOTK	3	LAW	0
2804	LAW TM	LIVE	3	LAW	0
2805	LAW TM	LIVE	3	LAW	0
2806	LAW TM	LIVE	3	LAW	0

2807	LAW TM	TOTK	3	LAW	0
2808	LAW TM	TOTK	3	LAW	0
2809	LAW TM	TOTK	3	LAW	0
2810	LAW TM	LIVE	3	LAW	0
2811	LAW TM	LIVE	3	LAW	0
2812	LAW TM	LIVE	3	LAW	0
2831	LAW TM	LIVE	3	LAW	0
2832	LAW TM	LIVE	3	LAW	0
2833	LAW TM	LIVE	3	LAW	0
2834	LAW TM	LIVE	3	LAW	0
2835	LAW TM	LIVE	3	LAW	0
2836	LAW TM	LIVE	3	LAW	0
2837	LAW TM	TOTK	3	LAW	0
2838	LAW TM	TOTK	3	LAW	0

RESOURCES	NOV	TOTAL	AMMUNITION	W/SURV	REPLACED	EXPENDED
2839	LAW TM		TOTK	3	LAW	0
2840	LAW TM		LIVE	3	LAW	0
2841	LAW TM		LIVE	3	LAW	0
2842	LAW TM		LIVE	3	LAW	0
2731	M106(MTR)		LIVE	1000	50 CAL	0
2732	M106(MTR)		LIVE	1000	50 CAL	0
2733	M106(MTR)		LIVE	1000	50 CAL	0
2736	M113(C&C)		LIVE	1000	50 CAL	0
113(C&C)	1	72 78 13000 119486	DRAGON LAW 50 CAL 7.62 MC	9 36 5935 49993	26 42 6792 69993	97 0 277 0
106(MTR)	4	1000	50 CAL	1000	0	0
AW TM	15	4000	50 CAL	4000	0	0
RAGON TM	4	72	LAW	45	25	2
			DRAGON	1	10	0

*** CORONER'S REPORT ***

EXERCISE NAME: NWC 4-3-4

SAGGER TH	(8867)	DIED AT TIME	37 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO INDIRECT FIRE, BATTERY NO.	9, 155 MM	SI	50
SAGGER TH	(8858)	DIED AT TIME	27 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO INDIRECT FIRE, BATTERY NO.	5, 155 MM	SI	50
SAGGER TH	(8885)	DIED AT TIME	37 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO INDIRECT FIRE, BATTERY NO.	5, 155 MM	SI	50
RPG TH	(9977)	DIED AT TIME	37 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO INDIRECT FIRE, BATTERY NO.	7, 155 MM	SI	50
RPG TH	(9972)	DIED AT TIME	37 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO INDIRECT FIRE, BATTERY NO.	8, 155 MM	SI	50
SAGGER TH	(8859)	DIED AT TIME	37 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO INDIRECT FIRE, BATTERY NO.	8, 155 MM	SI	50
RPG TH	(9964)	DIED AT TIME	96 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO INDIRECT FIRE, BATTERY NO.	9, 155 MM	HE	50
PI 75	(7123)	DIED AT TIME	170 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO INDIRECT FIRE, BATTERY NO.	11, 81 IN	HE	50
BROW-2	(7658)	DIED AT TIME	170 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO INDIRECT FIRE, BATTERY NO.	11, 81 IN	HE	50
M113(APC)	(1503)	DIED AT TIME	300 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO RFG TH (9970), FIRING	RPG 7	AT RANGE	50
DRAGON TH	(2933)	DIED AT TIME	300 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO RFG TH (9970), FIRING	RPG 7	AT RANGE	50
M113(TOW)	(1733)	DIED AT TIME	342 OF MOGIL KILL DUE TO RFG TH (9970), FIRING	RPG 7	AT RANGE	50
RPG TH	(9970)	DIED AT TIME	342 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO M113(TOW) (1733), FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	50
RPG TH	(9970)	DIED AT TIME	342 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO M113(TOW) (1733), FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	50
RPG TH	(1604)	DIED AT TIME	451 OF MOGIL KILL DUE TO RFG TH (1526), FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	50
RPG TH	(9986)	DIED AT TIME	480 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO RFG TH (9998), FIRING	RPG 7	AT RANGE	50
RPG TH	(9986)	DIED AT TIME	480 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO M113(APC) (1604), FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	50
RPG TH	(9986)	DIED AT TIME	501 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO M113(APC) (1604), FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	75
M113(APC)	(1526)	DIED AT TIME	510 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO RFG TH (9981), FIRING	RPG 7	AT RANGE	50
CAC ELEMENT	(3240)	DIED AT TIME	510 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO RFG TH (9981), FIRING	RPG 7	AT RANGE	50
BROW-2	(7657)	DIED AT TIME	510 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO M60A1 (1241), FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	650
RPG TH	(9981)	DIED AT TIME	513 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO M113(TOW) (1731), FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	75
RPG TH	(7657)	DIED AT TIME	520 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO M60A1 (1243), FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	675
RPG TH	(9986)	DIED AT TIME	521 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO M113(APC) (1603), FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	100
RPG TH	(9986)	DIED AT TIME	521 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO M113(APC) (1602), FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	50
BROW-2	(7657)	DIED AT TIME	528 OF MOGIL KILL DUE TO M60A1 (1242), FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	650
RPG TH	(1613)	DIED AT TIME	570 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO BMP (6117), FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	200
RPG TH	(2907)	DIED AT TIME	570 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO BMP (6117), FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	200
LAW TH	(2807)	DIED AT TIME	570 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO BMP (6117), FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	200
LAW TH	(2837)	DIED AT TIME	570 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO BMP (6117), FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	200
BMP	(6126)	DIED AT TIME	571 OF MOGIL KILL DUE TO M60A1 (1163), FIRING	105 AFDS	AT RANGE	225
BMP	(6109)	DIED AT TIME	571 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO M60A1 (1163), FIRING	105 AFDS	AT RANGE	225
BMP	(6117)	DIED AT TIME	572 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO M60A1 (1611), FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE	150
M60A1	(1143)	DIED AT TIME	581 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO M60A1 (1163), FIRING	105 AFDS	AT RANGE	225
M113(TOW)	(1721)	DIED AT TIME	601 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO BMP (6126), FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	400
M113(APC)	(1603)	DIED AT TIME	622 OF MOGIL KILL DUE TO SAGGER TH (8879), FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE	200
DRAGON TH	(2903)	DIED AT TIME	692 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO RFG TH (9976), FIRING	RPG 7	AT RANGE	50
LAW TH	(2803)	DIED AT TIME	692 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO RFG TH (9976), FIRING	RPG 7	AT RANGE	50
LAW TH	(2833)	DIED AT TIME	692 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO RFG TH (9976), FIRING	RPG 7	AT RANGE	50
LAW TH	(2804)	DIED AT TIME	692 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO M113(APC) (1601), FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	50
M60A1	(1242)	DIED AT TIME	720 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO RFG TH (9948), FIRING	RPG 7	AT RANGE	50
M113(APC)	(1614)	DIED AT TIME	720 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO RFG TH (9976), FIRING	RPG 7	AT RANGE	50

DRAGON TH	(2908)	DIED AT TIME	720 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	RPG TH	(9976), FIRING	RPG 7	AT RANGE	50
LAW TH	(2908)	DIED AT TIME	720 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	RPG TH	(9976), FIRING	RPG 7	AT RANGE	50
LAW TH	(2938)	DIED AT TIME	720 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	RPG TH	(9976), FIRING	RPG 7	AT RANGE	50
M113(APC)	(1601)	DIED AT TIME	721 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	GMP	(6113), FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	200
DRAGON TH	(2901)	DIED AT TIME	721 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	GMP	(6113), FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	200
LAW TH	(2801)	DIED AT TIME	721 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	GMP	(6113), FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	200
LAW TH	(2831)	DIED AT TIME	721 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	GMP	(6113), FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	200
C&C ELEMENT (3225)	(2831)	DIED AT TIME	721 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	GMP	(6113), FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	200
C&C ELEMENT (3225)	(2831)	DIED AT TIME	721 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	GMP	(6113), FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	200
RPG TH	(9981)	DIED AT TIME	724 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1254), FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	50
RPG TH	(9976)	DIED AT TIME	724 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	M113(APC)	(1604), FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	50
M60A1	(1276)	DIED AT TIME	733 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	INDIRECT FIRE, BATTERY NO.	29, 122	MRL HE	AT RANGE	50
C&C ELEMENT (3216)	(1276)	DIED AT TIME	733 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	INDIRECT FIRE, BATTERY NO.	29, 122	MRL HE	AT RANGE	50
M60A1	(1212)	DIED AT TIME	733 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	INDIRECT FIRE, BATTERY NO.	29, 122	MRL HE	AT RANGE	50
M60A1	(1252)	DIED AT TIME	733 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	INDIRECT FIRE, BATTERY NO.	29, 122	MRL HE	AT RANGE	50
M60A1	(1214)	DIED AT TIME	733 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	INDIRECT FIRE, BATTERY NO.	29, 122	MRL HE	AT RANGE	50
M60A1	(1223)	DIED AT TIME	733 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	INDIRECT FIRE, BATTERY NO.	29, 122	MRL HE	AT RANGE	50
M60A1	(1254)	DIED AT TIME	733 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	INDIRECT FIRE, BATTERY NO.	29, 122	MRL HE	AT RANGE	50
M60A1	(1221)	DIED AT TIME	733 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	INDIRECT FIRE, BATTERY NO.	29, 122	MRL HE	AT RANGE	50
C&C ELEMENT (3211)	(1221)	DIED AT TIME	733 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	INDIRECT FIRE, BATTERY NO.	29, 122	MRL HE	AT RANGE	50
RPG TH	(9998)	DIED AT TIME	733 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	INDIRECT FIRE, BATTERY NO.	29, 122	MRL HE	AT RANGE	50
RPG TH	(8882)	DIED AT TIME	733 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	INDIRECT FIRE, BATTERY NO.	29, 122	MRL HE	AT RANGE	50
M60A1	(1251)	DIED AT TIME	733 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	INDIRECT FIRE, BATTERY NO.	29, 122	MRL HE	AT RANGE	50
C&C ELEMENT (3214)	(1251)	DIED AT TIME	733 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	INDIRECT FIRE, BATTERY NO.	29, 122	MRL HE	AT RANGE	50
M60A1	(1264)	DIED AT TIME	733 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	INDIRECT FIRE, BATTERY NO.	29, 122	MRL HE	AT RANGE	50
M60A1	(1136)	DIED AT TIME	733 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	INDIRECT FIRE, BATTERY NO.	29, 122	MRL HE	AT RANGE	50
C&C ELEMENT (3204)	(1136)	DIED AT TIME	733 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	INDIRECT FIRE, BATTERY NO.	29, 122	MRL HE	AT RANGE	50
M60A1	(1198)	DIED AT TIME	733 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	INDIRECT FIRE, BATTERY NO.	29, 122	MRL HE	AT RANGE	50
M60A1	(1261)	DIED AT TIME	733 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	INDIRECT FIRE, BATTERY NO.	29, 122	MRL HE	AT RANGE	50
C&C ELEMENT (3215)	(1261)	DIED AT TIME	733 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	INDIRECT FIRE, BATTERY NO.	29, 122	MRL HE	AT RANGE	50
RPG TH	(9976)	DIED AT TIME	733 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	INDIRECT FIRE, BATTERY NO.	29, 122	MRL HE	AT RANGE	50
RPG TH	(5152)	DIED AT TIME	750 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1602), FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	50
T62	(5274)	DIED AT TIME	750 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1244), FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	75
T62	(5110)	DIED AT TIME	750 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1241), FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	50
M113(APC)	(1713)	DIED AT TIME	751 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	GMP	(1203), FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	50
LAW TH	(2827)	DIED AT TIME	751 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	GMP	(1263), FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	50
M60A1	(1161)	DIED AT TIME	751 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	GMP	(6165), FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	200
C&C ELEMENT (3207)	(1161)	DIED AT TIME	751 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	T62	(5231), FIRING	115 HEAT	AT RANGE	50
T62	(5148)	DIED AT TIME	751 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	T62	(5231), FIRING	115 HEAT	AT RANGE	50
T62	(5152)	DIED AT TIME	751 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1202), FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	50
T62	(5150)	DIED AT TIME	751 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1263), FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	50
GMP	(6168)	DIED AT TIME	751 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	M113(APC)	(1253), FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	50
						(1502), FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE	100

SAGGER TH	(8951)	DIED AT TIME	751 OF FP&MO	KILL DUE TO	M113(TOW)	(1703),	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	50
BMP	(6173)	DIED AT TIME	752 OF FP&MO	KILL DUE TO	M113(APC)	(1621),	FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	100
M113(APC)	(1733)	DIED*AT TIME	752 OF FP&MO	KILL DUE TO	BMP	(6173),	FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	200
T62	(5233)	DIED AT TIME	752 OF FP&MO	KILL DUE TO	M113(TOW)	(1723),	FIRING	TOW	AT RANGE	500
BMP	(6113)	DIED AT TIME	752 OF FP&MO	KILL DUE TO	M113(APC)	(1501),	FIRING	TOW	AT RANGE	100
T62	(5253)	DIED AT TIME	752 OF FP&MO	KILL DUE TO	M113(TOW)	(1732),	FIRING	TOW	AT RANGE	550
BMP	(6113)	DIED*AT TIME	752 OF FP&MO	KILL DUE TO	M113(APC)	(1604),	FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE	100
BMP	(6164)	DIED AT TIME	753 OF FP&MO	KILL DUE TO	M113(APC)	(1611),	FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE	100
BMP	(6126)	DIED*AT TIME	760 OF FP&MO	KILL DUE TO	M113(TOW)	(1721),	FIRING	TOW	AT RANGE	2000
RPG TH	(9976)	DIED*AT TIME	764 OF FP&MO	KILL DUE TO	M113(APC)	(1612),	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	50
M113(TOW)	(1723)	DIED AT TIME	774 OF FP&MO	KILL DUE TO	T62	(5551),	FIRING	115 HEAT	AT RANGE	450
M113(APC)	(1521)	DIED AT TIME	774 OF FP&MO	KILL DUE TO	BMP	(6164),	FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	200
DRAGON TH	(2909)	DIED AT TIME	774 OF FP&MO	KILL DUE TO	BMP	(6164),	FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	200
LAW TH	(2809)	DIED AT TIME	774 OF FP&MO	KILL DUE TO	BMP	(6164),	FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	200
LAW TH	(2839)	DIED AT TIME	774 OF FP&MO	KILL DUE TO	BMP	(6164),	FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	200
C&C ELEMENT	(3227)	DIED AT TIME	774 OF FP&MO	KILL DUE TO	BMP	(6164),	FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	200
BMP	(6178)	DIED AT TIME	775 OF FP&MO	KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1202),	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	50
BMP	(6113)	DIED*AT TIME	775 OF FP&MO	KILL DUE TO	M113(APC)	(1611),	FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE	100
M113(APC)	(1506)	DIED AT TIME	775 OF FP&MO	KILL DUE TO	BMP	(6165),	FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	200
BMP	(6164)	DIED*AT TIME	776 OF FP&MO	KILL DUE TO	M113(APC)	(1623),	FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE	100
BMP	(6178)	DIED*AT TIME	776 OF FP&MO	KILL DUE TO	M113(APC)	(1602),	FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE	100
T62	(5504)	DIED AT TIME	777 OF FP&MO	KILL DUE TO	M113(TOW)	(1724),	FIRING	TOW	AT RANGE	100
BMP	(6165)	DIED AT TIME	777 OF FP&MO	KILL DUE TO	M113(APC)	(1501),	FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE	100
T62	(5551)	DIED AT TIME	777 OF FP&MO	KILL DUE TO	M113(TOW)	(1732),	FIRING	TOW	AT RANGE	450
RPG TH	(9956)	DIED AT TIME	778 OF FP&MO	KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1253),	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	50
RPG TH	(9956)	DIED*AT TIME	779 OF FP&MO	KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1243),	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	50
M113(TOW)	(1731)	DIED AT TIME	780 OF FP&MO	KILL DUE TO	BMP	(6165),	FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	300
T62	(5504)	DIED*AT TIME	780 OF FP&MO	KILL DUE TO	DRAGON TH	(2932),	FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE	450
SAGGER TH	(8868)	DIED AT TIME	781 OF FP&MO	KILL DUE TO	M113(TOW)	(1712),	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	50
M113(APC)	(1602)	DIED AT TIME	781 OF FP&MO	KILL DUE TO	BMP	(6177),	FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	200
DRAGON TH	(2902)	DIED AT TIME	781 OF FP&MO	KILL DUE TO	BMP	(6179),	FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	200
LAW TH	(2802)	DIED AT TIME	781 OF FP&MO	KILL DUE TO	BMP	(6179),	FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	200
LAW TH	(2832)	DIED*AT TIME	781 OF FP&MO	KILL DUE TO	BMP	(6179),	FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	200
BMP	(6152)	DIED AT TIME	781 OF FP&MO	KILL DUE TO	M113(APC)	(1612),	FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE	100
M60A1	(1101)	DIED AT TIME	781 OF FP&MO	KILL DUE TO	BMP	(6121),	FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	200
C&C ELEMENT	(3201)	DIED AT TIME	781 OF FP&MO	KILL DUE TO	BMP	(6121),	FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	200
M60A1	(1236)	DIED AT TIME	782 OF FP&MO	KILL DUE TO	BMP	(6175),	FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	200
C&C ELEMENT	(3212)	DIED AT TIME	782 OF FP&MO	KILL DUE TO	BMP	(6175),	FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	200
M60A1	(1236)	DIED*AT TIME	782 OF FP&MO	KILL DUE TO	BMP	(6180),	FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	200
C&C ELEMENT	(3212)	DIED*AT TIME	782 OF FP&MO	KILL DUE TO	BMP	(6180),	FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	200
M60A1	(1202)	DIED AT TIME	782 OF FP&MO	KILL DUE TO	T62	(5531),	FIRING	115 HEAT	AT RANGE	50
M113(APC)	(1502)	DIED AT TIME	783 OF FP&MO	KILL DUE TO	SRDM-2	(2665),	FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE	770
BMP	(6164)	DIED*AT TIME	784 OF FP&MO	KILL DUE TO	M113(APC)	(1623),	FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE	200
BMP	(6165)	DIED*AT TIME	784 OF FP&MO	KILL DUE TO	M113(APC)	(1611),	FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE	200
SAGGER TH	(8893)	DIED AT TIME	789 OF FP&MO	KILL DUE TO	M113(TOW)	(1723),	FIRING	TOW	AT RANGE	2000
BMP	(6152)	DIED*AT TIME	791 OF FP&MO	KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1263),	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	50
BMP	(6121)	DIED AT TIME	792 OF FP&MO	KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1243),	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	150
BMP	(6175)	DIED AT TIME	792 OF FP&MO	KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1102),	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	250
BMP	(6180)	DIED AT TIME	797 OF FP&MO	KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1211),	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	150
RPG TH	(9956)	DIED*AT TIME	797 OF FP&MO	KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1244),	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	50

SAGGER TH	(8048)	DIED*AT TIME	800 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M113(TOW)	(1733),	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	50
RPG TH	(9978)	DIED AT TIME	803 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M113(TOW)	(1703),	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	100
BMP	(6180)	DIED*AT TIME	805 OF MOBIL KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1111),	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	300
RPG TH	(9978)	DIED*AT TIME	805 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M113(TOW)	(1701),	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	150
T62	(5534)	DIED AT TIME	809 OF MOBIL KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1262),	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	50
BMP	(6110)	DIED AT TIME	809 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1123),	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	150
BMP	(6121)	DIED*AT TIME	809 OF MOBIL KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1151),	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	100
BMP	(6121)	DIED*AT TIME	809 OF MOBIL KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1102),	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	100
M60A1	(1243)	DIED AT TIME	809 OF FRPW KILL DUE TO	BMP	(6131),	FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	200
M60A1	(1241)	DIED AT TIME	809 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	RPG TH	(9997),	FIRING	RPG 7	AT RANGE	50
C&C ELEMENT	(3213)	DIED AT TIME	809 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	RPG TH	(9997),	FIRING	RPG 7	AT RANGE	50
BMP	(6131)	DIED AT TIME	809 OF MOBIL KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1141),	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	50
T62	(5258)	DIED AT TIME	809 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1263),	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	50
M60A1	(1201)	DIED AT TIME	810 OF FRPW KILL DUE TO	T62	(5531),	FIRING	115 HEAT	AT RANGE	50
C&C ELEMENT	(3209)	DIED AT TIME	810 OF FRPW KILL DUE TO	T62	(5531),	FIRING	115 HEAT	AT RANGE	50
BMP	(6105)	DIED AT TIME	810 OF MOBIL KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1121),	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	50
M60A1	(1213)	DIED*AT TIME	810 OF FRPW KILL DUE TO	BMP	(6110),	FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	200
M60A1	(1241)	DIED*AT TIME	810 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	BMP	(6175),	FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	200
C&C ELEMENT	(3213)	DIED*AT TIME	810 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	BMP	(6175),	FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	200
M60A1	(1213)	DIED*AT TIME	810 OF FRPW KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1244),	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	50
M60A1	(1241)	DIED*AT TIME	810 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	BMP	(6121),	FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	200
C&C ELEMENT	(3213)	DIED*AT TIME	810 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	BMP	(6105),	FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	200
M60A1	(1244)	DIED AT TIME	810 OF FRPW KILL DUE TO	T62	(5160),	FIRING	115 HEAT	AT RANGE	50
BMP	(6175)	DIED*AT TIME	811 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1111),	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	75
T62	(5160)	DIED AT TIME	811 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1253),	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	50
BMP	(6179)	DIED AT TIME	812 OF MOBIL KILL DUE TO	M113(APC)	(1313),	FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE	100
M113(TOW)	(1722)	DIED AT TIME	818 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	BRDM-2	(7665),	FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE	800
LAW TH	(2830)	DIED AT TIME	818 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	BRDM-2	(7665),	FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE	800
SAGGER TH	(6126)	DIED*AT TIME	818 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M113(TOW)	(1732),	FIRING	TOW	AT RANGE	200
BMP	(6105)	DIED*AT TIME	840 OF MOBIL KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1122),	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	300
BMP	(6110)	DIED*AT TIME	840 OF MOBIL KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1114),	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	300
BMP	(6121)	DIED*AT TIME	840 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1102),	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	100
RPG TH	(9997)	DIED AT TIME	840 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1151),	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	400
BMP	(6131)	DIED AT TIME	841 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1704),	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	50
BMP	(6121)	DIED*AT TIME	841 OF MOBIL KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1164),	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	400
M60A1	(1203)	DIED AT TIME	841 OF FRPW KILL DUE TO	T62	(1121),	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	400
BMP	(6179)	DIED*AT TIME	841 OF MOBIL KILL DUE TO	M113(APC)	(5531),	FIRING	115 HEAT	AT RANGE	50
M113(TOW)	(1711)	DIED AT TIME	841 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1623),	FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE	100
C&C ELEMENT	(3218)	DIED AT TIME	841 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	BMP	(1113),	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	100
LAW TH	(2825)	DIED AT TIME	841 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	BMP	(6179),	FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	200
BMP	(6131)	DIED*AT TIME	841 OF MOBIL KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(6179),	FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	200
BMP	(6105)	DIED*AT TIME	841 OF FRPW KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(6179),	FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	200
BMP	(6179)	DIED*AT TIME	843 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M113(APC)	(1162),	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	400
BMP	(6162)	DIED*AT TIME	844 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M113(APC)	(1501),	FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE	100
BMP	(6162)	DIED*AT TIME	844 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M113(APC)	(1622),	FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE	100

T42	(5831)	DIED AT TIME	857 OF	F&M	KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1262), FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	50
RPG IM	(9987)	DIED*AT TIME	860 OF	F&M	KILL	DUE TO	M113(TOW)	(1701), FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	50
RPG TH	(9988)	DIED AT TIME	860 OF	F&M	KILL	DUE TO	M113(TOW)	(1702), FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	50
RPG TH	(9988)	DIED*AT TIME	861 OF	F&M	KILL	DUE TO	M113(TOW)	(1703), FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	50
M60A1	(1152)	DIED AT TIME	871 OF	F&M	KILL	DUE TO	RPG TH	(9965), FIRING	RPG 7	AT RANGE	50
BMP	(6110)	DIED*AT TIME	874 OF	F&M	KILL	DUE TO	M113(APC)	(1501), FIRING	RPG DRAGON	AT RANGE	300
BMP	(6110)	DIED*AT TIME	874 OF	F&M	KILL	DUE TO	M113(TOW)	(1623), FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE	300
RPG TH	(9965)	DIED AT TIME	875 OF	F&M	KILL	DUE TO	M113(TOW)	(1703), FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	50
RPG TH	(9965)	DIED*AT TIME	896 OF	F&M	KILL	DUE TO	M113(TOW)	(1701), FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	50
RPG TH	(9965)	DIED*AT TIME	897 OF	F&M	KILL	DUE TO	M113(TOW)	(1704), FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	50
M60A1	(1164)	DIED AT TIME	900 OF	F&M	KILL	DUE TO	BMP	(6163), FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	200
RPG TH	(9992)	DIED AT TIME	904 OF	F&M	KILL	DUE TO	M113(TOW)	(1733), FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	50
RPG TH	(9993)	DIED AT TIME	909 OF	F&M	KILL	DUE TO	M113(TOW)	(1712), FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	50
RPG TH	(9966)	DIED AT TIME	931 OF	F&M	KILL	DUE TO	M113(TOW)	(1714), FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	50
BMP	(6162)	DIED AT TIME	931 OF	F&M	KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1102), FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	200
BMP	(6112)	DIED AT TIME	931 OF	F&M	KILL	DUE TO	M113(TOW)	(1153), FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	200
RPG TH	(9955)	DIED AT TIME	931 OF	F&M	KILL	DUE TO	M113(TOW)	(1712), FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	50
RPG TH	(9967)	DIED AT TIME	931 OF	F&M	KILL	DUE TO	BMP	(1701), FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	75
M60A1	(1253)	DIED AT TIME	931 OF	F&M	KILL	DUE TO	BMP	(6124), FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	200
M60A1	(1224)	DIED AT TIME	931 OF	F&M	KILL	DUE TO	BMP	(6116), FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	200
M60A1	(1154)	DIED AT TIME	932 OF	F&M	KILL	DUE TO	BMP	(6112), FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	200
BMP	(6124)	DIED AT TIME	932 OF	F&M	KILL	DUE TO	M113(APC)	(1622), FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE	200
BMP	(6172)	DIED AT TIME	933 OF	F&M	KILL	DUE TO	M113(APC)	(1604), FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE	200
BMP	(6112)	DIED*AT TIME	933 OF	F&M	KILL	DUE TO	M113(APC)	(1612), FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE	200
BMP	(6116)	DIED AT TIME	934 OF	F&M	KILL	DUE TO	M113(APC)	(1624), FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE	200
M113(TOW)	(1733)	DIED*AT TIME	937 OF	F&M	KILL	DUE TO	RPG TH	(9961), FIRING	RPG 7	AT RANGE	50
RPG TH	(9961)	DIED AT TIME	960 OF	F&M	KILL	DUE TO	M113(TOW)	(1701), FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	50
BMP	(6112)	DIED*AT TIME	960 OF	F&M	KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1162), FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	150
BMP	(6811)	DIED AT TIME	960 OF	F&M	KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1263), FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	150
BMP	(6163)	DIED*AT TIME	960 OF	F&M	KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1102), FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	150
M60A1	(1263)	DIED AT TIME	960 OF	F&M	KILL	DUE TO	BMP	(6118), FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	200
BMP	(6124)	DIED*AT TIME	960 OF	F&M	KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1141), FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	150
BMP	(6811)	DIED*AT TIME	960 OF	F&M	KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1262), FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	150
RPG TH	(9961)	DIED*AT TIME	961 OF	F&M	KILL	DUE TO	M113(TOW)	(1703), FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	50
BMP	(6124)	DIED*AT TIME	961 OF	F&M	KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1144), FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	150
BMP	(6112)	DIED*AT TIME	961 OF	F&M	KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1222), FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	150
BMP	(6161)	DIED AT TIME	961 OF	F&M	KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1151), FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	150
BMP	(6172)	DIED*AT TIME	961 OF	F&M	KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1123), FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	150
M60A1	(1163)	DIED AT TIME	962 OF	F&M	KILL	DUE TO	BMP	(6161), FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	200
BMP	(6124)	DIED*AT TIME	962 OF	F&M	KILL	DUE TO	M113(TOW)	(1701), FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	50
BMP	(6118)	DIED AT TIME	963 OF	F&M	KILL	DUE TO	M113(APC)	(1622), FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE	200
BMP	(6163)	DIED*AT TIME	963 OF	F&M	KILL	DUE TO	M113(APC)	(1624), FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE	200
BMP	(6112)	DIED*AT TIME	964 OF	F&M	KILL	DUE TO	M113(APC)	(1612), FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE	200
BMP	(1141)	DIED AT TIME	968 OF	F&M	KILL	DUE TO	BMP	(6172), FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	200
C&C ELEMENT	(3205)	DIED AT TIME	968 OF	F&M	KILL	DUE TO	BMP	(6172), FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	200
RPG TH	(9961)	DIED*AT TIME	970 OF	F&M	KILL	DUE TO	M113(TOW)	(1733), FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	50
BMP	(6163)	DIED*AT TIME	979 OF	F&M	KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1103), FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	150
BMP	(6172)	DIED*AT TIME	986 OF	F&M	KILL	DUE TO	INDIRECT FIRE, BATTERY NO. 11, 81 IN ME				

*** CORONER'S REPORT ***

EXERCISE NAME: NWC 4-3-4

UNIT	STATUS	TIME	COORD	TYPE	RESULT	REMARKS	SCORE
M113(APC)	(1503)	DIED AT TIME	300 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	RPG TM	(9970), FIRING	RPG 7
DRAGON TM	(2933)	DIED AT TIME	300 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	RPG TM	(9970), FIRING	RPG 7
M113(TOW)	(1733)	DIED AT TIME	342 OF	MOBIL KILL DUE TO	RPG TM	(9970), FIRING	RPG 7
M113(APC)	(1604)	DIED AT TIME	451 OF	MOBIL KILL DUE TO	RPG TM	(9970), FIRING	RPG 7
M113(APC)	(1526)	DIED AT TIME	510 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	RPG TM	(9981), FIRING	RPG 7
C&C ELEMENT(3240)	(1613)	DIED AT TIME	570 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	RPG TM	(9981), FIRING	RPG 7
M60A1	(2907)	DIED AT TIME	570 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	RPG TM	(9981), FIRING	RPG 7
DRAGON TM	(2807)	DIED AT TIME	570 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	RPG TM	(9981), FIRING	RPG 7
LAW TM	(2837)	DIED AT TIME	601 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	RPG TM	(9981), FIRING	RPG 7
M60A1	(1143)	DIED AT TIME	601 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	RPG TM	(9981), FIRING	RPG 7
M113(TOW)	(1721)	DIED AT TIME	622 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	RPG TM	(9981), FIRING	RPG 7
M113(APC)	(1603)	DIED AT TIME	692 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	RPG TM	(9981), FIRING	RPG 7
DRAGON TM	(2903)	DIED AT TIME	692 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	RPG TM	(9981), FIRING	RPG 7
LAW TM	(2803)	DIED AT TIME	692 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	RPG TM	(9981), FIRING	RPG 7
LAW TM	(2833)	DIED AT TIME	720 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	RPG TM	(9981), FIRING	RPG 7
M60A1	(1242)	DIED AT TIME	720 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	RPG TM	(9981), FIRING	RPG 7
M113(APC)	(1614)	DIED AT TIME	720 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	RPG TM	(9981), FIRING	RPG 7
DRAGON TM	(2908)	DIED AT TIME	720 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	RPG TM	(9981), FIRING	RPG 7
LAW TM	(2808)	DIED AT TIME	720 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	RPG TM	(9981), FIRING	RPG 7
LAW TM	(2838)	DIED AT TIME	720 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	RPG TM	(9981), FIRING	RPG 7
M113(APC)	(1601)	DIED AT TIME	721 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	RPG TM	(9981), FIRING	RPG 7
DRAGON TM	(2901)	DIED AT TIME	721 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	RPG TM	(9981), FIRING	RPG 7
LAW TM	(2801)	DIED AT TIME	721 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	RPG TM	(9981), FIRING	RPG 7
LAW TM	(2831)	DIED AT TIME	721 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	RPG TM	(9981), FIRING	RPG 7
C&C ELEMENT(3225)	(1276)	DIED AT TIME	733 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	RPG TM	(9981), FIRING	RPG 7
M60A1	(1276)	DIED AT TIME	733 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	RPG TM	(9981), FIRING	RPG 7
C&C ELEMENT(3216)	(1212)	DIED AT TIME	733 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	RPG TM	(9981), FIRING	RPG 7
M60A1	(1252)	DIED AT TIME	733 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	RPG TM	(9981), FIRING	RPG 7
M60A1	(1214)	DIED AT TIME	733 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	RPG TM	(9981), FIRING	RPG 7
M60A1	(1223)	DIED AT TIME	733 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	RPG TM	(9981), FIRING	RPG 7
M60A1	(1254)	DIED AT TIME	733 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	RPG TM	(9981), FIRING	RPG 7
M60A1	(1221)	DIED AT TIME	733 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	RPG TM	(9981), FIRING	RPG 7
C&C ELEMENT(3211)	(1261)	DIED AT TIME	733 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	RPG TM	(9981), FIRING	RPG 7
M60A1	(1261)	DIED AT TIME	733 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	RPG TM	(9981), FIRING	RPG 7
C&C ELEMENT(3214)	(1264)	DIED AT TIME	733 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	RPG TM	(9981), FIRING	RPG 7
M60A1	(1264)	DIED AT TIME	733 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	RPG TM	(9981), FIRING	RPG 7
M60A1	(1136)	DIED AT TIME	733 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	RPG TM	(9981), FIRING	RPG 7
C&C ELEMENT(3204)	(1198)	DIED AT TIME	733 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	RPG TM	(9981), FIRING	RPG 7
M60A1	(1261)	DIED AT TIME	733 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	RPG TM	(9981), FIRING	RPG 7
C&C ELEMENT(3215)	(1713)	DIED AT TIME	751 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	RPG TM	(9981), FIRING	RPG 7
M113(APC)	(2827)	DIED AT TIME	751 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	RPG TM	(9981), FIRING	RPG 7
LAW TM	(1161)	DIED AT TIME	751 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	RPG TM	(9981), FIRING	RPG 7
C&C ELEMENT(3207)	(1261)	DIED AT TIME	751 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	RPG TM	(9981), FIRING	RPG 7

M113(APC)	(1733)	DIED AT TIME	752 OF	MOBIL KILL DUE TO	BMP	(6173)	FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	200
M113(TOW)	(1723)	DIED AT TIME	774 OF	MOBIL KILL DUE TO	T62	(5551)	FIRING	115 HEAT	AT RANGE	450
M113(APC)	(1621)	DIED AT TIME	774 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	BMP	(6164)	FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	200
DRAGON TH	(2909)	DIED AT TIME	774 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	BMP	(6164)	FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	200
LAW TH	(2809)	DIED AT TIME	774 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	BMP	(6164)	FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	200
LAW TH	(2839)	DIED AT TIME	774 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	BMP	(6164)	FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	200
CAC ELEMENT(3227)	(1506)	DIED AT TIME	775 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	BMP	(6165)	FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	200
M113(APC)	(1731)	DIED AT TIME	780 OF	MOBIL KILL DUE TO	BMP	(6165)	FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	300
M113(TOW)	(1602)	DIED AT TIME	781 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	BMP	(6179)	FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	200
DRAGON TH	(2902)	DIED AT TIME	781 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	BMP	(6179)	FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	200
LAW TH	(2802)	DIED AT TIME	781 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	BMP	(6179)	FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	200
LAW TH	(2832)	DIED AT TIME	781 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	BMP	(6179)	FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	200
M60A1	(1101)	DIED AT TIME	781 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	BMP	(6121)	FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	200
CAC ELEMENT(3201)	(1243)	DIED AT TIME	782 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	BMP	(6175)	FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	200
M60A1	(1236)	DIED AT TIME	782 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	BMP	(6175)	FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	200
CAC ELEMENT(3212)	(1236)	DIED AT TIME	782 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	BMP	(6175)	FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	200
M60A1	(1236)	DIED AT TIME	782 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	BMP	(6180)	FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	200
CAC ELEMENT(3212)	(1202)	DIED AT TIME	782 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	BMP	(6180)	FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	200
M60A1	(1202)	DIED AT TIME	782 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	T62	(5531)	FIRING	115 HEAT	AT RANGE	50
M113(APC)	(1502)	DIED AT TIME	809 OF	MOBIL KILL DUE TO	BRDM-2	(7665)	FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE	770
M60A1	(1243)	DIED AT TIME	809 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	BMP	(6131)	FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	200
M60A1	(1241)	DIED AT TIME	809 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	RPG TH	(9997)	FIRING	RPG 7	AT RANGE	50
CAC ELEMENT(3213)	(1201)	DIED AT TIME	810 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	RPG TH	(9997)	FIRING	RPG 7	AT RANGE	50
M60A1	(1201)	DIED AT TIME	810 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	T62	(5531)	FIRING	115 HEAT	AT RANGE	50
CAC ELEMENT(3209)	(1213)	DIED AT TIME	810 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	T62	(5531)	FIRING	115 HEAT	AT RANGE	50
M60A1	(1213)	DIED AT TIME	810 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	BMP	(6175)	FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	200
CAC ELEMENT(3210)	(1211)	DIED AT TIME	810 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	BMP	(6175)	FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	200
M60A1	(1213)	DIED AT TIME	810 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	BMP	(6121)	FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	200
CAC ELEMENT(3213)	(1241)	DIED AT TIME	810 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	BMP	(6105)	FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	200
M60A1	(1244)	DIED AT TIME	810 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	BMP	(6105)	FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	200
M113(TOW)	(1722)	DIED AT TIME	818 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	T62	(5160)	FIRING	115 HEAT	AT RANGE	50
LAW TH	(2830)	DIED AT TIME	818 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	BRDM-2	(7665)	FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE	800
M60A1	(1203)	DIED AT TIME	841 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	T62	(5531)	FIRING	115 HEAT	AT RANGE	50
M113(TOW)	(1711)	DIED AT TIME	841 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	BMP	(6179)	FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	200
CAC ELEMENT(3218)	(1711)	DIED AT TIME	841 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	BMP	(6179)	FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	200
LAW TH	(2825)	DIED AT TIME	841 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	BMP	(6179)	FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	200
M60A1	(1152)	DIED AT TIME	900 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	BRDM-2	(7665)	FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE	800
M60A1	(1164)	DIED AT TIME	931 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	BMP	(6163)	FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	200
M60A1	(1253)	DIED AT TIME	931 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	BMP	(6124)	FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	200
M60A1	(1224)	DIED AT TIME	931 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	BMP	(6116)	FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	200
M60A1	(1154)	DIED AT TIME	937 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	BMP	(6112)	FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	200
M113(TOW)	(1733)	DIED AT TIME	960 OF	MOBIL KILL DUE TO	RPG TH	(9961)	FIRING	RPG 7	AT RANGE	50
M60A1	(1263)	DIED AT TIME	962 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	BMP	(6118)	FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	200
M60A1	(1163)	DIED AT TIME	962 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	BMP	(6161)	FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	200
M60A1	(1141)	DIED AT TIME	968 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	BMP	(6172)	FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	200
CAC ELEMENT(3205)	(1205)	DIED AT TIME	968 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	BMP	(6172)	FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	200

*** CORONER'S REPORT ***

EXERCISE NAME: NWC 4-3-4

RED FORCE

SAGGER TH	(8867)	DIED AT TIME	37 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO INDIRECT FIRE,	BATTERY NO.	9, 155 MM SI	50
SAGGER TH	(8858)	DIED AT TIME	37 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO INDIRECT FIRE,	BATTERY NO.	5, 155 MM SI	50
SAGGER TH	(8885)	DIED AT TIME	37 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO INDIRECT FIRE,	BATTERY NO.	5, 155 MM SI	50
RPG TH	(9977)	DIED AT TIME	37 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO INDIRECT FIRE,	BATTERY NO.	7, 155 MM SI	75
RPG TH	(9972)	DIED AT TIME	37 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO INDIRECT FIRE,	BATTERY NO.	8, 155 MM SI	75
SAGGER TH	(8859)	DIED AT TIME	37 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO INDIRECT FIRE,	BATTERY NO.	8, 155 MM SI	75
RPG TH	(9964)	DIED AT TIME	96 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO INDIRECT FIRE,	BATTERY NO.	9, 155 MM HE	650
PT 76	(7123)	DIED AT TIME	170 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO INDIRECT FIRE,	BATTERY NO.	11, 81 IN HE	75
BRDM-2	(7658)	DIED AT TIME	170 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO INDIRECT FIRE,	BATTERY NO.	11, 81 IN HE	75
RPG TH	(9970)	DIED AT TIME	342 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO M113(TOW),	FIRING	50 CAL	50
RPG TH	(9970)	DIED AT TIME	342 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO M113(APC),	FIRING	50 CAL	50
RPG TH	(9986)	DIED AT TIME	480 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO M113(APC),	FIRING	50 CAL	50
RPG TH	(9986)	DIED AT TIME	481 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO M113(APC),	FIRING	50 CAL	50
RPG TH	(9986)	DIED AT TIME	501 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO M113(APC),	FIRING	50 CAL	50
BRDM-2	(7657)	DIED AT TIME	510 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO M60A1,	FIRING	105 HEAT	650
RPG TH	(9981)	DIED AT TIME	513 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO M113(TOW),	FIRING	50 CAL	75
BRDM-2	(7657)	DIED AT TIME	520 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO M60A1,	FIRING	50 CAL	75
RPG TH	(9986)	DIED AT TIME	521 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO M113(APC),	FIRING	105 HEAT	675
RPG TH	(9986)	DIED AT TIME	521 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO M113(APC),	FIRING	50 CAL	100
BRDM-2	(7657)	DIED AT TIME	528 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO M60A1,	FIRING	50 CAL	50
BMP	(6126)	DIED AT TIME	571 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO M60A1,	FIRING	105 HEAT	650
BMP	(6109)	DIED AT TIME	571 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO M60A1,	FIRING	105 HEAT	225
BMP	(6109)	DIED AT TIME	572 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO M60A1,	FIRING	105 HEAT	225
BMP	(6117)	DIED AT TIME	581 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO M60A1,	FIRING	105 HEAT	225
RPG TH	(9984)	DIED AT TIME	695 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO M113(APC),	FIRING	50 CAL	50
RPG TH	(9984)	DIED AT TIME	705 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO M113(APC),	FIRING	50 CAL	50
RPG TH	(9951)	DIED AT TIME	724 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO M60A1,	FIRING	12, 81 IN HE	50
RPG TH	(9976)	DIED AT TIME	724 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO M113(APC),	FIRING	50 CAL	50
RPG TH	(9998)	DIED AT TIME	733 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO M113(APC),	FIRING	50 CAL	50
RPG TH	(9998)	DIED AT TIME	733 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO M113(APC),	FIRING	50 CAL	50
RPG TH	(9976)	DIED AT TIME	733 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO M113(APC),	FIRING	50 CAL	50
T62	(5152)	DIED AT TIME	750 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO M60A1,	FIRING	29, 122 MRL HE	50
RPG TH	(9968)	DIED AT TIME	750 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO M60A1,	FIRING	105 HEAT	75
T62	(5274)	DIED AT TIME	750 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO M60A1,	FIRING	50 CAL	50
T62	(5110)	DIED AT TIME	750 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO M60A1,	FIRING	105 HEAT	50
T62	(5168)	DIED AT TIME	751 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO M60A1,	FIRING	105 HEAT	50

T62	(5152)	DIED AT TIME	751 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1263),	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	50
T62	(5510)	DIED AT TIME	751 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1253),	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	75
BMP	(6168)	DIED AT TIME	751 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	M113(APC)	(1622),	FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE	100
SAGGER TM	(8851)	DIED AT TIME	761 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	M113(TOW)	(1703),	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	50
BMP	(6173)	DIED AT TIME	752 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	M113(APC)	(1621),	FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE	100
T62	(5233)	DIED AT TIME	752 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	M113(TOW)	(1723),	FIRING	TOW	AT RANGE	500
BMP	(6113)	DIED AT TIME	752 OF	MOBIL KILL	DUE TO	M113(APC)	(1501),	FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE	100
T62	(5253)	DIED AT TIME	752 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	M113(TOW)	(1732),	FIRING	TOW	AT RANGE	550
BMP	(6113)	DIED AT TIME	752 OF	MOBIL KILL	DUE TO	M113(APC)	(1604),	FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE	100
BMP	(6164)	DIED AT TIME	753 OF	MOBIL KILL	DUE TO	M113(APC)	(1611),	FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE	100
BMP	(6126)	DIED AT TIME	760 OF	MOBIL KILL	DUE TO	M113(TOW)	(1721),	FIRING	TOW	AT RANGE	2000
RPG TM	(9976)	DIED AT TIME	764 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	M113(APC)	(1612),	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	50
BMP	(6178)	DIED AT TIME	775 OF	MOBIL KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1203),	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	50
BMP	(6113)	DIED AT TIME	775 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	M113(APC)	(1611),	FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE	100
BMP	(6164)	DIED AT TIME	776 OF	MOBIL KILL	DUE TO	M113(APC)	(1623),	FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE	100
BMP	(6178)	DIED AT TIME	776 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	M113(APC)	(1602),	FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE	100
T62	(5504)	DIED AT TIME	777 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	M113(TOW)	(1724),	FIRING	TOW	AT RANGE	450
BMP	(6165)	DIED AT TIME	777 OF	MOBIL KILL	DUE TO	M113(APC)	(1501),	FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE	100
T62	(5551)	DIED AT TIME	777 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	M113(TOW)	(1732),	FIRING	TOW	AT RANGE	450
RPG TM	(9956)	DIED AT TIME	778 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1253),	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	50
RPG TM	(9956)	DIED AT TIME	779 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1243),	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	50
T62	(5504)	DIED AT TIME	780 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	DRAGON TM	(2932),	FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE	450
BMP	(8868)	DIED AT TIME	781 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	M113(TOW)	(1712),	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	50
BMP	(6152)	DIED AT TIME	781 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	M113(APC)	(1612),	FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE	100
BMP	(6164)	DIED AT TIME	784 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	M113(APC)	(1623),	FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE	200
BMP	(6165)	DIED AT TIME	784 OF	MOBIL KILL	DUE TO	M113(APC)	(1611),	FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE	200
SAGGER TM	(8893)	DIED AT TIME	789 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	M113(TOW)	(1723),	FIRING	TOW	AT RANGE	2000
BMP	(6152)	DIED AT TIME	791 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1263),	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	50
BMP	(6121)	DIED AT TIME	792 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1243),	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	150
BMP	(6175)	DIED AT TIME	792 OF	MOBIL KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1102),	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	250
BMP	(6180)	DIED AT TIME	797 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1211),	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	150
RPG TM	(9956)	DIED AT TIME	797 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1244),	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	50
SAGGER TM	(8868)	DIED AT TIME	800 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	M113(TOW)	(1733),	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	50
RPG TM	(9978)	DIED AT TIME	803 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	M113(TOW)	(1703),	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	100
BMP	(6180)	DIED AT TIME	805 OF	MOBIL KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1111),	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	300
RPG TM	(5576)	DIED AT TIME	805 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	M113(TOW)	(1701),	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	150
T62	(5534)	DIED AT TIME	809 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1262),	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	50
BMP	(6110)	DIED AT TIME	809 OF	MOBIL KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1122),	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	150
BMP	(6121)	DIED AT TIME	809 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1151),	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	100
BMP	(6121)	DIED AT TIME	809 OF	MOBIL KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1102),	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	100
BMP	(6131)	DIED AT TIME	809 OF	MOBIL KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1141),	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	50
T62	(5258)	DIED AT TIME	809 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1263),	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	50
BMP	(6105)	DIED AT TIME	810 OF	MOBIL KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1121),	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	50
T62	(5258)	DIED AT TIME	810 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1244),	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	50

BMP	(6175)	DIED AT TIME	811 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1111), FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	75
T62	(6180)	DIED AT TIME	812 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1123), FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	50
BMP	(6179)	DIED AT TIME	812 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M113(APC)	(1612), FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE	100
SACGER TH	(6126)	DIED AT TIME	818 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M113(TOW)	(1732), FIRING	TOW	AT RANGE	2000
BMP	(6105)	DIED AT TIME	840 OF MOBIL KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1122), FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	300
BMP	(6105)	DIED AT TIME	840 OF MOBIL KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1114), FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	300
BMP	(6110)	DIED AT TIME	840 OF MOBIL KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1102), FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	100
BMP	(6121)	DIED AT TIME	840 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1151), FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	400
RPG	(9997)	DIED AT TIME	840 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M113(TOW)	(1704), FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	50
BMP	(6131)	DIED AT TIME	841 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1164), FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	400
BMP	(6121)	DIED AT TIME	841 OF MOBIL KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1121), FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	400
BMP	(6179)	DIED AT TIME	841 OF MOBIL KILL DUE TO	M113(APC)	(1623), FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE	100
BMP	(6110)	DIED AT TIME	841 OF MOBIL KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1111), FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	350
BMP	(6131)	DIED AT TIME	841 OF MOBIL KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1196), FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	300
BMP	(6105)	DIED AT TIME	842 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1162), FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	400
BMP	(6179)	DIED AT TIME	843 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M113(APC)	(1501), FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE	100
BMP	(6152)	DIED AT TIME	844 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M113(APC)	(1622), FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE	100
T62	(5531)	DIED AT TIME	857 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1262), FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	50
RPG TH	(9997)	DIED AT TIME	860 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M113(TOW)	(1701), FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	50
RPG TH	(9988)	DIED AT TIME	860 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M113(TOW)	(1702), FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	50
RPG TH	(9988)	DIED AT TIME	861 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M113(TOW)	(1703), FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	50
BMP	(6110)	DIED AT TIME	874 OF MOBIL KILL DUE TO	M113(APC)	(1501), FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE	300
BMP	(6110)	DIED AT TIME	874 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M113(APC)	(1623), FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE	300
RPG TH	(9965)	DIED AT TIME	875 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M113(TOW)	(1701), FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	50
RPG TH	(9965)	DIED AT TIME	894 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M113(TOW)	(1701), FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	50
RPG TH	(9965)	DIED AT TIME	897 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M113(TOW)	(1704), FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	50
RPG TH	(9992)	DIED AT TIME	904 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M113(TOW)	(1733), FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	50
RPG TH	(9993)	DIED AT TIME	909 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M113(TOW)	(1712), FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	50
RPG TH	(9966)	DIED AT TIME	931 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M113(TOW)	(1714), FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	50
BMP	(6163)	DIED AT TIME	931 OF MOBIL KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1102), FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	200
RPG TH	(6112)	DIED AT TIME	931 OF MOBIL KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1153), FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	200
RPG TH	(9955)	DIED AT TIME	931 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M113(TOW)	(1712), FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	50
RPG TH	(9967)	DIED AT TIME	931 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M113(TOW)	(1701), FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	75
BMP	(6124)	DIED AT TIME	932 OF MOBIL KILL DUE TO	M113(APC)	(1622), FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE	200
BMP	(6172)	DIED AT TIME	933 OF MOBIL KILL DUE TO	M113(APC)	(1604), FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE	200
BMP	(6112)	DIED AT TIME	933 OF MOBIL KILL DUE TO	M113(APC)	(1612), FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE	200
BMP	(6114)	DIED AT TIME	934 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M113(APC)	(1624), FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE	200
RPG TH	(9961)	DIED AT TIME	960 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M113(TOW)	(1701), FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	50
BMP	(6112)	DIED AT TIME	960 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1162), FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	150
BMP	(6112)	DIED AT TIME	960 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1127), FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	150
BMP	(6163)	DIED AT TIME	960 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1102), FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	150
BMP	(6124)	DIED AT TIME	960 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1141), FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	150
BMP	(6811)	DIED AT TIME	960 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1262), FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	150
RPG TH	(9961)	DIED AT TIME	961 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M113(TOW)	(1703), FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	50
BMP	(6124)	DIED AT TIME	961 OF MOBIL KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1144), FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	150
BMP	(6112)	DIED AT TIME	961 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1222), FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	150
BMP	(6161)	DIED AT TIME	961 OF MOBIL KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1151), FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	150
BMP	(6172)	DIED AT TIME	961 OF MOBIL KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1123), FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	150
BMP	(6124)	DIED AT TIME	963 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M113(APC)	(1604), FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE	200
BMP	(6113)	DIED AT TIME	963 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M113(APC)	(1623), FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE	200
BMP	(6163)	DIED AT TIME	963 OF MOBIL KILL DUE TO	M113(APC)	(1624), FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE	200
BMP	(6112)	DIED AT TIME	964 OF MOBIL KILL DUE TO	M113(APC)	(1612), FIRING	DRAGON	AT RANGE	200
RPG TH	(9961)	DIED AT TIME	970 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M113(TOW)	(1733), FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	50
BMP	(6163)	DIED AT TIME	979 OF MOBIL KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1103), FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	150
BMP	(6172)	DIED AT TIME	984 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1103), FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	150

ANNEX H

SCENARIO #3

ANNEX H (Scenario #3)

1. For both Option I and Option II attacks, the Soviet Motorized Rifle Battalion (MRB) assumed identical three band defenses on the same terrain (see Appendix 1 and 2).
2. The Soviet MRB was organized in the same manner for both attacks:

31 BMPs (3 MR companies)
13 T-62s (1 tank company)

3. The Soviets had the following artillery support:

1 Battery 120mm mortar (immediately responsive)
1 Battery 122mm Howitzers RAG (immediately responsive)
1 Battery 152mm Guns RAG (immediately responsive)
2 Batteries 122mm Howitzers RAG (less responsive)
2 Batteries 152mm Guns RAG (less responsive)
1 Battalion 122mm Howitzers DAG (in support)
2 Battalions 130mm Gun-Howitzers DAG (in support)
2 Battalions 152mm Guns DAG (in support)
1 Battalion 122mm MRL DAG (in support)

4. The weather was the same for both options:

visibility - 2200 meters
wind - 8mph from the Southwest

5. The rates of movement were the same for both options:

18KPH Track Cross Country Sustained
12KPH Track in Smoke
12KPH Track Cross Country Assault (Firing)
24KPH Track on the Road
6KPH Soldier Running (3 minutes)
4KPH Soldier Cross Country (Sustained)

6. The attacking U.S. battalions were organized in an identical manner:

5 tanks per platoon
3 platoons per company
3 companies in the battalion
1 TOW Company (12 TOWs)

7. The attacking U.S. battalions had the same attachment:

1 Mechanized Infantry Company

12 Dragon Teams

24 LAW Teams

3 81mm Mortars

8. The attacking U.S. battalions had the same artillery support:

1 Battalion 155 Howitzers (DS)

1 Battalion 8in. Howitzers (Reinf)

1 Battalion 155 Howitzers (GSR)

1 Battalion 8in. Howitzers (GS)

Appendices

1. Scenario #3, Option I

2. Scenario #3, Option II

Appendix 1 (Scenario #3, Option I) to ANNEX H (Scenario #3)


1. The U.S. initiated the attack with a short artillery prep and smoked critical terrain (see page H-5).
2. A and B Companies constituted the maneuver force while C and TOW Companies provided the overwatching fires.
3. As the maneuver force passed east of Kirchhasel (NA 560170), the Soviet tank platoon on Hill 360 (NA 578177) took them under fire. Concurrently, the Infantry Company cleared the town of Kirchhasel (no Soviet forces were located there) and the overwatching force took up position on the ridge north-east of Kirchhasel.
4. The Soviet tank platoon on Hill 360 destroyed ten M-60A1 tanks before the U.S. battalion could kill all four T-62 tanks.
5. As the maneuver force approached the northern slopes of Hill 360, the two Soviet Motorized Rifle platoons west of Kirchhasel along route 84 hit them with flanking Sagger fire while the two Soviet Motorized Rifle platoons on the ridge east of Grossenbach (NA 560150) engaged the maneuver force with frontal Sagger fire.
6. The overwatching force east of Kirchhasel and the Infantry Company along the southern and western outskirts of Kirchhasel attempted to suppress this long range Sagger fire with mixed results.
7. The maneuver force passed below the crest of Hill 360 to allow the artillery to smoke the remnants of the two Soviet

Motorized Rifle platoons dug in along the ridge east of Grossenbach.


8. As the maneuver force crested Hill 360, the Soviet Motorized Rifle platoon (coordinates NA 586158) engaged them with long range Sagger fire. The maneuver force returned fire and called for smoke on this platoon.

9. In the interim, the overwatching companies moved to Hill 360 and supported the final assault of the maneuver force.


10. When the maneuver force destroyed the Soviet Motorized Rifle platoon at coordinates NA 586158 and took this ground, the U.S. battalion had effectively breached the Motorized Rifle Battalion's third band. The ridge east of Grossenbach however, had not been taken, and the U.S. battalion had lost its momentum. Whether a follow battalion could have exploited this narrow penetration is questionable. A determined Soviet counterattack could have destroyed the small remnants of the maneuver force effectively closing this narrow gap. Time sequenced photographs (pages H-6 to H-10) show the progress of the battle.







8-H







H-10

ATTACK #3, OPTION I TACTICS

SOVIET SYSTEMS KILLED BY U.S. SYSTEMS

	<u>T-62</u>	<u>BMP</u>	<u>Sagger TM</u>	<u>RPG TM</u>
M-60A1	5	1	3	0
TOW	3	2	0	0
DRAGON	0	0	0	0
LAW	0	0	0	0
M113 (50 Cal)	0	0	2	3
Indirect Fire	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
TOTALS	8	3	2	3

U.S. SYSTEMS KILLED BY SOVIET SYSTEMS

	<u>M-60</u>	<u>TOW</u>	<u>M113</u>	<u>DRAGON</u>	<u>LAW</u>
T-62	12	0	0	0	0
Sagger Team	15	2	0	0	0
RPG Team	0	0	5	1	2
BMP (73 HEAT)	2	0	0	0	0
Indirect Fire	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
TOTALS	29	2	5	1 ¹	2 ²

1. Dragon Team killed while riding a M113.
2. LAW Teams killed while riding a M113.

*** CORONER'S REPORT ***

EXERCISE NAME: NWC 5-3-3

M60A1	(1237)	DIED AT TIME	331 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	T62	(5142),	FIRING	115 HVAPFSD	AT RANGE	750
M60A1	(1236)	DIED AT TIME	331 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	T62	(5510),	FIRING	115 HVAPFSD	AT RANGE	750
C&C ELEMENT (3221)		DIED AT TIME	331 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	T62	(5510),	FIRING	115 HVAPFSD	AT RANGE	750
M60A1	(1202)	DIED AT TIME	332 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	T62	(5539),	FIRING	115 HVAPFSD	AT RANGE	750
M60A1	(1205)	DIED AT TIME	332 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	T62	(5535),	FIRING	115 HVAPFSD	AT RANGE	750
M60A1	(1112)	DIED AT TIME	342 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	SAGGER TM	(8803),	FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE	1200
M60A1	(1113)	DIED AT TIME	342 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	SAGGER TM	(8816),	FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE	1200
M60A1	(1111)	DIED AT TIME	343 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	SAGGER TM	(8808),	FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE	1200
C&C ELEMENT (3202)		DIED AT TIME	343 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	SAGGER TM	(8808),	FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE	1200
M60A1	(1201)	DIED AT TIME	343 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	SAGGER TM	(8874),	FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE	1800
C&C ELEMENT (3218)		DIED AT TIME	348 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	SAGGER TM	(8874),	FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE	1800
M60A1	(1203)	DIED AT TIME	349 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	SAGGER TM	(8806),	FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE	1800
T62	(5535)	DIED AT TIME	349 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1213),	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	700
M60A1	(1214)	DIED AT TIME	350 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	T62	(5510),	FIRING	115 HVAPFSD	AT RANGE	750
M113(APC)		DIED AT TIME	350 OF MOBIL KILL	DUE TO	RPG TM	(9916),	FIRING	RPG 7	AT RANGE	125
M60A1	(1213)	DIED AT TIME	351 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	T62	(5142),	FIRING	115 HVAPFSD	AT RANGE	750
T62	(5535)	DIED AT TIME	351 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1225),	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	700
T62	(5539)	DIED AT TIME	354 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	M113(TOW)	(1212),	FIRING	TOW	AT RANGE	900
T62	(5539)	DIED AT TIME	359 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1212),	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	700
M60A1	(1122)	DIED AT TIME	362 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	SAGGER TM	(8803),	FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE	1200
M60A1	(1121)	DIED AT TIME	362 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	SAGGER TM	(8816),	FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE	1300
C&C ELEMENT (3203)		DIED AT TIME	362 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	SAGGER TM	(8808),	FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE	1300
M60A1	(1123)	DIED AT TIME	363 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	SAGGER TM	(1224),	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	750
T62	(5539)	DIED AT TIME	376 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1223),	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	125
RPG TM	(9908)	DIED AT TIME	390 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	M113(APC)	(1213),	FIRING	115 HVAPFSD	AT RANGE	750
M60A1	(1137)	DIED AT TIME	390 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	T62	(5142),	FIRING	115 HVAPFSD	AT RANGE	750
BMF	(6116)	DIED AT TIME	391 OF MOBIL KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1102),	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	900
T62	(5142)	DIED AT TIME	391 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1115),	FIRING	105 AFDS	AT RANGE	500
M113(APC)	(1623)	DIED AT TIME	391 OF MOBIL KILL	DUE TO	RPG TM	(9916),	FIRING	RPG 7	AT RANGE	125
M60A1	(1136)	DIED AT TIME	391 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	T62	(5510),	FIRING	115 HVAPFSD	AT RANGE	750
C&C ELEMENT (3204)		DIED AT TIME	391 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	T62	(5510),	FIRING	115 HVAPFSD	AT RANGE	750
T62	(5510)	DIED AT TIME	391 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1211),	FIRING	105 AFDS	AT RANGE	800
SAGGER TM	(8816)	DIED AT TIME	391 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1223),	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	700
M60A1	(1211)	DIED AT TIME	392 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	RMP	(4108),	FIRING	76 HEAT	AT RANGE	600
C&C ELEMENT (3219)		DIED AT TIME	392 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	BMF	(6108),	FIRING	76 HEAT	AT RANGE	600
T62	(5142)	DIED AT TIME	392 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1215),	FIRING	105 AFDS	AT RANGE	500
T62	(5510)	DIED AT TIME	392 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	(1204),	FIRING	105 AFDS	AT RANGE	500
SAGGER TM	(8816)	DIED AT TIME	392 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	M113(APC)	(1224),	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	550
M60A1	(1212)	DIED AT TIME	392 OF FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	BMF	(6108),	FIRING	76 HEAT	AT RANGE	600

BMP	(6116)	DIED*AT	TIME	394 OF	MOBIL	KILL	DUE TO	M113(TOW)	FIR 13	TOW	AT RANGE	1000
BMP	(6103)	DIED AT	TIME	394 OF	FP&MO	KILL	DUE TO	M113(TOW)	FIRING	TOW	AT RANGE	1000
BMP	(6108)	DIED AT	TIME	395 OF	FP&MO	KILL	DUE TO	M113(TOW)	FIRING	TOW	AT RANGE	1000
T62	(5124)	DIED AT	TIME	395 OF	FP&MO	KILL	DUE TO	M113(TOW)	FIRING	TOW	AT RANGE	1000
M60A1	(1177)	DIED AT	TIME	403 OF	FP&MO	KILL	DUE TO	SAGGER TM	FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE	1300
M60A1	(1176)	DIED AT	TIME	404 OF	FP&MO	KILL	DUE TO	SAGGER TM	FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE	1300
C&C ELEMENT	(3215)	DIED AT	TIME	404 OF	FP&MO	KILL	DUE TO	SAGGER TM	FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE	1300
T62	(5510)	DIED*AT	TIME	410 OF	FP&MO	KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	FIRING	105 AFDS	AT RANGE	950
SAGGER TM	(8803)	DIED AT	TIME	412 OF	FP&MO	KILL	DUE TO	M113(APC)	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	700
RPG TM	(9908)	DIED*AT	TIME	430 OF	FP&MO	KILL	DUE TO	M113(APC)	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	175
M60A1	(1151)	DIED AT	TIME	434 OF	FP&MO	KILL	DUE TO	SAGGER TM	FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE	1300
C&C ELEMENT	(3213)	DIED AT	TIME	434 OF	FP&MO	KILL	DUE TO	SAGGER TM	FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE	1300
SAGGER TM	(8806)	DIED AT	TIME	435 OF	FP&MO	KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	FIRING	105 SOF TGT	AT RANGE	1700
M60A1	(1215)	DIED AT	TIME	436 OF	MOBIL	KILL	DUE TO	SAGGER TM	FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE	1650
M113(APC)	(1601)	DIED AT	TIME	462 OF	MOBIL	KILL	DUE TO	RPG TM	FIRING	RPG 7	AT RANGE	50
M113(APC)	(1613)	DIED AT	TIME	464 OF	MOBIL	KILL	DUE TO	RPG TM	FIRING	RPG 7	AT RANGE	50
RPG TM	(8816)	DIED*AT	TIME	505 OF	FP&MO	KILL	DUE TO	M113(APC)	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	100
SAGGER TM	(8871)	DIED AT	TIME	508 OF	FP&MO	KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	1550
SAGGER TM	(8871)	DIED*AT	TIME	512 OF	FP&MO	KILL	DUE TO	M113(TOW)	FIRING	TOW	AT RANGE	1600
M60A1	(1114)	DIED AT	TIME	521 OF	FP&MO	KILL	DUE TO	SAGGER TM	FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE	1600
M60A1	(1115)	DIED AT	TIME	522 OF	FP&MO	KILL	DUE TO	SAGGER TM	FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE	1600
M113(APC)	(1623)	DIED*AT	TIME	529 OF	FP&MO	KILL	DUE TO	RPG TM	FIRING	RPG 7	AT RANGE	50
DRAGON TM	(2911)	DIED AT	TIME	529 OF	FP&MO	KILL	DUE TO	RPG TM	FIRING	RPG 7	AT RANGE	50
LAW TM	(2812)	DIED AT	TIME	529 OF	FP&MO	KILL	DUE TO	RPG TM	FIRING	RPG 7	AT RANGE	50
M113(APC)	(1612)	DIED AT	TIME	600 OF	MOBIL	KILL	DUE TO	RPG TM	FIRING	RPG 7	AT RANGE	50
RPG TM	(9952)	DIED AT	TIME	600 OF	FP&MO	KILL	DUE TO	M113(APC)	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	50
RPG TM	(9950)	DIED AT	TIME	600 OF	FP&MO	KILL	DUE TO	M113(APC)	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	50
M60A1	(1204)	DIED AT	TIME	601 OF	FP&MO	KILL	DUE TO	T62	FIRING	115 HVAFPSD	AT RANGE	1300
M60A1	(1104)	DIED AT	TIME	601 OF	FP&MO	KILL	DUE TO	T62	FIRING	115 HVAFPSD	AT RANGE	1300
RPG TM	(9952)	DIED*AT	TIME	601 OF	FP&MO	KILL	DUE TO	M113(APC)	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	50
M60A1	(1103)	DIED AT	TIME	602 OF	FP&MO	KILL	DUE TO	T62	FIRING	115 HVAFPSD	AT RANGE	1200
T62	(5181)	DIED AT	TIME	603 OF	FP&MO	KILL	DUE TO	M60A1	FIRING	105 AFDS	AT RANGE	1350
T62	(5518)	DIED AT	TIME	605 OF	FP&MO	KILL	DUE TO	M113(TOW)	FIRING	TOW	AT RANGE	1250
T62	(5184)	DIED AT	TIME	606 OF	FP&MO	KILL	DUE TO	M113(TOW)	FIRING	TOW	AT RANGE	1250
M113(TOW)	(1711)	DIED AT	TIME	613 OF	MOBIL	KILL	DUE TO	SAGGER TM	FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE	1400
M60A1	(1102)	DIED AT	TIME	614 OF	FP&MO	KILL	DUE TO	SAGGER TM	FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE	1400
M113(TOW)	(1712)	DIED AT	TIME	614 OF	MOBIL	KILL	DUE TO	SAGGER TM	FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE	1400
SAGGER TM	(9874)	DIED AT	TIME	622 OF	FP&MO	KILL	DUE TO	M113(APC)	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	1150
M60A1	(1105)	DIED AT	TIME	630 OF	FP&MO	KILL	DUE TO	T62	FIRING	115 HVAFPSD	AT RANGE	1300

EXERCISE NAME: NWC 5-3-3

H-14

*** GURKNER'S REPORT ***

EXERCISE NAME: NWC S-3-3

RED FORCE

T62	(5535)	DIED AT TIME	349 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1213),	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	700
T62	(5535)	DIED*AT TIME	351 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1225),	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	750
T62	(5535)	DIED*AT TIME	354 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M113(TOW)	(1721),	FIRING	TOW	AT RANGE	900
T62	(5539)	DIED AT TIME	359 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1212),	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	700
T62	(5539)	DIED*AT TIME	376 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1224),	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	750
RPG TM	(7908)	DIED AT TIME	390 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M113(APC)	(1623),	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	175
BMP	(6116)	DIED AT TIME	391 OF	MO&IL KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1102),	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	800
T62	(5142)	DIED AT TIME	391 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M50A1	(1115),	FIRING	105 APDS	AT RANGE	900
T62	(5510)	DIED AT TIME	391 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1211),	FIRING	105 APDS	AT RANGE	600
SAGGER TM	(8816)	DIED AT TIME	391 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1223),	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	700
T62	(5142)	DIED*AT TIME	392 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1215),	FIRING	105 APDS	AT RANGE	650
T62	(5510)	DIED*AT TIME	392 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1204),	FIRING	105 APDS	AT RANGE	500
SAGGER TM	(8816)	DIED*AT TIME	392 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M113(APC)	(1624),	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	650
BMP	(6116)	DIED*AT TIME	394 OF	MO&IL KILL DUE TO	M113(TOW)	(1714),	FIRING	TOW	AT RANGE	1000
T62	(6103)	DIED AT TIME	394 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M113(TOW)	(1721),	FIRING	TOW	AT RANGE	1000
BMP	(6108)	DIED AT TIME	395 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M113(TOW)	(1723),	FIRING	TOW	AT RANGE	1000
T62	(5124)	DIED AT TIME	395 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M113(TOW)	(1724),	FIRING	TOW	AT RANGE	1000
T62	(5510)	DIED*AT TIME	410 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1114),	FIRING	105 APDS	AT RANGE	950
SAGGER TM	(8803)	DIED AT TIME	412 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M113(APC)	(1622),	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	700
RPG TM	(9908)	DIED*AT TIME	430 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M113(APC)	(1221),	FIRING	105 SOF	AT RANGE	175
SAGGER TM	(8806)	DIED AT TIME	435 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1224),	FIRING	105 SOF	AT RANGE	1700
RPG TM	(8816)	DIED*AT TIME	505 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M113(APC)	(1623),	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	100
SAGGER TM	(8871)	DIED AT TIME	508 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1114),	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	1550
SAGGER TM	(8871)	DIED*AT TIME	512 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M113(TOW)	(1714),	FIRING	TOW	AT RANGE	1500
RPG TM	(9952)	DIED AT TIME	600 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M113(APC)	(1604),	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	50
RPG TM	(9960)	DIED AT TIME	600 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M113(APC)	(1613),	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	70
RPG TM	(9952)	DIED*AT TIME	601 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M113(APC)	(1622),	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	50
T62	(5181)	DIED AT TIME	603 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1104),	FIRING	105 APDS	AT RANGE	1350
T62	(5518)	DIED AT TIME	605 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M113(TOW)	(1714),	FIRING	TOW	AT RANGE	1250
T62	(5184)	DIED AT TIME	606 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M113(TOW)	(1712),	FIRING	TOW	AT RANGE	1250
SAGGER TM	(8874)	DIED AT TIME	622 OF	FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M113(APC)	(1614),	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	1150

*** GURKNER'S REPORT ***

Appendix 2 (Scenario #3, Option II) to ANNEX II (Scenario #3)

1. The U.S. battalion initiated the attack with a short artillery prep of two volleys and a third volley that laid down the smoke envelope for the assault force (see page H-18).
2. The TOW Company provided overwatching fires from three locations: Hill 352 (NA 542162), the ridge east of Kirchhasel (NA 560170), and the southern outskirts of Kirchhasel. This overwatch which never shifted during the attack proved exceptionally effective in pinning down all of the Soviet Motorized Rifle Battalion west of the smoke envelopes with the exception of one tank platoon in the second band. This overwatch force killed four T-62s and two BMPs which attempted to shift laterally with the loss of only one TOW tank (mobility kill only).
3. Led by the Scout Platoon, the three letter companies and Infantry Company advanced toward Hill 360 (NA 578176) without casualties. When the scouts broke from the smoke at the base of Hill 360, the Soviet tank platoon on Hill 360 engaged them destroying three vehicles. The Soviet platoon then backed off into the town of Neuwirtshaus (NA 577169) and reengaged the scout platoon as it crested Hill 360. These engagements destroyed all of the scout platoon except for one vehicle.
4. The lead U.S. tank company, A Company, stopped in hull defilade on Hill 360 and destroyed all of the Soviet tank platoon in Neuwirtshaus.

5. The U.S. force then continued its advance within the smoke envelope.


6. For the assault on the woods, vicinity NA 585158, the Infantry Company assumed the lead, and the Infantry Company and A Company broke through the last smoke screen three hundred meters from the Soviet Motorized Rifle Platoon at coordinate NA 585158, quickly destroying this force.

7. Currently, B Company, second in the formation wheeled right and attacked the remnants of the two Motorized Rifle Platoons positioned behind the road that climbs the ridge east of Grossenbach (NA 568155). (These platoons had previously been attacked by indirect fire repeatedly.) B Company's attack broke through the smoke screen 500 meters from the Soviet position and quickly gained control of this ridge which commands the Soviet second and third bands all the way to the Rossberg (NA 566147).

8. C Company drove between the A and B Company objectives and could have enveloped the entire Soviet battalion defensive position.

9. This attack had effectively opened a three kilometer penetration of the Soviet position.


10. This attack suffered no M-60A1 casualties until the final assault; however, a battalion MRL volley landed about two hundred to three hundred meters behind the trailing VTRs (this could have caused heavy casualties prior to the assault). Time sequenced photographs (pages H-19 to H-23) show the progress of the battle.



H-19




H-20



H-21


H-22



H-23

TIME IS
NOW
1200

ding



ATTACK #3, OPTION II TACTICS

SOVIET SYSTEMS KILLED BY U.S. SYSTEMS

	<u>T-62</u>	<u>BMP</u>	<u>SAGGER TM</u>	<u>RPG TM</u>	<u>SPG9</u>
M-60A1	4	4	2	3	0
TOW	4	2	0	0	0
DRAGON	0	0	0	0	0
LAW	0	0	0	0	0
Indirect Fire	<u>0</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>0</u>
TOTALS	8	9	6	5	0

U.S. SYSTEMS KILLED BY SOVIET SYSTEMS

	<u>M-60</u>	<u>TOW</u>	<u>M113</u>	<u>DRAGON</u>	<u>LAW</u>
T-62	2	2	4	2	4
SAGGER TM	1	1	0	0	0
RPG	2	0	0	0	0
BMP (73 HEAT)	2	0	0	0	0
Indirect Fire	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
TOTALS	7	3	4	2 ¹	4 ²

1. All Dragon Teams were killed while riding M113s.
2. All LAW Teams were killed while riding M113s.

TASK FORCE 5-3-3 STATUS 1289-7
EXERCISE NWC 5-3-3, EX- TIME
BEGIN RESOURCES NOW 47

BEGIN	RESOURCES	TOTAL	AMMUNITION	W/SURV	W/CASU	EXPENDED
54	M60A1	810	105 HEAT	671	100	39
		2160	105 APDS	1860	300	0
		432	105 SOF TGT	382	50	0
		108000	50 CAL	77805	30000	195
17	M113(APC)	14				
		102	LAW	84	18	0
		17000	50 CAL	14000	3000	0
		90	DRAGON	72	15	3
		149985	7.62 MG	119988	29997	0
15	M113(TOW)	11				
		150	TOW	98	34	18
		18	105 SOF TGT	0	18	0
		15000	50 CAL	11000	4000	0
		72	LAW	66	6	0
2	M113(C&C)	2				
		6	LAW	6	0	0
		2000	50 CAL	2000	0	0
6	M106(MTR)	6				
		4000	50 CAL	4000	0	0
37	LAW TM	37				
		150	LAW	150	0	0
15	DRAGON TM	13				
		90	DRAGON	78	12	0
1	ASP-1	1				
		50	105 HEAT	50	0	0
		200	105 APDS	200	0	0
		60	TOW	60	0	0
		60	DRAGON	60	0	0
		120	LAW	120	0	0
		9000	50 CAL	9000	0	0
1	ASP-2	1				
		50	105 HEAT	50	0	0
		200	105 APDS	200	0	0
		60	TOW	60	0	0
		60	DRAGON	60	0	0
		120	LAW	120	0	0
		9000	50 CAL	9000	0	0

TEAM HQ STATUS
EXERCISE NWC 5-3-3, EX. TIME 1209.7

BEGIN	RESOURCES	NOW	TOTAL	AMMUNITION	W/SURV	W/CASU	EXPENDED
3	M60A1	3	45	105 HEAT	30	15	0
			120	105 APDS	80	40	0
			24	105 SOF TGT	16	8	0
			6000	50 CAL	4000	2000	0
1196	M60A1			LIVE			
				15 HEAT			0
				40 APDS			0
				8 SOF TGT			0
				2000 CAL			0
1197	M60A1			LIVE			
				15 HEAT			0
				40 APDS			0
				8 SOF TGT			0
				2000 CAL			0
1198	M60A1			LIVE			
				15 HEAT			0
				40 APDS			0
				8 SOF TGT			0
				2000 CAL			0

EXERCISE TEAM ALPHA STATUS
NWC 5-3-3, EX- TIME 1289.17

1101	M6001	LIVE	13 105 HEAT 40 105 AFDS 8 105 SDF TGT 1961 50 CAL	0 0 0 0
1102	M6001	LIVE	13 105 HEAT 40 105 AFDS 8 105 SDF TGT 2000 50 CAL	0 0 0 0
1103	M6001	LIVE	13 105 HEAT 40 105 AFDS 8 105 SDF TGT 2000 50 CAL	0 0 0 0
1104	M6001	LIVE	13 105 HEAT 40 105 AFDS 8 105 SDF TGT 2000 50 CAL	0 0 0 0
1105	M6001	LIVE	13 105 HEAT 40 105 AFDS 8 105 SDF TGT 2000 50 CAL	0 0 0 0
1111	M6001	LIVE	13 105 HEAT 40 105 AFDS 8 105 SDF TGT 2000 50 CAL	0 0 0 0
1112	M6001	LIVE	13 105 HEAT 40 105 AFDS 8 105 SDF TGT 2000 50 CAL	0 0 0 0
1113	M6001	LIVE	13 105 HEAT 40 105 AFDS 8 105 SDF TGT 2000 50 CAL	0 0 0 0

1114	M60A1	LIVE	15	105 HEAT	0
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SOF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
1115	M60A1	LIVE	15	105 HEAT	0
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SOF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
1121	M60A1	LIVE	15	105 HEAT	1
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SOF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
1122	M60A1	LIVE	13	105 HEAT	2
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SOF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
1123	M60A1	LIVE	15	105 HEAT	0
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SOF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
1124	M60A1	LIVE	14	105 HEAT	1
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SOF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
1125	M60A1	LIVE	13	105 HEAT	2
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SOF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
1136	M60A1	LIVE	15	105 HEAT	0
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SOF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
1137	M60A1	LIVE	15	105 HEAT	0
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SOF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0

BEGIN	RESOURCES	NOW	TOTAL	AMMUNITION	W/SURV	W/CASU	EXPENDED
17	M60A1	15	255	105 HEAT	108	131	16
			680	105 APDS	320	360	0
			136	105 SOF TGT	64	72	0
			34000	50 CAL	18961	18000	39

TEAM BRAVO STATUS
EXERCISE NWC 5-3-3, EX. TIME 1289.7

1141	M60A1	DEAD	13	105 HEAT	2
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
1142	M60A1	LIVE	14	105 HEAT	1
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			1974	50 CAL	26
1143	M60A1	DEAD	15	105 HEAT	0
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
1144	M60A1	DEAD	12	105 HEAT	3
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
1145	M60A1	LIVE	13	105 HEAT	2
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			1987	50 CAL	13
1151	M60A1	LIVE	14	105 HEAT	1
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
1152	M60A1	LIVE	13	105 HEAT	2
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			1987	50 CAL	13
1153	M60A1	DEAD	15	105 HEAT	0
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0

1154	M60A1	TOTK	15	105 HEAT	0
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	9
1155	M60A1	LIVE	14	105 HEAT	1
			40	105 APDS	7
			8	105 SDF TGT	9
			1961	50 CAL	39
1161	M60A1	LIVE	13	105 HEAT	2
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
1162	M60A1	LIVE	12	105 HEAT	3
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
1163	M60A1	LIVE	12	105 HEAT	3
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			1987	50 CAL	13
1164	M60A1	LIVE	13	105 HEAT	2
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			1987	50 CAL	13
1165	M60A1	LIVE	14	105 HEAT	1
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			1961	50 CAL	39
1176	M60A1	LIVE	15	105 HEAT	0
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
1177	M60A1	LIVE	15	105 HEAT	0
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0

BEGIN	RESOURCES	NOW	TOTAL	AMMUNITION	W/SURV	W/CASU	EXPENDED
17	M60A1	12	255	105 HEAT	162	70	23
			680	105 APDS	480	200	0
			136	105 SDF TGT	96	40	0
			34000	50 CAL	23844	10000	156

TEAM CHARLIE STATUS
EXERCISE NWC 5-3-3, EX. TIME 1289.7

1201	M60A1	LIVE	15	105 HEAT	0
			40	105 APC'S	0
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
1202	M60A1	LIVE	15	105 HEAT	0
			40	105 APC'S	0
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
1203	M60A1	LIVE	15	105 HEAT	0
			40	105 APC'S	0
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
1204	M60A1	LIVE	15	105 HEAT	0
			40	105 APC'S	0
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
1205	M60A1	LIVE	15	105 HEAT	0
			40	105 APC'S	0
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
1211	M60A1	LIVE	15	105 HEAT	0
			40	105 APC'S	0
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
1212	M60A1	LIVE	15	105 HEAT	0
			40	105 APC'S	0
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
1213	M60A1	LIVE	15	105 HEAT	0
			40	105 APC'S	0
			8	105 SDF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0

1214	M60A1	LINE	15	105 HEAT	0
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SOF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
1215	M60A1	LINE	15	105 HEAT	0
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SOF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
1221	M60A1	LINE	15	105 HEAT	0
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SOF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
1222	M60A1	LINE	15	105 HEAT	0
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SOF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
1223	M60A1	LINE	15	105 HEAT	0
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SOF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
1224	M60A1	LINE	15	105 HEAT	0
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SOF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
1225	M60A1	LINE	15	105 HEAT	0
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SOF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
1236	M60A1	LINE	15	105 HEAT	0
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SOF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0
1237	M60A1	LINE	15	105 HEAT	0
			40	105 APDS	0
			8	105 SOF TGT	0
			2000	50 CAL	0

BEGIN	RESOURCES	NOW	TOTAL	AMMUNITION	W/SURV	W/CASU	EXPENDED
17	M60A1	17	255	105 HEAT	255	0	0
			680	105 APDS	680	0	0
			136	105 SOF TGT	136	0	0
			4000	50 CAL	4000	0	0

TEAM SCOUT STATUS
EXERCISE NWC 5-3-3, EX. TIME 1289.7

1526	M113 (APC)	LIV	6	LAW	0
			1000	50 CAL	0
1731	M113 (TOW)	TOT	9	TOW	0
			6	105 SOF TGT	0
			1000	50 CAL	0
1732	M113 (TOW)	TOT	9	TOW	0
			6	105 SOF TGT	0
			1000	50 CAL	0
1733	M113 (TOW)	TOT	10	TOW	0
			6	105 SOF TGT	0
			1000	50 CAL	0
1501	M113 (APC)	MOB	5	DRAGON	1
			6	LAW	0
			1000	50 CAL	0
			9999	7.62 MG	0
1502	M113 (APC)	TOT	5	DRAGON	1
			6	LAW	0
			1000	50 CAL	0
			9999	7.62 MG	0
1503	M113 (APC)	TOT	5	DRAGON	1
			6	LAW	0
			1000	50 CAL	0
			9999	7.62 MG	0
2931	DRAGON TM	LIVE	6	DRAGON	0
2932	DRAGON TM	TOT	6	DRAGON	0
2933	DRAGON TM	TOT	6	DRAGON	0

BEGIN	RESOURCES	NOW	TOTAL	AMMUNITION	N/SOFT	W/CASU	EXPENSE
4	M113 (APC)	1	24	LAW	6	18	0
			4000	50 CAL	1000	3000	0
			18	DRAGON	0	15	3
			9999	7.62 MG	0	29997	0
3	M113 (TOW)	0	30	TOW	0	28	0
			18	105 SOF TGT	0	18	0
			2000	50 CAL	0	3000	0
3	DRAGON TM	1	18	DRAGON	6	12	0

TEAM TOW STATUS
EXERCISE NWC 5-3-3, EX. TIME 1289.7

1701	M113(TOW)	LIVE	10 6 1000	TOW LAW 50 CAL	0 0 0
1702	M113(TOW)	LIVE	10 6 1000	TOW LAW 50 CAL	0 0 0
1703	M113(TOW)	LIVE	10 6 1000	TOW LAW 50 CAL	0 0 0
1704	M113(TOW)	LIVE	10 6 1000	TOW LAW 50 CAL	0 0 0
1711	M113(TOW)	LIVE	10 6 1000	TOW LAW 50 CAL	0 0 0
1712	M113(TOW)	LIVE	10 6 1000	TOW LAW 50 CAL	0 0 0

BEGIN 12	RESOURCES M113(TOW)	NOW 11	TOTAL	AMMUNITION	W/SURV	W/CASU	EXPENDED
1713	M113(TOW)	LIVE		10 6 1000	TOW LAW 50 CAL		0 0 0
1714	M113(TOW)	LIVE		10 6 1000	TOW LAW 50 CAL		0 0 0
1721	M113(TOW)	LIVE		6 6 1000	TOW LAW 50 CAL		4 0 0
1722	M113(TOW)	MOBK		6 6 1000	TOW LAW 50 CAL		4 0 0
1723	M113(TOW)	LIVE		6 6 1000	TOW LAW 50 CAL		4 0 0
1724	M113(TOW)	LIVE		6 6 1000	TOW LAW 50 CAL		4 0 0
1726	M113(C&C)	LIVE		6 1000	LAW 50 CAL		0 0
1	M113(C&C)	1	120 72 12000	TOW LAW 50 CAL	98 66 11000	6 6 1000	16 0 0
1	M113(C&C)	1	6 1000	LAW 50 CAL	6 1000	0 0	0 0

TEAM TRAINS STATUS
EXERCISE NWC 5-3-3, EX. TIME 1289.7

3301 ASP-1 LIVE
50 105 HEAT 0
200 105 APDS 0
60 TOW 0
60 DRAGON 0
120 LAW 0
9000 50 CAL 0

3302 ASP-2 LIVE
50 105 HEAT 0
200 105 APDS 0
60 TOW 0
60 DRAGON 0
120 LAW 0
9000 50 CAL 0

BEGIN	RESOURCES	NOW	TOTAL	AMMUNITION	W/SURV	W/CASU	EXPENDED
1	ASP-1	1	50	105 HEAT	50	0	0
			200	105 APDS	200	0	0
			60	TOW	60	0	0
			60	DRAGON	60	0	0
			120	LAW	120	0	0
			9000	50 CAL	9000	0	0
1	ASP-2	1	50	105 HEAT	50	0	0
			200	105 APDS	200	0	0
			60	TOW	60	0	0
			60	DRAGON	60	0	0
			120	LAW	120	0	0
			9000	50 CAL	9000	0	0

TEAM INFANTRY STATUS
EXERCISE NWC 5 3-3, EX. TIME 1289.7

1624	M113(ABD)	LIVE	5	DRAGON	0
			5	LAW	0
			1000	50 CAL	0
			9999	7.62 MG	0
1623	M113(ABD)	LIVE	5	DRAGON	0
			5	LAW	0
			1000	50 CAL	0
			9999	7.62 MG	0
1622	M113(ABD)	LIVE	5	DRAGON	0
			5	LAW	0
			1000	50 CAL	0
			9999	7.62 MG	0
1621	M113(ABD)	LIVE	5	DRAGON	0
			5	LAW	0
			1000	50 CAL	0
			9999	7.62 MG	0
1614	M113(ABD)	LIVE	5	DRAGON	0
			5	LAW	0
			1000	50 CAL	0
			9999	7.62 MG	0
1613	M113(ABD)	LIVE	5	DRAGON	0
			5	LAW	0
			1000	50 CAL	0
			9999	7.62 MG	0
1612	M113(ABD)	LIVE	5	DRAGON	0
			5	LAW	0
			1000	50 CAL	0
			9999	7.62 MG	0
1611	M113(ABD)	LIVE	5	DRAGON	0
			5	LAW	0
			1000	50 CAL	0
			9999	7.62 MG	0

**THIS PAGE IS BEST QUALITY PRACTICABLE
 FROM COPY FURNISHED TO DDC**

1604	M113(ARF)	LIVE	6	DRAGON	0
			6	LAW	0
			1000	50 CAL	0
			9999	7.62 MG	0
1605	M113(ARF)	LIVE	6	DRAGON	0
			6	LAW	0
			1000	50 CAL	0
			9999	7.62 MG	0
1607	M113(ARF)	LIVE	6	DRAGON	0
			6	LAW	0
			1000	50 CAL	0
			9999	7.62 MG	0
1601	M113(ARF)	LIVE	6	DRAGON	0
			6	LAW	0
			1000	50 CAL	0
			9999	7.62 MG	0
1626	M113(ARF)	LIVE	6	LAW	0
			1000	50 CAL	0
2901	DRAGON TM	LIVE	6	DRAGON	0
2902	DRAGON TM	LIVE	6	DRAGON	0
2903	DRAGON TM	LIVE	6	DRAGON	0
2904	DRAGON TM	LIVE	6	DRAGON	0
2905	DRAGON TM	LIVE	6	DRAGON	0
2906	DRAGON TM	LIVE	6	DRAGON	0
2907	DRAGON TM	LIVE	6	DRAGON	0

THIS PAGE IS BEST QUALITY PRACTICABLE
FROM COPY FURNISHED TO DDC

2908	DRAGON TM	LIVE	6	DRAGON	0
2909	DRAGON TM	LIVE	5	DRAGON	0
2910	DRAGON TM	LIVE	5	DRAGON	0
2911	DRAGON TM	LIVE	6	DRAGON	0
2912	DRAGON TM	LIVE	5	DRAGON	0
2801	LAW TM	LIVE	3	LAW	0
2802	LAW TM	LIVE	3	LAW	0
2803	LAW TM	LIVE	3	LAW	0
2804	LAW TM	LIVE	3	LAW	0
2805	LAW TM	LIVE	3	LAW	0
2806	LAW TM	LIVE	3	LAW	0
2807	LAW TM	LIVE	3	LAW	0
2808	LAW TM	LIVE	3	LAW	0
2809	LAW TM	LIVE	3	LAW	0
2810	LAW TM	LIVE	3	LAW	0
2811	LAW TM	LIVE	3	LAW	0
2812	LAW TM	LIVE	3	LAW	0
2831	LAW TM	LIVE	3	LAW	0
2832	LAW TM	LIVE	3	LAW	0
2833	LAW TM	LIVE	3	LAW	0

THIS PAGE IS BEST QUALITY PRACTICABLE
FROM COPY FURNISHED TO DDC

2834	LAW TM	LIVE	3	LAW	0
2835	LAW TM	LIVE	3	LAW	0
2836	LAW TM	LIVE	3	LAW	0
2837	LAW TM	LIVE	3	LAW	0
2838	LAW TM	LIVE	3	LAW	0
2839	LAW TM	LIVE	3	LAW	0
2840	LAW TM	LIVE	3	LAW	0
2841	LAW TM	LIVE	3	LAW	0
2842	LAW TM	LIVE	3	LAW	0
2731	M106(MTR)	LIVE	1000	50 CAL	0
2732	M106(MTR)	LIVE	1000	50 CAL	0
2733	M106(MTR)	LIVE	1000	50 CAL	0
2734	M113(C&C)	LIVE	1000	50 CAL	0

BEGIN	RESOURCES	NOW	TOTAL	AMMUNITION	W/SURV	W/CASU	EXPENDED
13	M113(APC)	13	72	DRAGON	72	0	0
			78	LAW	78	0	0
			13000	50 CAL	13000	0	0
			119988	7.62 MG	119988	0	0
1	M113(C&C)	1	1000	50 CAL	1000	0	0
4	M106(MTR)	4	4000	50 CAL	4000	0	0
24	LAW TM	24	72	LAW	72	0	0
12	DRAGON TM	12	72	DRAGON	72	0	0

THIS PAGE IS BEST QUALITY PRACTICABLE
FROM COPY FURNISHED TO DDC

EXERCISE NAME: NWC 5-3-3

SAGGER TM	(8864)	DIED AT TIME	42 OF F&MO KILL DUE TO	INDIRECT FIRE, BATTERY NO.	7, 155 MM	51
SAGGER TM	(8888)	DIED AT TIME	42 OF F&MO KILL DUE TO	INDIRECT FIRE, BATTERY NO.	17, 155 MM	51
SAGGER TM	(8858)	DIED AT TIME	42 OF F&MO KILL DUE TO	INDIRECT FIRE, BATTERY NO.	8, 155 MM	51
BMP	(6173)	DIED AT TIME	83 OF F&MO KILL DUE TO	INDIRECT FIRE, BATTERY NO.	7, 155 MM	HE
SAGGER TM	(8891)	DIED AT TIME	476 OF F&MO KILL DUE TO	INDIRECT FIRE, BATTERY NO.	7, 155 MM	HE
M113(TOW)	(1723)	DIED AT TIME	794 OF F&MO KILL DUE TO	T62 (5158), FIRING	115 HEAT	AT RANGE 350
M113(TOW)	(1501)	DIED AT TIME	797 OF MOBIL KILL DUE TO	T62 (5274), FIRING	115 HEAT	AT RANGE 350
M113(TOW)	(1732)	DIED AT TIME	797 OF MOBIL KILL DUE TO	T62 (5152), FIRING	115 HEAT	AT RANGE 350
T62	(5233)	DIED AT TIME	877 OF F&PW KILL DUE TO	M113(TOW), FIRING	TOW	AT RANGE 1600
T62	(5551)	DIED AT TIME	878 OF F&MO KILL DUE TO	M113(TOW), FIRING	TOW	AT RANGE 1600
T62	(5253)	DIED AT TIME	887 OF MOBIL KILL DUE TO	M113(TOW), FIRING	TOW	AT RANGE 1800
T62	(5504)	DIED AT TIME	889 OF F&MO KILL DUE TO	M113(TOW), FIRING	TOW	AT RANGE 1800
M113(TOW)	(1502)	DIED AT TIME	900 OF F&MO KILL DUE TO	T62 (5152), FIRING	115 HEAT	AT RANGE 350
DRAGON TM	(2932)	DIED AT TIME	900 OF F&MO KILL DUE TO	T62 (5152), FIRING	115 HEAT	AT RANGE 350
M113(TOW)	(1503)	DIED AT TIME	900 OF F&MO KILL DUE TO	T62 (5110), FIRING	115 HEAT	AT RANGE 350
DRAGON TM	(2933)	DIED AT TIME	900 OF F&MO KILL DUE TO	T62 (5110), FIRING	115 HEAT	AT RANGE 350
M113(TOW)	(1731)	DIED AT TIME	902 OF F&MO KILL DUE TO	T62 (5274), FIRING	115 HEAT	AT RANGE 400
M113(TOW)	(1143)	DIED AT TIME	930 OF F&PW KILL DUE TO	T62 (5274), FIRING	115 HEAT	AT RANGE 400
M113(TOW)	(5163)	DIED AT TIME	931 OF F&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1 (5163), FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE 350
T62	(5110)	DIED AT TIME	931 OF F&PW KILL DUE TO	M60A1 (5164), FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE 350
T62	(5274)	DIED AT TIME	932 OF F&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1 (1144), FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE 350
T62	(5152)	DIED AT TIME	945 OF F&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1 (1144), FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE 350
T62	(5168)	DIED AT TIME	946 OF F&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1 (1164), FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE 350
DRAGON TM	(9973)	DIED AT TIME	999 OF F&MO KILL DUE TO	INDIRECT FIRE, BATTERY NO.	11, 155 MM	51
BMP	(6164)	DIED AT TIME	999 OF F&MO KILL DUE TO	INDIRECT FIRE, BATTERY NO.	11, 155 MM	HE
BMP	(6165)	DIED AT TIME	1017 OF F&MO KILL DUE TO	INDIRECT FIRE, BATTERY NO.	12, 81 MM	HE
BMP	(9961)	DIED AT TIME	1017 OF F&MO KILL DUE TO	INDIRECT FIRE, BATTERY NO.	12, 81 MM	HE
BMP	(6116)	DIED AT TIME	1028 OF F&MO KILL DUE TO	M113(TOW), FIRING	TOW	AT RANGE 1550
BMP	(6116)	DIED AT TIME	1028 OF MOBIL KILL DUE TO	M113(TOW), FIRING	TOW	AT RANGE 1550
BMP	(6116)	DIED AT TIME	1028 OF MOBIL KILL DUE TO	M113(TOW), FIRING	TOW	AT RANGE 1550
BMP	(6161)	DIED AT TIME	1057 OF MOBIL KILL DUE TO	M113(TOW), FIRING	TOW	AT RANGE 1550
BMP	(6161)	DIED AT TIME	1057 OF F&MO KILL DUE TO	M113(TOW), FIRING	TOW	AT RANGE 1550
BMP	(6161)	DIED AT TIME	1058 OF F&MO KILL DUE TO	M113(TOW), FIRING	TOW	AT RANGE 1550
BMP	(1729)	DIED AT TIME	1067 OF MOBIL KILL DUE TO	SAGGER TM (8856), FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE 1750
BMP	(1159)	DIED AT TIME	1067 OF F&MO KILL DUE TO	EMP (5152), FIRING	EMP	AT RANGE 1750

THIS PAGE IS BEST QUALITY PRACTICABLE
FROM COPY FURNISHED TO DDC

M60A1	(1153)	DIED AT TIME 1201 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	BMP	(6117),	FIRING	73 HEAT	AT RANGE	225
M60A1	(1141)	DIED AT TIME 1201 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	RPG TM	(9965),	FIRING	RPG 7	AT RANGE	250
BMP	(6117)	DIED AT TIME 1205 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1161),	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	450
BMP	(6117)	DIED AT TIME 1207 OF MOBIL KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1165),	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	225
BMP	(6126)	DIED AT TIME 1209 OF MOBIL KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1155),	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	300
BMP	(6126)	DIED AT TIME 1209 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1153),	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	250
BMP	(6109)	DIED AT TIME 1210 OF MOBIL KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1151),	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	400
BMP	(6109)	DIED AT TIME 1214 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1164),	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	250
M60A1	(1197)	DIED AT TIME 1214 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	SAGGER TM	(8811),	FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE	1450
BMP	(6109)	DIED AT TIME 1215 OF MOBIL KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1141),	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	200
M60A1	(1112)	DIED AT TIME 1220 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	152	(1258),	FIRING	115 HVOF 50	AT RANGE	900
RPG TM	(9952)	DIED AT TIME 1227 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1164),	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	100
BMP	(6113)	DIED AT TIME 1227 OF MOBIL KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1134),	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	400
BMP	(9740)	DIED AT TIME 1228 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1153),	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	200
M60A1	(1149)	DIED AT TIME 1229 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	RPG TM	(9955),	FIRING	RPG 7	AT RANGE	100
BMP	(6117)	DIED AT TIME 1233 OF MOBIL KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1142),	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	200
M60A1	(1121)	DIED AT TIME 1234 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	SAGGER TM	(8870),	FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE	550
8&C ELEMENT	(3203)	DIED AT TIME 1234 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	SAGGER TM	(8870),	FIRING	SAGGER	AT RANGE	550
BMP	(6117)	DIED AT TIME 1234 OF MOBIL KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1145),	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	200
SAGGER TM	(8870)	DIED AT TIME 1239 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1103),	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	450
BMP	(6117)	DIED AT TIME 1240 OF MOBIL KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1153),	FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE	600
RPG TM	(9992)	DIED AT TIME 1248 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1152),	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	50
SAGGER TM	(8893)	DIED AT TIME 1249 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1145),	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	75
RPG TM	(9992)	DIED AT TIME 1267 OF FP&MO KILL DUE TO	M60A1	(1155),	FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE	100

THIS PAGE IS BEST QUALITY PRACTICABLE
FROM COPY FURNISHED TO DDC

EXERCISE NAME : NW 1, 2, 3

THIS PAGE IS BEST QUALITY PRACTICABLE
FROM COPY FURNISHED TO DDG

*** COKNER'S REPORT ***

EXERCISE NAME: NWC 5-3-3

RED FORCE

SAGGER TH	(8864)	DIED AT TIME	42 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	INDIRECT FIRE, BATTERY NO.	9, 155 MM	SI
SAGGER TH	(8888)	DIED AT TIME	42 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	INDIRECT FIRE, BATTERY NO.	12, 81 IN	SI
SAGGER TH	(8891)	DIED AT TIME	42 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	INDIRECT FIRE, BATTERY NO.	9, 155 MM	SI
BMP	(6173)	DIED AT TIME	83 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	INDIRECT FIRE, BATTERY NO.	7, 155 MM	HE
SAGGER TH	(8891)	DIED AT TIME	476 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	INDIRECT FIRE, BATTERY NO.	7, 155 MM	HE
T62	(5233)	DIED AT TIME	877 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	M113(TOW), FIRING	TOW	AT RANGE 1600
T62	(5551)	DIED AT TIME	878 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	M113(TOW), FIRING	TOW	AT RANGE 1600
T62	(5253)	DIED AT TIME	887 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	M113(TOW), FIRING	TOW	AT RANGE 1800
T62	(5504)	DIED AT TIME	888 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	M113(TOW), FIRING	TOW	AT RANGE 1800
T62	(5184)	DIED AT TIME	931 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	M50A1, FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE 350
T62	(5110)	DIED AT TIME	931 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	M50A1, FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE 350
T62	(5110)	DIED AT TIME	931 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	M50A1, FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE 350
T62	(5274)	DIED AT TIME	932 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	M50A1, FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE 350
T62	(5152)	DIED AT TIME	945 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	M50A1, FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE 350
T62	(5108)	DIED AT TIME	946 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	M50A1, FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE 350
RPG TH	(9978)	DIED AT TIME	999 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	INDIRECT FIRE, BATTERY NO.	11, 81 IN	HE
BMP	(6164)	DIED AT TIME	999 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	INDIRECT FIRE, BATTERY NO.	11, 81 IN	HE
BMP	(6165)	DIED AT TIME	1017 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	INDIRECT FIRE, BATTERY NO.	11, 81 IN	HE
RPG TH	(6116)	DIED AT TIME	1028 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	INDIRECT FIRE, BATTERY NO.	12, 81 IN	HE
BMP	(6116)	DIED AT TIME	1028 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	M113(TOW), FIRING	TOW	AT RANGE 1550
BMP	(6116)	DIED AT TIME	1028 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	M113(TOW), FIRING	TOW	AT RANGE 1550
BMP	(6161)	DIED AT TIME	1057 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	M113(TOW), FIRING	TOW	AT RANGE 1550
BMP	(6161)	DIED AT TIME	1057 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	M113(TOW), FIRING	TOW	AT RANGE 1550
BMP	(6161)	DIED AT TIME	1058 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	M113(TOW), FIRING	TOW	AT RANGE 1550
BMP	(6161)	DIED AT TIME	1058 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	M113(TOW), FIRING	TOW	AT RANGE 1550
BMP	(6117)	DIED AT TIME	1206 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	M50A1, FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE 450
BMP	(6117)	DIED AT TIME	1207 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	M50A1, FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE 450
BMP	(6126)	DIED AT TIME	1209 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	M50A1, FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE 300
BMP	(6126)	DIED AT TIME	1209 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	M50A1, FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE 300
BMP	(6109)	DIED AT TIME	1210 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	M50A1, FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE 400
BMP	(6109)	DIED AT TIME	1214 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	M50A1, FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE 400
BMP	(6109)	DIED AT TIME	1215 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	M50A1, FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE 200
BMP	(6113)	DIED AT TIME	1227 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	M50A1, FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE 200
BMP	(6113)	DIED AT TIME	1227 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	M50A1, FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE 400
RPG TH	(9980)	DIED AT TIME	1228 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	M50A1, FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE 200
BMP	(6117)	DIED AT TIME	1233 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	M50A1, FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE 200
BMP	(6117)	DIED AT TIME	1234 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	M50A1, FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE 200
SAGGER TH	(8870)	DIED AT TIME	1239 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	M50A1, FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE 450
BMP	(6117)	DIED AT TIME	1240 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	M50A1, FIRING	105 HEAT	AT RANGE 500
RPG TH	(8870)	DIED AT TIME	1248 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	M50A1, FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE 50
SAGGER TH	(8870)	DIED AT TIME	1249 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	M50A1, FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE 75
RPG TH	(9992)	DIED AT TIME	1267 OF	FP&MO KILL	DUE TO	M50A1, FIRING	50 CAL	AT RANGE 100

THIS PAGE IS BEST QUALITY PRACTICABLE
FROM COPY FURNISHED TO DDG

ANNEX I

INTERPRETATION

ANNEX I (INTERPRETATION)

A. Weather and Option II

1. Relative Direction of Wind

a. From the Rear (see APPENDIX 1)

(1) There should be little adverse effect on the establishment and subsequent maintenance of screening smoke on the flank(s) of the attacking force. The interior of the envelope should be relatively clear allowing good visibility and rapid movement.

(2) There will be a decided effect on the screen(s) established across the direction of attack. Impact points of smoke fires will have to be closer together since dispersal by the wind may not create overlaps of smoke and gaps might occur between concentrations. The dispersed smoke may thin out close to the objective area and parts of the attacking force may become visible to the defender at varying ranges. The attacker will have reduced control over the time and place that the massed force exits from the smoke. The shock effect (and firepower) of the attack force will be reduced.

(3) Under these conditions the attack force may choose to extend the smoke envelope on to the objective so that it will close with and engage the defender under conditions of reduced visibility. If so, the defender will be hampered and mutual supporting positions will likely be unable to reinforce those elements that receive the brunt of the attack.

b. From a Flank (see APPENDICES 2 and 3)

(1) As shown in APPENDIX 2, impact points for planned smoke concentrations probably will have to be closer together along the flank of the attacking force to avoid the creation of gaps in the screen. Smoke will spread to the interior of the envelope hampering visibility and perhaps the rate of movement. The force may have more difficulty in maintaining the proper orientation and its intended direction of attack. Ground units emplacing smoke pots or generators to maintain the flank screen may be exposed to enemy fires at the outer limits of the envelope. Smoke impact points must be planned further upwind to allow for movement of the screen with the wind.

(2) As shown in APPENDIX 3, wind will not affect visibility within the envelope and will aid in the concealment of elements charged with maintaining the flank screen with smoke pots or generators.

(3) There will be little adverse effect on the screens laid across the direction of attack. Times and places of exit from the envelope can be designated to maximize shock effect and firepower to the front.

c. From the Front (see APPENDIX 4)

(1) Comment a (1) above applies.

(2) Screens established across the direction of attack will be blown into the interior of the envelope hampering visibility and, perhaps, orientation as the attacking

force approaches the objective. The force should be able to predict when and where it will emerge from the screen and maximize its shock effect and firepower. Orientation and control within the screen can be aided if recognizable terrain features (roads, stream beds, etc) that cross the direction of attack are incorporated into the plan as control measures.

d. Combinations of a, b or c will have some of the effects of each and may hamper visibility, orientation and rate of movement. If the attacker has the choice he should select the avenue of approach along which the relative wind will least hamper the conduct of the operation.

2. Wind Speed

a. An increase in wind speed will affect the rate at which smoke munitions must be expended in order to establish and maintain screens that form the envelope. The total requirement for smoke munitions also will increase.

b. Taken in conjunction with direction, the limiting effects of the screens will be accelerated in time and extent as a function of increasing wind speed.

3. Other weather conditions that affect the employment of smoke screens apply as well. These include humidity, temperature, inversion effects, rain, snow, and fog to name a few. These are covered in existing field manuals and will not be reviewed in this report.

B. U.S. Leadership Lost

1. Data displayed below summarize the loss of U.S. leadership elements from platoon to battalion level during the conduct of each iteration.

Leadership Lost	<u>BN CDR</u>	<u>BN DEPUTY</u>	<u>CO CDRS</u>	<u>PLTN LDRS</u>	<u>PLTN SGTS</u>
Scenario #1					
Option I			2	12	12
Option II			3	6	7
Scenario #2					
Option I		1	5	12	13
Option II		1	3	14	7
Scenario #3					
Option I			3	8	7
Option II				2	2

2. Effects on Alternatives: The results of Scenario 1 and 2 are unchanged because the battalion using Option I tactics never achieved the basic measure of effectiveness. The rank order from Scenario 3 remains unchanged.

C. Direct Fire Ammunition Expenditures

Data concerning direct fire ammunition expenditures are displayed below organized by scenario and iteration. The reader is advised that these expenditures are in part a function of the near perfect fire distribution exercised during the play of the game. Furthermore, .50 caliber fires were not employed to recon by fire and are considered to be exceptionally low for an offensive operation. Finally, proportions of 105 HEAT/105 APDS expended are a function of the range at which engagements took place. HEAT was employed almost exclusively at ranges less than 1,000 meters.

Direct Fire						
	<u>105 HEAT</u>	<u>105 APDS</u>	<u>TOW</u>	<u>DRAGON</u>	<u>CAL 50</u>	<u>LAW</u>
Scenario #1						
Option I	68	42	28	6	0	0
Option II	46	34	38	37	1352	0
Scenario #2						
Option I	33	53	15	0	286	0
Option II	69	4	17	34	962	2
Scenario #3						
Option I	DATA NOT AVAILABLE					
Option II	39	0	18	3	195	0

D. Alternative Formations and Smoke Envelopes

1. Mass Formation. The purpose of the massed formation is to permit the assault force to focus overwhelming combat power to rupture the defense while minimizing the difficulties in constructing and manipulating the smoke envelope. Option II allowed the commander to vary the composition of the massed formation to counter possible enemy threats.

a. Tanks. Tanks were initially placed in the front of the massed formation in all scenarios. This provided maximum firepower to the front when the assault force broke through the smoke. Depending on the nature of the objective, tank companies might be employed abreast as shown in Illustration I (Main Body) or with companies on line as shown in APPENDIX 5 (MASSED FORMATION, EXAMPLE A) to this ANNEX.

b. Infantry were employed on the flank of the formation that presented the greatest threat from dismounted enemy. An example of the infantry moving along the flank exposed to a wooded area and a town is depicted in APPENDIX 6 (MASSED FORMATION, EXAMPLE B) to this ANNEX.

2. Smoke Envelopes. The smoke envelope is designed to screen the attacking force from enemy observation and fire. The smoke is oriented on the friendly force (whose location is known) rather than suspected or known enemy positions. Smoke curtains are anchored whenever possible on terrain, forests and towns that also limit enemy observation. Examples of smoke envelopes are depicted in APPENDICES 7 and 8 (SMOKE ENVELOPE, EXAMPLE A; SMOKE ENVELOPE, EXAMPLE B).

E. Implications for Employment of Indirect Fire Resources

1. Targets to be Serviced:

a. Option I:

(1) It is impossible to neutralize all Soviet systems before their location is known. Therefore, some are always able to fire and can only be engaged after their firing is detected.

(2) Accuracy and lethality of long range anti-armor systems, especially SAGGER and T-62, demand that they be neutralized quickly either with smoke or HE.

(3) More targets of opportunity must be attacked and either suppressed or destroyed when compared to Option II.

b. Option II:

(1) Choice of axes of advance for the attacking force determines the location of targets for screening smoke. Locations can be planned in advance of the operation.

(2) Fewer defending systems can engage at longer ranges which reduces the number of targets of opportunity demanding immediate suppression, neutralization, or destruction with smoke or HE munitions.

2. Amount and Composition of Indirect Fire Support Assets

Additional assets could be employed effectively by both options.

a. A rapid firing system that can deliver high volumes of smoke munitions accurately and responsively would aid in establishing and maintaining screening smoke whether the screens are oriented on suspected and known enemy locations (Option I) or the friendly force (Option II). The 115mm multiple rocket system or additional 4.2 inch mortars may provide a short term solution to this requirement.

b. A multiple rocket launcher system with the effectiveness of the Soviet BM 21 (as indicated by hit/kill probability data provided by AMSA) should be added to U.S. inventory.

(1) On those occasions when the Soviet 122 MRL delivered accurate fire the effect on U.S. armored vehicles was devastating. This was particularly true in the case of Scenario 2, Option II, Time: 733 seconds.

(2) A multiple rocket launcher system which will accurately and quickly deliver a high volume of anti-armor munitions will help to crack a Soviet defensive strongpoint.

Obviously it would also aid in breaking up Soviet formations massed to conduct a breakthrough attack.

(3) The General Support Rocket System (GSRS) may be programmed to fill this requirement. If not, steps should be taken to incorporate the weapon/munition characteristics noted above into some other system that will be available in the near term.

3. Organization for Combat

a. Option I: The greater number of targets of opportunity that must be engaged rapidly requires additional fire support units to reinforce the Direct Support battalion in order to reduce response times.

b. Option II: The established organization for combat is satisfactory; however, additional 4.2 inch mortars might be required. One solution would be to attach mortars from the exploiting force to the attacking force for the conduct of operations and use mortar fire units primarily to establish and/or maintain screening smoke.

4. Reconnaissance and Prior Planning:

a. Option I:

(1) Use of multiple avenues of approach may increase the number of pre-planned targets required to support the operation.

(2) Choosing avenues which conceal the attacking force from enemy's view allows fire support personnel to focus

more of their efforts on reconnaissance for targets in the objective area.

b. Option II:

(1) Thorough reconnaissance of the avenue of approach, to include consideration of wind and weather conditions, is critical to concealment of attacking force.

(2) Target locations for screening smoke must be determined in advance and the desired attitude must allow for the location of the enemy, attacking force, wind conditions and terrain.

(3) Objective of the reconnaissance might also include landmarks (which will be visible within smoke) that can serve as control measures to maintain direction, orientation, and/or coordinate indirect fire support.

(4) The reconnaissance effort of the objective area might be reduced when compared to Option I.

(5) More time for reconnaissance may be required than in Option I.

5. Fire Support Coordination

a. Option I:

(1) Use of multiple avenues of approach, a sizeable overwatch force, and a relatively large number of targets of opportunity to be serviced will require multiple fire support coordination measures.

(2) The problem is complex but susceptible to solution by standard techniques and procedures.

b. Option II

(1) Coordination of supporting fires to establish and maintain screening smoke is critical to the success of the operation.

(2) Desired location and attitude of smoke concentrations will require special piece corrections. More time is required for preparation of target and firing data.

(3) Timing of smoke fires is critical. Landmarks within the smoke envelope should be used to trigger calls for subsequent planned fires. Changes to planned rate of movement may call for alteration to planned schedule of fires.

(4) An observer located outside the envelope should assist in the coordination of planned fires.

(5) Special measures to locate friendly elements within the smoke (especially scouts or lead and flank elements) may be required.

(6) If Soviet elements are discovered within the smoke envelope of the attacking force then special control measures will have to be implemented to coordinate delivery of indirect and direct fires. The nature of the massed formation, location of friendly elements, and possibility of limited visibility at the time and place of the engagement will place a premium on speedy decisions about fire support coordination. SOPs can be developed to handle these cases.

(7) The fire support coordination problem is more complex than that of Option I; however, it is similar to that of a night attack. More planning, attention to detail, and time are required than in Option I.

6. Communications

a. Option I:

(1) Most of the fire support planning and coordination should be accomplished by secure voice, wire, or messenger.

(2) Likelihood that more targets of opportunity must be serviced than in Option II places high reliance on effective radio communications between elements of attacking force and fire support units.

(3) Increased traffic between fire support units and attacking elements increases their vulnerability to EW efforts and attack of emitters by Soviet indirect fire systems.

b. Option II:

(1) Most of the fire support planning and coordination for the attack can be accomplished prior to the operation by secure voice, wire, or messenger.

(2) Relatively fewer number of targets of opportunity to be serviced should reduce the amount of radio traffic during the approach march and conduct of the attack prior to the assault.

(3) Any changes to anticipated conditions (e.g., wind velocity or direction; direction, location or movement

speed of the attacking force, unanticipated enemy dispositions, impact points or attitude of smoke munitions, etc) will call for immediate alteration of planned fires and increased radio communications between the attacking force and fire support elements.

(4) Coordination of the screening smoke by an observer located outside of the smoke envelope may reduce the amount of radio traffic. Similarly, the use of signal flares to coordinate planned fires could be incorporated.

(5) If actual conditions meet those of the plan then reduced reliance on radio communications could occur when compared to Option I; however, any changes to plan probably will require as much, and perhaps more radio traffic than Option I.

7. Vulnerability to Massed Soviet Indirect Fires

a. Option I

(1) Use of multiple avenues of approach, covered and concealed routes, and dispersal of forces increases the number of smaller troop concentrations presented by the attacking force. The force as a whole is less vulnerable to massed fires.

(2) Inability to obscure visibility of all defending elements makes it more likely that some elements of attacking force will be observed and effective fires will be directed against them.

(3) Dispersal of units on the battlefield will limit the vulnerability of the attacking force to massed fires, either conventional or nuclear.

b. Option II

(1) If screening smoke is correctly established and maintained, the defender will have difficulty locating the attacking force and engaging at the right time and place.

(2) If located by the enemy, and direction and rate of movement is disclosed, then the attacking force is vulnerable to the effects of on-call massed fires. Soviet MRL (BM21) is the most dangerous indirect fire weapon on the battlefield. The mass formation presents numerous targets within a confined area. If struck by massed fires, some loss of command and control may result in addition to destruction of armored vehicles.

(3) Soviet use of artillery-delivered anti-tank mines that could be scattered across the route of march might have a major impact on control of the formation, especially if attacker encountered mines while in smoke.


8. Soviet Employment of Indirect Fire Assets

a. Although the data is not displayed in this report the Soviet commander employed his artillery as soon as possible to direct accurate, effective massed fire against the U.S. force because, (a) it was moving and BATTLE does not have a simple routine for placing fires on call, or (b) he could not see (hence, locate) the U.S. force.


b. The defending forces usually processed about 2/3 the number of fire missions as the U.S. force if the U.S. preparation is ignored.

Appendix 1 (Relative Wind From
the Rear) to ANNEX I
(INTERPRETATION)

OBJECTIVE AREA





Appendix 2 (Relative Wind
From the Flank) to ANNEX I
(INTERPRETATION)




Appendix 3 (Relative Wind to
Flank) to ANNEX I
(INTERPRETATION)


OBJECTIVE AREA



Appendix 4 (Relative Wind From the Front)
to ANNEX I (INTERPRETATION)




Appendix 5 (Massed Formation, Example A) TO
ANNEX I (INTERPRETATION)




TANK
 TANK CO CDR
 BN CDR
 INF APC
 INF CO CDR
 TOW
 VTR

Appendix 6 (Massed Formation, Example B) TO
ANNEX I (INTERPRETATION)



Appendix 7 (Smoke Envelope, Example A) TO
ANNEX I (INTERPRETATION)



Appendix 8 (Smoke Envelope, Example B) TO
ANNEX I (INTERPRETATION)

